Integrated Safety Management (ISM) & risk management a complimentary pairing

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew M. Olsen ◽  
Jennifer L. Martin ◽  
Kevin Holm
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Safety Management

Risk management in the healthcare safety management system

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-53
Author(s):  
Yuriy Voskanyan ◽  
Irina Shikina ◽  
Fedor Kidalov ◽  
David Davidov ◽  
Tatiana Abrosimova
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Management System ◽  
Safety Management ◽  
Medical Organization ◽  
Safety Management System ◽  
Risk Management Process ◽  
Iso 31000 ◽  
Main Components ◽  
Processing Subsystem ◽  
To Receive

The paper discusses the main components of the modern system of risk management in medicine. Using the ISO 31000 standard of risk management and the ARIS integrated modeling environment, the authors have built a model of the risk management process in a medical organization, including the accounting subsystem, the risk analysis subsystem, and the risk processing subsystem. The concept of risk management proposed in the article is formulated on the basis of a system safety model, which assumes that adverse events related to the provision of medical care are based on systemic causes that under certain conditions turn into a hazard, and the latter is used to receive active threats and incidents. The risk management system is an executive block of the safety management system in a medical organization, which includes (in addition to risk management) an ideological block (a new safety culture) and an educational block (an organizational learning subsystem).

Enhancing Safety Risk Management with Quantitative Measures

2017 ◽  
Vol 2603 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boris Claros ◽  
Carlos Sun ◽  
Praveen Edara
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Management System ◽  
Goodness Of Fit ◽  
Safety Management ◽  
Multinomial Distribution ◽  
Safety Management System ◽  
Safety Risk ◽  
Safety Risks ◽  
Safety Models ◽  
Runway Incursion

At the airfield in hub airports, many activities occur that involve a range of participants, including various-size aircraft, ground vehicles, and workers. The safety management system is FAA's approach for systematically managing aviation safety. A major component of the safety management system is safety risk management (SRM), which entails analysis, assessment, and control of safety risks, including risks on the airfield. Current SRM has few specific safety models to estimate the likelihood or frequency of risks. This paper presents an example for development and incorporation of safety models into SRM. Specifically, it discusses safety models for runway incursion that use the following variables: total and general aviation operations, length of runway by type, number of taxiway intersections, snowfall, precipitation, number of hot spots, and construction activity. Categorization and processing of data were significant because each variable used could take on multiple forms, and some types of data involved review of airfield diagrams. The data used were from 137 U.S. hub airports for 2009 through 2014. For modeling, the negative multinomial distribution was used because it proved suitable for representing overdispersed data such as runway incursion frequency. Performance of the models was assessed through the goodness-of-fit measures of log likelihood, overdispersion, and cumulative residual plots. Models were developed for five severity categories of runway incursions and three types of surface events. The safety modeling approach presented here can serve as a foundation for development of other safety models that can be integrated into SRM to enable quantitative analysis of safety risks.

Strategy Targets Risk Management for CO2 Waterless Fracturing

2021 ◽  
Vol 73 (11) ◽  
pp. 62-63
Author(s):  
Chris Carpenter
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
High Pressures ◽  
Safety Management ◽  
Co2 Storage ◽  
Management Approach ◽  
Offshore Technology ◽  
Liquid Co2 ◽  
Process Work ◽  
Pump Testing ◽  
Waterless Fracturing

This article, written by JPT Technology Editor Chris Carpenter, contains highlights of paper OTC 30437, “Risk Management and Control for CO2 Waterless Fracturing,” by Siwei Meng, Qinghai Yang, SPE, and Yongwei Duan, PetroChina, et al., prepared for the 2020 Offshore Technology Conference Asia, originally scheduled to be held in Kuala Lumpur, 2–6 November. The paper has not been peer reviewed. Copyright 2020 Offshore Technology Conference. Reproduced by permission. Given shortages and uneven distribution of water resources in China, efforts must be made to develop waterless fracturing techniques. The fluid experiences high pressures and low temperatures during carbon dioxide (CO2) waterless fracturing operations, which can lead to accidents and environmental pollution. In the complete paper, a safety-management approach and a contingency plan for such operations are developed. At the time of writing, this CO2 waterless fracturing methodology has been completed successfully more than 20 times. Surface Process Work Flow of CO2 Waterless Fracturing The basic process of a CO2 waterless fracturing operation is shown in Fig. 1. First, several CO2 storage tanks are connected in parallel. The booster, sealed blender, fracturing pump (all mounted on trunks), and wellhead equipment are connected. The measuring trunk communicates with each vehicle to monitor operation status. Proppant is put into the sealed blender, into which liquid CO2 is injected for pre-cooling. Pump testing is conducted on the high-pressure line and the wellhead and the low-pressure liquid supply line is pressure-tested. Operation does not proceed until pressure-testing results are positive. Afterward, liquid CO2 is injected into formations to fracture them and, moreover, extend created fractures. The sealed blender is enabled to inject prop-pants, and displacement begins after the end of proppant injection. Finally, a series of tasks, including well shut-in for soaking and flowback, is carried out successively.

