scholarly journals CEO compensation and firm performance in Japan: Evidence from new panel data on individual CEO pay

2006 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Takao Kato ◽  
Katsuyuki Kubo
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Ceo Pay

scholarly journals CEO Compensation and Firm Performance: The Role of ESG Transparency

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 278
Author(s):  
Chetna Rath ◽  
Florentina Kurniasari ◽  
Malabika Deo
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
The Impact

Chief executive officers (CEOs) of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) firms are known to take lesser pay and engage themselves in corporate social responsibility activities to achieve the dual objective of the enhancement of firm’s performance as well as benefit for stakeholders in the long run. This study examines the role of ESG transparency in strengthening the impact of firm performance on total CEO pay in ESG firms. A panel of 67 firms for the period of 2014–2019 has been analyzed using the two-step system GMM model, with NSE Nifty 100 ESG Index as the data sample and ESG scores from Bloomberg database as a proxy for transparency. Findings reveal that environmental and governance disclosure scores have the potential to intensify the negative relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation, while social disclosure scores do not. In addition, various firm-specific, board-specific, and CEO-specific attributes have also been considered controls affecting remuneration. This paper contributes to the literature by exploring the effect of exhibiting ESG transparency and its nexus with CEO pay as well as firm performance.

Accounting and Stock Price Performance in Dynamic CEO Compensation Arrangements

2003 ◽  
Vol 78 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
John F. Boschen ◽  
Augustine Duru ◽  
Lawrence A. Gordon ◽  
Kimberly J. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Accounting Performance ◽  
Financial Gain ◽  
Price Performance ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Initial Effect ◽  
Ceo Pay

In this study we examine the long-run effects of unexpected firm performance on CEO compensation. We find that unexpectedly good accounting performance is initially associated with increases in CEO pay. However, this initial effect soon reverses, and is followed by lower CEO pay in later years. Overall, the CEO's long-run cumulative financial gain from unexpectedly good accounting performance is not significantly different from zero. In contrast, unexpectedly good stock price performance is associated with increases in CEO pay for several years. Thus, the CEO's long-run cumulative financial gain from unexpectedly good stock price performance is positive and significant.

The determinants of CEO compensation: new insights from United States

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmed Bouteska ◽  
Salma Mefteh-Wali
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Ceo Power ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
The Us ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
The Impact

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of CEO compensation for sample of the US firms. It emphasizes the presence of executive compensation persistence and the importance of CEO power besides performance while setting CEO pay.Design/methodology/approachThe empirical analysis is conducted on a large sample of US firms during the period 2006–2016. It is based on the generalized method of moments (GMM) models to assess the impact of numerous factors on CEO compensation.FindingsThe main findings reveal that firm performance proxied by accounting-based proxies, as well as market-based proxies, plays a significant role in explaining variations in levels of executive compensation. Moreover, there is a significant persistence in executive compensation among the US sample firms. The authors also document that poor governance conditions (managerial power hypothesis) lead to high compensation levels offered to CEO.Research limitations/implicationsAt the end, without a doubt, the analysis has some limitations that prompt the authors to consider future research directions. One future research avenue that can help better explain the effect of firm performance on the CEO compensation is to study this issue using an international sample to determine whether country-level characteristics (e.g. creditor rights, shareholder rights and the enforcement climate) can influence this relationship. Furthermore, it can be worthwhile to deepen the analysis of CEO power and its impact on CEO compensation. It will be interesting to emphasize how the CEO power interacts with the other governance characteristics and some CEO attributes as CEO gender.Practical implicationsThe paper's findings have implications for practitioners, policymakers and regulatory authorities. First, the findings inform regulators that performance is not the only determinant of CEO pay level. This may warrant increased firm disclosure of the details of the pay structure. Second, the study offers insights to policymakers and members of boards of directors interested in enhancing the design of executive compensation and internal corporate governance, to better align managerial incentives to shareholder interests. Firms should strengthen the board independence and properly constitute the board committees (compensation, risk, nomination…).Originality/valueThis paper presents a comprehensive overview of the CEO compensation determinants. It supplements the classic pay-for-performance sensitivity predictions with insights gained from the dynamics of wage setting theory and managerial power theory. The authors develop a composite index to measure the CEO power in order to test the impact of CEO attributes on CEO pay. Additionally, it verifies whether the determinants of CEO pay depend on firm age and size.

