Donors look divided over approaches to the Sahel

Significance The conference raised approximately USD1bn for 2020, and USD725mn for 2021. This met the organisers’ target for the conference itself, but fell short of the USD2.4bn the UN says is needed until end-2021. Furthermore, the conference hinted at scepticism over France’s largely counterterrorism-centred approach to the Sahel. Impacts The pledges theoretically widen the space for Sahelian states to address violence and its causes. State security force abuses are a significant cause of conflict, which donors evaded at the conference. The large US pledge signals that, despite talk of military disengagement from West Africa, Washington remains invested in the Sahel.


Significance These have long been matters of serious concern. President Cyril Ramaphosa on August 5 responded with a cabinet reshuffle that replaced the minister of defence, closed down the ministry of state security and moved intelligence agencies into the presidency. Impacts Planned cuts to security force budgets will be politically unsustainable. Ramaphosa’s decision to retain Minister of Police Bheki Cele in post casts doubt on the prospects of much-needed police reform. Incorporating intelligence functions into the presidency may speed reforms but also poses long-term dangers of more abuses.



Significance The United States has sent 3,000 'train and assist' troops to the country, and passed a 1.6 billion dollar assistance package in December 2014 to provide funding for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Kurdish peshmerga and a Tribal Security Force (TSF) of Sunni Arabs in Anbar Province. Impacts The Mosul offensive will also depend on Baghdad reaching political accommodation with Sunni Arabs. The rise of Iran-backed Shia militias will challenge the ISF's monopoly over state security. Their deployment also raises the risk of sectarian atrocities during reconquest of Sunni areas. ISG is likely to retain a strong presence in western Iraq so long as it has safe havens in eastern Syria.



2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 106-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Lorenzo Johnson ◽  
Ches Thurber

The ethnic composition of state security forces is believed to have important effects on the dynamics of conflict processes, but data limitations have impeded our ability to test such hypotheses cross-nationally until now. To address this problem, the Security Force Ethnicity dataset provides time-series, group-level measures of the ethnic composition of military forces in the Middle East between 1946 and 2013. We draw on an extensive review of case studies and histories to produce unique ordinal codings for participation rates in the officer corps and in the rank and file. We demonstrate the utility of the data through empirical applications, examining the relationship between military ethnic composition and the incidence of coups and repression. Our findings illustrate the theoretical and empirical importance of disaggregating ethnic representation in the military from inclusion in other institutions of the state.



2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Buno (Okenyebuno) Emmanuel Nduka ◽  
Giwa Sechap

