CEO Compensation and Firm Performance: an Empirical Investigation of UK Panel Data

This study develops and uses a two-stage model to examine the correlation between the compensation of 137 CEO’s and the subsequent performance of the 56 companies they manage. This study tests both relationships suggested by the analytical compensation literature and several common assumptions made in the empirical compensation literature. The results suggest that the form of CEO compensation and the relative importance of personal stock ownership both have an effect on subsequent firm performance. Greater reliance on stock options, as a form of CEO compensation, is positively correlated with superior subsequent firm performance, while greater reliance on annual bonuses appears to have the opposite effect. The results also suggest that greater personal stock ownership may not provide the commonly assumed alignment of interest between CEO and stockholder.

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Corporate Governance Mechanism and Firm Performance as Determinants of CEO Compensation: A Panel Data Analysis of Pakistani Listed Companies

Journal of Global Economy ◽

10.1956/jge.v8i4.262 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 8 (4) ◽

pp. 307-314

Author(s):

Zahid Irshad Younas ◽

Bilal Mehmood ◽

Asal Ilyas ◽

Haseeb Asif Bajwa

Keyword(s):

Corporate Governance ◽

Firm Performance ◽

Panel Data ◽

Fixed Effects ◽

Ceo Compensation ◽

Stock Exchange ◽

Panel Data Analysis ◽

Governance Mechanism ◽

Board Size ◽

The Impact

The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of corporate governance, firm performance on CEO compensation. More specific, firm performance, board size and audit expenditure are linked with CEO compensation. Using panel data for 151 Pakistani firms listed on Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE), fixed effects regression has been performed. The results indicate firm performance is negatively associated with CEO compensation, which hold managerial power theory. While, board size and audit expenditure showed a positive relationship with CEO compensation, which reflects the presence of human capital theory. The results of study are in line with the prior studies done on CEO compensation.

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Does Diversity in The Boardroom Add Value to a Firm?

American Journal of Management ◽

10.33423/ajm.v18i5.255 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 18 (5) ◽

Keyword(s):

Firm Performance ◽

Panel Data ◽

Firm Size ◽

Significant Influence ◽

Negative Influence ◽

Positive Influence ◽

Future Research ◽

Board Composition ◽

Board Diversity

This study examines whether board diversity affects firm performance. We investigate this study using panel data of a sample of S&P 500 firms during a 12 year period. After controlling for industry, firm size, and other board composition variables, we find that all three board diversity variables of interest – gender, ethnicity, and age have a significant influence on firm performance. While ethnicity and age have a positive influence on firm performance, it was found that gender has a negative influence. Implications for future research are discussed.

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CEO Compensation and Acquired and Acquiring Companies in Large Corporate Acquisitions

GIS Business ◽

10.26643/gis.v11i5.3423 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 11 (5) ◽

pp. 01-13

Author(s):

Simon Yang

Keyword(s):

Firm Performance ◽

Executive Compensation ◽

Ceo Compensation ◽

Relative Sensitivity ◽

Matched Sample ◽

Executive Pay ◽

Corporate Acquisitions ◽

Acquiring Firms ◽

Managerial Power ◽

To Receive

This paper examines the relative sensitivity of CEO compensation of both acquiring and acquired firms in the top 30 U.S. largest corporate acquisitions in each year for the period of 2003 to 2012. We find that total compensation and bonus granted to executive compensation for acquired companies, not acquiring companies, are significantly related to the amount of acquisition deal even after the size and firm performance are controlled for. Both acquiring and acquired CEOs are found to make the significantly higher compensation than the matched sample firms in the same industry and calendar year. We also find that executives with higher managerial power, as measured by a lower salary-based compensation mix, prior to a corporate acquisition are more likely to receive a higher executive pay in the year of acquisition. The association between executive compensation and managerial power seems to be stronger for acquired firms than for acquiring firms in corporate acquisition. Overall, our findings suggest that corporate acquisition has higher impacts on executive compensation for acquired firm CEOs than for acquiring firm CEOs.

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