US-China competition will create Middle East dilemmas

Significance The Middle East has long been polarised between US allies and enemies, while Beijing has historically retained a comparatively smaller footprint and rejected taking sides in regional political and security disputes. However, its economic interests are increasing. Impacts The United States will maintain a comparative advantage from its long history of political, military and economic cooperation in the region. Beijing could leverage its control over large industrial conglomerates in key sectors such as energy, infrastructure and biotechnology. The Belt and Road Initiative will be an attractive project for all Middle Eastern countries, maximising their geographical advantages.

Significance Senior US officials see Communist-led China as the foremost threat to the United States. The Trump administration’s campaign against it spans the spectrum of government actions: criticism; tariffs; sanctions; regulatory crackdowns; military intimidation; support for Taiwan; and restrictions on imports, exports, investment and visas. Impacts Beijing will have little success in driving a wedge between Washington and its major Western allies. The West is unlikely to produce a convincing alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Negative public views of China incentivise China-bashing by politicians, which in turn feeds negative public opinion in a downward spiral. Beijing will persist in its efforts to encourage a more positive view of China among Western publics.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (04) ◽  
pp. 37-45
Author(s):  
Zhiqun ZHU

China needs assistance as it restructures and upgrades its economy. Israel fits the bill as a global powerhouse in technologies and innovation. Besides, China considers Israel a potential node in the Belt and Road Initiative. The United States is concerned about China’s growing investments in key Israeli infrastructure and expanding influence in the Middle East. Israel, like other third parties, is caught between the United States and China as US–China rivalry intensifies.


Author(s):  
Daniel S. Markey

This chapter introduces China’s new global initiatives like the vaunted “Belt and Road” and previews how the political and economic interests of other states in South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East tend to set the conditions for Chinese activities and shape regional outcomes. It leads with the history of China’s involvement in Pakistan’s Gwadar port. It then identifies ways in which Eurasia’s powerful and privileged groups often expect to profit from their connections to China, while others fear commercial and political losses. Similarly, it foreshadows how statesmen across Eurasia are scrambling to harness China’s energy purchases, arms sales, and infrastructure investments to outdo strategic competitors, like India and Saudi Arabia, while negotiating relations with Russia and the United States. This chapter introduces the book’s subsequent chapters on China’s Eurasian aspirations, South Asia and China, Central Asia and China, the Middle East and China, and the American policy response.


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 199-214
Author(s):  
Yoram Evron

In recent years, the ties between Asian powers and Middle Eastern countries have grown significantly, and the consequence of this development is a gradual spin-off of intra-Asian political process to the Middle East. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) provides an intriguing illustration of such a possible spin-off. Japan’s response to BRI is mostly negative but less clear is the possible implications of the China–Japan confrontation over BRI for their interaction with the Middle East. Japan’s responses to the BRI and China’s perceptions thereof can expand the set of factors that shape the two Asian powers’ involvement in that region.


2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Enderwick

Purpose The continuation of China’s belt and road initiative (BRI) is assumed in most analyses. Yet, recent events have created significant reputational damage for China and Chinese businesses. With a trade war evolving into a hegemonic struggle, there are a number of potential developments that could derail the BRI. This paper aims to provide a contemporary review of the factors that could negatively impact its continuation, and what China has done to mitigate the risks. Design/methodology/approach A descriptive paper that groups possible disruptive factors into three groups: internal weaknesses of the BRI and its design; those related to China’s implementation of the BRI and external concerns and pressures. Findings China has actively reviewed and refined the BRI to reduce its perceived weaknesses and increase its attractiveness to potential participants, focussing on debt dependency, transparency and governance. However, this has occurred at the same time as growing concerns regarding China’s international assertiveness, the hegemonic challenge and recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. Research limitations/implications These changes are occurring within an extremely dynamic environment and any analysis at one point in time is subject to considerable limitations. However, the paper brings together a range of disparate perspectives in a structured manner. Originality/value The classification of possible threats to the BRI is original and provides insights into the relative significance of the diverse challenges that China faces. The paper concludes that while China’s operational focus on the mechanics of the BRI process is necessary, it may not be sufficient to ensure its continuing development. The paper identifies the next step which is conceptualisation of these ideas and of the BRI. Some guidance as to how this might be done is provided.


Author(s):  
Jie Gao

Chapter 9 explores the roles of Sino–foreign education partnerships (SFEP) within China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), in particular, how it has been shifted from a strategic tool to reform and upgrade China’s domestic higher education sector, to becoming a diplomatic instrument for building connections between China and the regions and countries along the BRI routes. The history of the development of SFEP reveals how policy and regulation have evolved. The shifting paradigm of the Chinese government, through its MOE (Ministry of Education), in regulating SFEP provides a window into the grand transformation of China’s narrative towards its position in the global education hierarchy. China is shifting from the follower/importer of “advanced foreign educational programs,” to a proactive player that builds a platform and framework for educational collaboration in the world. Now, China is becoming an initiator/exporter of its own educational programs and culture along the belt and road.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-121
Author(s):  
Tom Harper

Abstract The Belt and Road Initiative alongside the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation are the latest phase of China’s return to the Eurasian landmass after the collapse of the Soviet Union. China has reshaped Eurasia in several ways, which includes the common definition of this concept, which had largely been perceived as a chiefly Russian entity. This is rooted in Halford Mackinder’s The Geographical Pivot of History, which depicted the Eurasian landmass as a threat to Britain’s maritime hegemony with the advent of rail. While the traditional focus had been on Eurasia as the Russian empire, Mackinder also alluded to a Eurasian empire created by ‘Chinese organised by Japanese’ as a result of the latter’s development during the Meiji Restoration. While this did not come to pass, it has become an imperative to consider the notion of an Asian power in Eurasia due to China’s rise. The purpose of this paper is to argue that China is as much a Eurasian power in the vein of Mackinder’s theories as Russia is, with the BRI providing a potential opportunity to further integrate with Eurasia. In addition, the initiative is also symbolic of China’s bid to create an alternative order both in Eurasia and the wider world as part of its global role to challenge the dominance of the United States, which raises the spectre of Mackinder’s warning over a challenger emerging from the Eurasian Heartland.


2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 82-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Garlick ◽  
Radka Havlová

Drawing on the literature on strategic hedging and adapting it to China’s use of economic diplomacy in the service of comprehensive national security goals within the regionalised foreign policy approach of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), we examine China’s approach to securing and expanding its interests in the Persian Gulf. To implement the trade and infrastructure connectivity goals of the BRI and to secure the continued flow of diversified energy supplies, China needs to boost relations with both regional powerhouses, Iran and Saudi Arabia, without alienating either of them or the regional hegemon, the United States. The resulting strategy of strategic hedging is based in the Chinese approach to economic diplomacy, which utilises Chinese commercial actors in the service of national strategic objectives. Relations require careful and ongoing management if China is to achieve outcomes which benefit all sides while avoiding becoming entangled in the region’s intractable geopolitical problems.


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