Purpose Designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) are important actors both in the formal and informal sectors owing to the nature of services they offer. The DNFBPs are key players in financial and economic development and thus are highly vulnerable to money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) risks. Globally, and indeed, within the West African region, typologies studies have indicated several instances of misuse of DNFBPs for the laundering of proceeds of crime and to a lesser extent, TF. Factors that make DNFBPs vulnerable to ML and TF in the region, include limited understanding of ML/TF risk and anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) obligations, and poor implementation of AML/CFT measures by the sector. As reporting institutions, DNFBPs are required to implement appropriate measures to mitigate the ML/TF risk facing them. Mutual evaluation reports (MERs) of countries in the region noted weak implementation of AML/CFT measures by DNFBPs compares to financial institutions. These coupled with the general poor monitoring and supervision of DNFBPs for compliance, make them a weak link in member states’ AML/CFT regime. This study examined how Economic Community of West African States member states can plug the loopholes in the DNFBPs to strengthen their AML/CFT regime and thus improve their performance during mutual evaluation. This study reviewed data from the publications of Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and other credible sources. Design/methodology/approach This study is more of desk-review based on secondary data, including information obtained from GIABA, and FATF publications, and websites as well as information obtained from reliable sources on the internet. The authors reviewed the MERs of GIABA member states that have been assessed under the second round, especially that of Ghana, Senegal, Cape Verde, Mali and Burkina Faso, with particular focus on sections of the reports relating to preventive measures and supervision. In general, this paper adopts a policy approach with a view to explaining the importance and benefits of implementing AML/CFT preventive measures by reporting entities, especially the DNFBPs. Findings This study found that there is a general lack of information on the exact size of DNFBPs across member states, the risk of ML/TF associated with DNFBPs is generally identified as high across member states (albeit at different levels), the extent and level of monitoring/supervision of DNFBPs for AML/CFT compliance trails what is obtainable in financial institutions; the institutional and operational frameworks for regulating, supervising and monitoring DNFBPs are either weak or poorly defined in many member states; and the focus of AML/CFT technical assistance has been more on financial institutions than DNFBPs. Although the number of MERs reviewed for this work may be few, the findings and conclusions in the concluded MERs reflect regional peculiarities, including high informality of the economies, preponderance use of cash in transactions, diversity of DNFBPs and the general weak application of AML/CFT preventive measures by these entities, and the weak AML/CFT supervision or monitoring of DNFBPs which cut across all GIABA member states. Although efforts to address the weaknesses in the DNFBPs, including training and supervision, have commenced, in most member states, these are still at rudimentary levels. Research limitations/implications However, this study is limited by the fact that it was desk-based review without direct inputs of industry players (DNFBPs and their supervisors). Practical implications In general, this paper adopts a policy approach with a view to explaining the importance and benefits of implementing AML/CFT preventive measures by reporting entities, especially the DNFBPs. It aims to bring to the fore the weaknesses of the DNFBPs in the implementation of AML/CFT preventive measures and therefore will be useful to national authorities who are striving toward strengthening their national AML/CT regimes and to DNFBPs who wish to protect the integrity and stability of their system. Originality/value It is imperative to mention that the weak compliance by DNFBPs, and indeed other challenges inhibiting effective implementation of preventive measures, is not peculiar to West Africa. A review of MERs of 17 African countries (eight countries in the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti Money Laundering Group region, five in GIABA region and three in the Middle East and North Africa region assessed under the current round as on October 2020, show a similar pattern of weak ratings under Immediate Outcome 4.



Headline WEST AFRICA: Worsening piracy will prompt action



Significance While the overall number of incidents is fewer than a dozen since the rise of the region's jihadist insurgencies in the early 2010s, the trend lends credence to growing warnings about the jihadist threat to coastal West African countries. Concern has focused on Ivory Coast and Benin, but there is also nervousness about Ghana, Togo and even Senegal. Impacts Western governments will boost security assistance to coastal states. Intelligence sharing and joint operations will not forestall cross-border hit-and-run attacks. Most regional states will resort to security-focused responses whose abuses drive jihadist recruitment.



Keyword(s):  

Headline WEST AFRICA: ECOWAS will delay harsher moves on Guinea



Subject Regional power outlook for West Africa. Significance The West African Power Pool (WAPP), institutionalised in 2001, aimed to create a regional power market large enough to attract private investment. Among its 14 member states, WAPP boasts considerable energy resources. Progress has been slow, with chronic power shortages reflecting decades of under-investment in national sectors. Impacts With the exception of hydroelectricity, renewable energy will likely augment not replace traditional power, eg, coal and gas-based. However, 'off grid' renewable electricity generation and transmission systems may be increasingly used for powering remote locations. Facilities such the Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa will need to fund many renewables projects initially for them to be viable.



Significance Protests over state brutality, corruption and rising inequality have become more frequent in recent years and increased in intensity since the oil price has dropped. Impacts Efforts to clamp down on unpopular illegal immigration will have limited success due to Angola's porous borders. Military embarrassments in West Africa will dent appetite for foreign military involvement, releasing capacity for domestic security. Activities in Cabinda could exacerbate tensions with neighbours, where military forces cross the border in pursuit of Congolese miners. Western reports on human rights abuses will have little effect on the regime, which prioritises ties with Russia, China and Brazil.



Subject West Africa ports development. Significance Economic growth and rising trade volumes with Asian countries are straining West Africa's commercial port capacities. Various port infrastructure projects are underway as states compete to become shipping gateways for the region. Ever larger container ships are also forcing states to offer deeper water berth ports. Ivory Coast, Ghana and Nigeria are leading the race. Impacts Low oil prices should not affect port expansion as the costs are borne by competing private sector operators. The question of whether the operator-driven port model delivers equivalent benefits to individual economies will grow as profits rise. European private sector port operators continue to dominate, but competition from Asian companies such as DP World is growing.



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