Thünen-Vorlesung: Unternehmensführung und ökonomische Rationalität

2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 295-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
Herbert Hax

Abstract In a normative theory of decision making in the firm, limited cognitive capabilities of decision makers can be taken into account in different ways. If individual decision making alone is being considered, the concept of rationality must be defined in such a way that it is acceptable from the viewpoint of potential users of the theory. In an organizational context, normative theory deals primarily with the design of contracts; as far as the anticipation of the actual behaviour of contract partners is concerned an empirically valid descriptive decision theory is needed. A major problem which arises if one applies contract theory to problems of corporate governance is the definition of an adequate standard to evaluate the firm’s outcome periodically. Accounting profit and market value are two possible measures, but both have grave shortcomings.

Author(s):  
Lee A. Bygrave ◽  
Luca Tosoni

Article 4(1) (Definition of ‘personal data’) (see too recital 26); Article 4(15) (Definition of ‘data concerning health’) (see also recital 35); Article 4(16) (Definition of ‘biometric data’) (see too recital 51); Article 9(1) (Processing of special categories of personal data) (see also recital 53); Article 22(4) (Automated individual decision-making, including profiling) (see also recital 71); Article 35(3)(b) (Data protection impact assessment) (see too recital 91).


Author(s):  
Lee A. Bygrave ◽  
Luca Tosoni

Article 4(1) (Definition of ‘personal data’) (see too recital 26); Article 4(13) (Definition of ‘genetic data’) (see also recital 34); Article 4(16) (Definition of ‘biometric data’) (see too recital 51); Article 9(1) (Processing of special categories of personal data) (see also recital 53); Article 22(4) (Automated individual decision-making, including profiling) (see also recital 71); Article 35(3)(b) (Data protection impact assessment) (see too recital 91).


Author(s):  
Lee A. Bygrave ◽  
Luca Tosoni

Article 4(1) (Definition of ‘personal data’) (see too recital 26); Article 4(13) (Definition of ‘genetic data’) (see too recital 34); Article 4(15) (Definition of ‘data concerning health’) (see also recital 35); Article 9(1) (Special categories of personal data); Article 22(4) (Automated individual decision-making, including profiling) (see also recital 71); Article 35(3)(b) (Data protection impact assessment) (see too recital 91).


2009 ◽  
pp. 42-61
Author(s):  
A. Oleynik

Power involves a number of models of choice: maximizing, satisficing, coercion, and minimizing missed opportunities. The latter is explored in detail and linked to a particular type of power, domination by virtue of a constellation of interests. It is shown that domination by virtue of a constellation of interests calls for justification through references to a common good, i.e. a rent to be shared between Principal and Agent. Two sources of sub-optimal outcomes are compared: individual decision-making and interactions. Interactions organized in the form of power relationships lead to sub-optimal outcomes for at least one side, Agent. Some empirical evidence from Russia is provided for illustrative purposes.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Bogert ◽  
Aaron Schecter ◽  
Richard T. Watson

AbstractAlgorithms have begun to encroach on tasks traditionally reserved for human judgment and are increasingly capable of performing well in novel, difficult tasks. At the same time, social influence, through social media, online reviews, or personal networks, is one of the most potent forces affecting individual decision-making. In three preregistered online experiments, we found that people rely more on algorithmic advice relative to social influence as tasks become more difficult. All three experiments focused on an intellective task with a correct answer and found that subjects relied more on algorithmic advice as difficulty increased. This effect persisted even after controlling for the quality of the advice, the numeracy and accuracy of the subjects, and whether subjects were exposed to only one source of advice, or both sources. Subjects also tended to more strongly disregard inaccurate advice labeled as algorithmic compared to equally inaccurate advice labeled as coming from a crowd of peers.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document