The History of Beyng. By Martin Heidegger; translated by WiliamMcNeill and JeffreyPowell. Pp. xiii, 208, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2015, $36.00.

2017 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 723-724
Author(s):  
Brian Harding
Keyword(s):  
Martin Heidegger ◽  
Indiana University ◽  
History Of

scholarly journals Affective Aporetics: Complementary Contradictions in the Interpretation of Friedrich Nietzsche

PhaenEx ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 121
Author(s):  
NANDITA BISWAS MELLAMPHY
Keyword(s):  
Martin Heidegger ◽  
Friedrich Nietzsche ◽  
The Self ◽  
Leo Strauss ◽  
Will To Power ◽  
Karl Jaspers ◽  
Place Holder ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Relationship

In 1971, Wolfgang Müller-Lauter introduced his study of Nietzsche as an investigation into the history of modern nihilism in which “contradiction” forms the central thread of the argument. For Müller-Lauter, the interpretive task is not to demonstrate the overall coherence or incoherence of Nietzsche’s philosophy, but to examine Nietzsche’s “philosophy of contradiction.” Against those such as Karl Jaspers, Karl Löwith and Martin Heidegger, Müller-Lauter argued that contradiction is the foundation of Nietzsche’s thought, and not a problem to be corrected or cast aside for exegetical or political purposes. For Müller-Lauter, contradiction qua incompatibility (not just mere opposition) holds a key to Nietzsche’s affective vision of philosophy. Beginning with the relationship between will to power and eternal recurrence, in this paper I examine aspects of Müller-Lauter’s account of Nietzsche’s philosophy of contradiction specifically in relation to the counter-interpretations offered by two other German commentators of Nietzsche, Leo Strauss and Karl Löwith, in order to confirm Müller-Lauter’s suggestion that contradiction is indeed an operative engine of Nietzsche’s thought. Indeed contradiction is a key Nietzschean theme and an important dynamic of becoming which enables the subject to be revealed as a “multiplicity” (BGE §12) and as a “fiction” (KSA 12:9[91]). Following Müller-Lauter’s assertion that for Nietzsche the problem of nihilism is fundamentally synonymous with the struggle of contradiction experienced by will to power, this paper interprets Nietzsche’s philosophy of contradiction in terms of subjective, bodily life (rather than in terms of logical incoherences or ontological inconsistencies). Against the backdrop of nihilism, the “self” (and its related place holder the “subject”), I will argue, becomes the psycho-physiological battlespace for the struggle and articulation of “contradiction” in Nietzsche’s thought.  

scholarly journals Davos 1929: “¿Qué es el Hombre?” El desencuentro entre Cassirer y Heidegger. Razones filosófica y política

2021 ◽  
pp. 177
Author(s):  
Julio Quesada
Keyword(s):  
Martin Heidegger ◽  
Edmund Husserl ◽  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Existential Philosophy ◽  
Ernst Cassirer ◽  
Anti Semitism ◽  
History Of

Mi ensayo ha querido explicar genealógicamente y de forma contextualizada el desencuentro entre Ernst Cassirer y Martin Heidegger en Davos, y la deriva de éste hacia el nazismo desde los presupuestos de su filosofía existencial. ¿Qué papel juega el antisemitismo espiritual en la crítica heideggeriana al neokantismo y la fenomenología trascendental? ¿Por qué la fenomenología de Edmund Husserl es "una monstruosidad"? ¿Por qué Kant se convierte en batalla y campo de batalla de la Kulturkampf? ¿Por qué se lee a Heidegger como se lee? ¿Qué sentido tiene la práctica de la historia de la filosofía en el “final” de la filosofía?My essay wanted to explain genealogically and in a contextualized way the disagreement between Cassirer and Heidegger in Davos, and its drift towards Nazism from the budgets of their existential philosophy. What role does spiritual anti-Semitism play in the Heideggerian critique of neo-Kantianism and transcendental phenomenology? Why is Husserl's phenomenology "a monstrosity"? Why does Kant become the battle and battlefield of the Kulturkampf? Why do you read Heidegger as you read? What is the meaning of the practice of the history of philosophy in the “final” of philosophy?

Heraclitus armeniacus

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 ◽  
pp. 1-50
Author(s):  
Udo Reinhold Jeck
Keyword(s):  
Martin Heidegger ◽  
20Th Century ◽  
19Th Century ◽  
Greek Version ◽  
Philo Of Alexandria ◽  
Great Loss ◽  
History Of ◽  
The 19Th Century

Abstract It is a great loss to philosophy that Heraclitus’s writing was lost in antiquity, for the surviving fragments rarely contain more than one sentence. Often, they are succinct but concise statements that contain little text. So, when one succeeds in augmenting important fragments with a few words or illuminating their context, there is progress in Heraclitus research. Sometimes, however, this requires recourse to lineages outside the Greek-Latin tradition. An example of this is provided by fragment 123, which has played an important role since its discovery in the Orationes of Themistius: in the 20th century, Martin Heidegger used it several times for his idiosyncratic interpretation of Heraclitus and the philosophy of the Pre-Socratics. However, he did not consider that an Armenian variant of this fragment had become available at the beginning of the 19th century. This Armenian variant derives from a treatise of Philo of Alexandria which has only been transmitted in Armenian and offers more text than the Greek version. As Diels-Kranz did not include this Armenian source in their edition of The Fragments of the Pre-Socratics, this Armenian variant fell into oblivion and was not known to Heidegger either. Now this article, after introductory remarks on the transmission of Heraclitus’s sayings in Themistius and Philo’s Heraclitea, focuses on the history of the Armenian version of fragment 123 and its primary interpretations. It concludes with a reconstruction of the remarks which Ferdinand Lassalle dedicated to this fragment in both its Greek and Armenian versions in 1858.

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