Japan and the war on terror: military force and political pressure in the US-Japanese alliance. By Michael Penn

2015 ◽  
Vol 91 (1) ◽  
pp. 211-213
Author(s):  
Joel Campbell
2012 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mattia Toaldo

This article uses recently declassified records to analyze the American intervention in Lebanon between 1982 and 1984 and the confrontation with Libya between 1981 and 1986. In both cases, the US responded to a terrorist attack with military force. Especially after the attacks in Lebanon, members of the administration started to elaborate a comprehensive strategy to fight terrorism which focused on pre-emptive strikes against states deemed to be supporters of terrorism. The strike on Libya in April 1986 was the first implementation of this strategy and, furthermore, regime change had been attempted both before and after this strike. The article argues that the policy of the Reagan administration in the fight against terrorism was a combination of two factors: the global Cold War mindset and the first elaboration of concepts that would later become part of the Bush administration’s War on Terror. Rather than being the beginning of the War on Terror, however, Reagan’s policy should be considered as a source of inspiration for it, albeit one that was deeply influenced by the bipolar confrontation with the Soviet Union.


Author(s):  
Avinash Paliwal

The Taliban’s destruction of the Bamiyan Buddha in March 2001 outraged India (and the world). It killed any scope for conciliation with the Taliban. In this context, the US decision to take military action in Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks was welcomed by many in India. However, Washington’s decision to undertake such action without UN approval (which came only in December 2001) sparked another round of debate between the partisans and the conciliators. As this chapter shows, the former were enthusiastic about supporting the US in its global war on terror, but the latter advocated caution given Washington’s willingness to partner with Islamabad. Despite the global trend to ‘fight terrorism’, the conciliators were successful in steering India away from getting involved in Afghanistan militarily.


Author(s):  
Richard A. Falkenrath

This chapter examines strategy and deterrence and traces the shift from deterrence by ‘punishment’ to deterrence by ‘denial’ in Washington’s conduct of the Global War on Terror. The former rested on an assumption that the consequences of an action would serve as deterrents. The latter may carry messages of possible consequences, but these are delivered by taking action that removes the capabilities available to opponents – in the given context, the Islamist terrorists challenging the US. Both approaches rest on credibility, but are more complex in the realm of counter-terrorism, where the US authorities have no obvious ‘return to sender’ address and threats to punish have questionable credibility. In this context, denial offers a more realistic way of preventing terrorist attacks. Yet, the advanced means available to the US are deeply ethically problematic in liberal democratic societies. However, there would likely be even bigger questions if governments failed to act.


Significance Follow-on action from Washington and responses from foreign actors will shape the US government’s adversarial policy towards China in semiconductors and other strategic technologies. Impacts The Biden administration will likely conclude that broad-based diversion of the semiconductor supply chain away from China is not feasible. The United States will rely on export controls and political pressure to prevent diffusion to China of cutting-edge chip technologies. The United States will focus on persuading foreign semiconductor leaders to help develop US capabilities, thereby staying ahead of China. Washington will focus on less direct approaches to strategic technology competition with China, notably technical standards-setting. Industry leaders in the semiconductor supply chain worldwide will continue expanding business in China in less politically sensitive areas.


2021 ◽  
Vol VI (I) ◽  
pp. 179-191
Author(s):  
Syed Umair Jalal ◽  
Bakhtiar Khan ◽  
Muhammad Usman Ullah

The study will elaborate the Afghan historical events that took place right after the Geneva accord of 1988 when USSR forces pullout from the country till 2010. The article will explain the emergence of the Taliban and their establishment of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Moreover, the paper will elaborate on the Taliban's nexus with al-Qaeda and their efforts to settle them in Afghanistan. Furthermore, this particular research tends to analyse the US retaliation and war on terror after the catastrophic event of 9/11. Additionally, the paper will illustrate the launching of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Taliban's bloody resurgence and their belligerence after the said mission. Consequently, the research will examine Obama's administration war strategies and tactics after his presidential victory over John McCain.


Author(s):  
N. Zagladin

In today’s world the U.S. ruling elite has proved unable to maintain its claim to world leadership by relying on military force. It was also necessary to make corrections in the budget and tax policy and to limit further increase of the state debt. The problems of choosing political alternatives, however, have provoked a serious conflict between the republican and the democratic parties, involving public movements. In fact, the US political system is in the state of crisis that exerts influence on Russian-American relations.


2018 ◽  
pp. 226-262
Author(s):  
Muhammad Qasim Zaman

This chapter focuses on religio-political violence, whose widespread incidence—after Pakistan's realignment in the US-led War on Terror in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent rise of a new, Pakistani Taliban—has threatened the very fabric of state and society. It examines the violence in question from two broad and intertwined perspectives, one relating to the state, and the other to Islam and those speaking in its terms. Part of the concern in this chapter is to contribute to an understanding of how the governing elite and the military have often fostered the conditions in which the resort to religiously inflected violence has been justified. It also suggests that the nonstate actors—ideologues and militants—have had an agency of their own, which is not reducible to the machinations of the state. Their resort to relevant facets of the Islamic tradition also needs to be taken seriously in order to properly understand their view of the world and such appeal as they have had in particular circles.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document