Institutional Investors and CEO Pay Performance in Malaysian Firms

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tee Chwee Ming ◽  
Yee-Boon Foo ◽  
Ferdinand A. Gul ◽  
Abdul Majid
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Institutional Investor ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Foreign Institutional Investors ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT This study uses Malaysian data to examine whether institutional investors affect the association between firm performance and CEO compensation. Overall, we find that total institutional investor ownership has a negative effect on the positive association between firm performance and CEO compensation, which suggests ineffective monitoring. When the institutional investors are categorized into local and foreign, we find that the negative effect is driven by local institutional ownership, consistent with the argument that foreign institutional investors are associated with better monitoring. Our results provide new insights on the association between institutional investors and the CEO compensation-firm performance relationship in an emerging economy. JEL Classifications: G34; J33.

scholarly journals CEO Pay For Long-Run Performance: A Dynamic View

2014 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 317 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ji-Young Ahn
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Dynamic Response ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Complete Convergence ◽  
Partial Adjustment ◽  
Incentive Effects ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Dynamic View ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
One Year

This study examines multi-year dynamic response of CEO compensation to firm performance. Multi-period agency theories posit that the CEO's current performance can be compensated both today and tomorrow. This study investigates the dynamic view of CEO pay and firm performance by using partial adjustment models of CEO pay. We find that target pay levels are set on long-run past firm performance and that the deviation of the actual pay level causes near-complete convergence to the target in one year. Overall, the findings here indicate that a pay-for-contemporaneous-only-performance relationship significantly understates the incentive effects of CEO pay.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance Mechanism and Firm Performance as Determinants of CEO Compensation: A Panel Data Analysis of Pakistani Listed Companies

2013 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 307-314
Author(s):  
Zahid Irshad Younas ◽  
Bilal Mehmood ◽  
Asal Ilyas ◽  
Haseeb Asif Bajwa
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Panel Data Analysis ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Board Size ◽  
The Impact

The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of corporate governance, firm performance on CEO compensation. More specific, firm performance, board size and audit expenditure are linked with CEO compensation. Using panel data for 151 Pakistani firms listed on Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE), fixed effects regression has been performed. The results indicate firm performance is negatively associated with CEO compensation, which hold managerial power theory. While, board size and audit expenditure showed a positive relationship with CEO compensation, which reflects the presence of human capital theory. The results of study are in line with the prior studies done on CEO compensation.

Does Diversity in The Boardroom Add Value to a Firm?

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (5) ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
Firm Size ◽  
Significant Influence ◽  
Negative Influence ◽  
Positive Influence ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Board Composition ◽  
Board Diversity

This study examines whether board diversity affects firm performance. We investigate this study using panel data of a sample of S&P 500 firms during a 12 year period. After controlling for industry, firm size, and other board composition variables, we find that all three board diversity variables of interest – gender, ethnicity, and age have a significant influence on firm performance. While ethnicity and age have a positive influence on firm performance, it was found that gender has a negative influence. Implications for future research are discussed.

CEO Compensation and Acquired and Acquiring Companies in Large Corporate Acquisitions

GIS Business ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 01-13
Author(s):  
Simon Yang
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Relative Sensitivity ◽  
Matched Sample ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Corporate Acquisitions ◽  
Acquiring Firms ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
To Receive

This paper examines the relative sensitivity of CEO compensation of both acquiring and acquired firms in the top 30 U.S. largest corporate acquisitions in each year for the period of 2003 to 2012. We find that total compensation and bonus granted to executive compensation for acquired companies, not acquiring companies, are significantly related to the amount of acquisition deal even after the size and firm performance are controlled for. Both acquiring and acquired CEOs are found to make the significantly higher compensation than the matched sample firms in the same industry and calendar year. We also find that executives with higher managerial power, as measured by a lower salary-based compensation mix, prior to a corporate acquisition are more likely to receive a higher executive pay in the year of acquisition. The association between executive compensation and managerial power seems to be stronger for acquired firms than for acquiring firms in corporate acquisition. Overall, our findings suggest that corporate acquisition has higher impacts on executive compensation for acquired firm CEOs than for acquiring firm CEOs.

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