Divisible-good uniform price auctions: The role of allocation rules and communication among bidders

AbstractThis paper focuses on the phonetic, morphological and semantic principles determining the grammatical gender of nouns in German. Based on the experiments we established the main trends in determining the gender of the German equivalents and interlingual homonyms and the role of the interlingual and intralingual interference in this process. The results of two experiments show that Ukrainian students take into consideration suffixes of German nouns when choosing the correct gender. Phonetic or semantic gender allocation rules play a subordinate role. The interlingual interference determinates the gender choice in the target language: the gender of the mother tongue lemma interferes the selection of the gender in the foreign language equivalent. This effect appears more frequently in interlingual homonyms than in translation equivalents. A plausible interpretation of these results could be: the lemmas of two similar nouns or translation equivalents share the same concepts, the relationship between them is rather close, and the competition between the two lemmas and their genus nodes is strong and influences language production. This conclusion supports the hypothesis that both languages, the mother tongue and the foreign one, can be activated during language producing.

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Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions

Theoretical Economics ◽

10.3982/te3675 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 16 (3) ◽

pp. 1095-1137

Author(s):

Carolina Manzano ◽

Xavier Vives

Keyword(s):

Market Integration ◽

Comparative Statics ◽

Price Impact ◽

Linear Quadratic ◽

Uniform Price Auction ◽

Strategic Complementarity ◽

Good Uniform ◽

Price Auction ◽

Divisible Good Auctions

We analyze a divisible good uniform‐price auction that features two groups, each with a finite number of identical bidders, who compete in demand schedules. In the linear‐quadratic‐normal framework, this paper presents conditions under which the unique equilibrium in linear demands exists and derives novel comparative statics results that highlight the interaction between payoff and information parameters with asymmetric groups. We find that the strategic complementarity in the slopes of traders' demands is reinforced by inference effects from prices, and we display the role of payoff and information asymmetries in explaining deadweight losses. Furthermore, price impact and the deadweight loss need not move together, and market integration may reduce welfare. The results are consistent with the available empirical evidence.

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The Development of Distributive Justice: Does Type of Schooling really matter?

International Journal of Indian Psychology ◽

10.25215/0103.015 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 1 (3) ◽

Author(s):

Dr. Rita Karmakar ◽

Prof. Anjali Ghosh

Keyword(s):

Distributive Justice ◽

West Bengal ◽

Allocation Of Resources ◽

Allocation Rules ◽

Normative Principle ◽

Reward Allocation

Distributive justice is the normative principle designed to guide the allocation of resources among the members of a community. Distributive justice in the context of reward allocation mainly deals with various determinants of preference for specific justice (allocation) rules, such as equity (merit), equality, need and seniority (Deutsch, 1985; Homans, 1961; Leventhal, 1980). The present study has been undertaken to determine the role of age, gender and type of schooling on the development of distributive justice of children. Participants of the study were 200 children (100 from missionary and 100 from non-missionary schools) belonging to Kolkata district, West Bengal. The results indicated the role of type of schooling and age on the development of distributive justice of adolescents. Pre adolescents generally prefer equality as justice criteria whereas adolescents generally prefer merit as their justice criteria. Effect of type of schooling is prominent among pre-adolescents.

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