Risk and Security of Information Systems in the Portuguese Financial Sector

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 18-38
Author(s):  
Pedro Fernandes da Anunciação ◽  
Alexandre Miguel Barão Rodrigues
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Information Systems ◽  
Safety Management ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Safety Standards ◽  
Degree Of Protection ◽  
Financial Activity ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
Risk Management Process ◽  
Definition Of

This work follows the need of safety standards, update ISO27002:2013, in the major central banks of several European countries. This need has been studied by establishing a focus group that integrated European experts from major central banks. The analysis carried out was supported in the current methodology of information risk management, used by central banks in the safety management of information systems. This methodology is used to analyze and evaluate the adequacy of practices to risk management in the financial activity. The main objective was to present a proposal, sufficiently comprehensive and consistent, to a new risk management process of Information Systems within the European System of Central Banks. And a definition of a practical guide to risk management throughout the different stages of the Information Systems Life Cycle. The proposed model provides a higher degree of protection systems, technologies and information, especially in Central Banks, taking as reference the Portuguese Central Bank.

Post Macondo Safety and Regulatory Issues: Human Factors From an Organizational Development and Senior Management Perspective

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Grossweiler ◽  
David Costello ◽  
Kevin Graham
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Human Factors ◽  
Organizational Development ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Safety Management ◽  
National Research Council ◽  
Management Systems ◽  
Safety Management Systems ◽  
Cost Center

Regulations governing the safety of drilling and offshore production operations have changed since the Macondo spill. This paper suggests management level perspectives on the nexus of human factors and safety management systems including an overview of ideas from: Congressional Testimony; the Bipartisan Policy Center inputs to the Presidents Commission on the Spill; the National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council Deepwater Horizon Report, and workshops and initiatives by RPSEA (Research Partnership to Secure Energy for America), SPE, and ASME. The value of benchmarks from risk management practices from the aviation, nuclear power, and financial community are also discussed. The paper will also consider questions as to what management might consider reducing risk and treating risk management as not just a cost center, but as a way to integrate safety management systems into improving corporate performance for all stakeholders. Paper published with permission.

scholarly journals A Parsonian Approach to Patient Safety: Transformational Leadership and Social Capital as Preconditions for Clinical Risk Management—the GI Factor

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (11) ◽  
pp. 3989 ◽  
Author(s):  
Holger Pfaff ◽  
Jeffrey Braithwaite
Keyword(s):  
Social Capital ◽  
Risk Management ◽  
Transformational Leadership ◽  
Patient Safety ◽  
Goal Attainment ◽  
Safety Management ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Clinical Risk Management ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Clinical Risk

The purpose of this study is to investigate the role of the combination of transformational leadership and social capital in safety capacity building. Drawing on the A-G-I-L concept of Talcott Parsons, we test a model for patient safety. The hypothesis is, that good safety management needs a combination of goal attainment (G) and integration (I), here called the GI factor. We tested this hypothesis by using transformational leadership as a surrogate for goal attainment and social capital as a surrogate for integration in a study of the perceptions of chief medical officers in 551 German hospitals. We conducted a cross-sectional hospital survey combined with secondary data analysis in all German hospitals with at least one internal medicine unit and one surgery unit (N = 1224 hospitals) in the year 2008 with a response rate of 45% (N = 551). The regression model explained 17.9% of the variance in perceived clinical risk management. We found that if both requirements for goal-oriented collective action—transformational leadership and social capital—are met, good safety management is more likely. The tentative conclusion is that it takes transformative leaders and cohesive followers together as a social basis to improve safety in hospitals.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document