Reading Downs: New Labour and An Economic Theory of Democracy

Author(s):  
Andrew Hindmoor

In Downs' median voter theorem parties can only increase their vote by changing their policies and moving towards the electoral centre ground. This theorem has been used to sustain a particular and, I will argue, one-sided interpretation of New Labour's actions and political trajectory. There is more to An Economic Theory of Democracy than the median voter theorem. Downs argues that voters and parties operate in conditions of uncertainty and that this gives parties the opportunity to persuade voters to revise their beliefs. Parties can win elections not only by changing their policies but by changing voters' minds. Downs' arguments about persuasion can be used to generate an alternative and very different interpretation of New Labour.

Author(s):  
Russell Muirhead

Anthony Downs’s Economic Theory of Democracy has been marginalized in normative democratic theory, notwithstanding its prominence in positive political theory. For normative theorists, the “paradox of voting” testifies to the reality of moral motivation in politics, a species of motivation foreign to Downs’s theory and central to the ideals of deliberative democracy that normative theorists developed in the 1980s and 1990s. The deliberative ideal displaced aggregative conceptions of democracy such as Downs’s model. The ensuing segmentation of normative democratic theories that assume moral motives (like deliberative democracy) and positive models of democracy that assume selfish motives (like Downs’s theory) leaves both without the resources to diagnose the persistence of ideological partisanship and polarization that beset modern democracies. Engaging Downs’s theoretical contributions, especially the median voter theorem, would constitute a salutary step toward a democratic theory that integrates normative and positive theory.


Author(s):  
Alan Ryan

This chapter describes a “dramatistic,” “dramatic,” or “dramaturgical” approach to the study of social interaction. It asks whether the dramaturgical model insists on the theatricality of social life merely in the sense of insisting that people fill roles just as persons act parts in a play. This is the question of whether the crucial element in the dramaturgical picture is that cluster of insights that goes under the general heading of “role distance.” The chapter considers the peculiarities of rational explanation and about the role of reconstructions of “the thing to do” other than the role of explaining an action or series of actions by focusing on voting behavior in the terms proposed by Anthony Downs's An Economic Theory of Democracy. It also examines some recent accounts of the phenomenon of suicide, along with the rationality principle, which Karl Popper calls “false but indispensable” to the social sciences.


Author(s):  
Sara E. Guffey

In 2018, the Irish people voted in favour of the passage of the Thirty-Sixth Amendment. This vote abolished the Eighth Amendment, which had previously outlawed abortion by establishing the equal rights of the woman and the unborn child. To uncover potential driving forces behind the vote share in support of the Thirty-Sixth Amendment, this article uses regional data on religious identification, age and a measure of traditional identity. The results of this article show that variation by region in religious identification was significantly correlated with voting behaviour in the 2018 referendum. Furthermore, evidence for the validity of the median voter theorem is developed by analysing data on the reported support of Irish elected representatives for the legislation before the vote. The results of this analysis on the referendum vote suggest a societal shift has taken place in the preferences of Irish citizens, which is complimented by the views of their elected representatives.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 154-170 ◽  
Author(s):  
Filipa Figueira

The current surge of populism in Europe and the United States calls for further analysis using public choice tools. In this article, populism is modelled as a deviation from the normal state of the median voter theorem. This study adds to the public choice literature by proposing a model of populism which is suited, not only to left-wing populism, but also to other forms of populism prevalent in Europe and the United States today. It is argued that, due to changes in the assumptions underpinning the median voter theorem, the operation of the model can be modified, and as a result surges of populism occur. Those assumptions concern: the political spectrum; the distribution of ideological preferences; sociological, psychological and historical factors; political party competition; and extreme political preferences. It is shown that the current peak of populism in Europe and the United States can be explained through a simultaneous change in all of these aspects, leading to a “perfect storm” of populism. 


2019 ◽  
Vol 66 ◽  
pp. 57-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Magiera ◽  
Piotr Faliszewski

We provide the first polynomial-time algorithm for recognizing if a profile of (possibly weak) preference orders is top-monotonic. Top-monotonicity is a generalization of the notions of single-peakedness and single-crossingness, defined by Barbera and Moreno. Top-monotonic profiles always have weak Condorcet winners and satisfy a variant of the median voter theorem. Our algorithm proceeds by reducing the recognition problem to the SAT-2CNF problem.


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