Pot of gold or winner's curse? An event study of the auctions of 3G mobile telephone licences in the UK

2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 447-462 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Cable ◽  
Andrew Henley ◽  
Kevin Holland
Keyword(s):  
Event Study ◽  
Mobile Telephone ◽  
Winner's Curse ◽  
Winner’S Curse ◽  
The Uk

Pre-Empting the Competition: How Do Shareholders View Sponsorships in the Sport Apparel Industry?

2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 275-287 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrien Bouchet ◽  
Thomas W. Doellman ◽  
Mike Troilo ◽  
Brian R. Walkup
Keyword(s):  
Event Study ◽  
Abnormal Returns ◽  
Apparel Industry ◽  
Study Analysis ◽  
Winner's Curse ◽  
Football Club ◽  
Winner’S Curse ◽  
Fierce Competition

Gaining exclusive sponsorship rights to international football club apparel has become increasingly competitive, resulting in larger deal values. The first objective of this study was to analyze the effect of kit sponsorship announcements on the underlying value of sponsoring firms. Utilizing event study analysis, we found that firms announcing kit sponsorships experience negative abnormal returns. This finding may not be surprising given the fierce competition for obtaining valuable, scarce marketing space and the well-known winner’s curse. The second objective was to shed further light on the value of kit sponsorship deals by conducting a novel test in which we analyzed a subset of sample observations where the kit sponsorship changed to a new sponsor. We found that firms may be willing to overpay for sponsorships to pre-empt their direct competitors from obtaining valuable, scarce marketing space. Firms losing a pre-existing sponsorship to a direct competitor experience large negative abnormal returns.

scholarly journals Navigating sample overlap, winner's curse and weak instrument bias in Mendelian randomization studies using the UK Biobank

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ildar I Sadreev ◽  
Benjamin L Elsworth ◽  
Ruth E Mitchell ◽  
Lavinia Paternoster ◽  
Eleanor Sanderson ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Complex Traits ◽  
Linear Mixed Model ◽  
Mendelian Randomization ◽  
Causal Effect ◽  
Uk Biobank ◽  
Winner's Curse ◽  
Winner’S Curse ◽  
Instrument Bias ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Impact

We performed GWAS on 2514 complex traits from the UK Biobank using a linear mixed model, identifying 40,620 independent significant associations (p<5x10-8). We estimate that winner's curse incurs substantial overestimation of effect sizes in a mean of 35% of discovered associations per trait. We use these results to estimate that the polygenicity of most complex traits is below 10000 common causal variants. We evaluated the impact of winner's curse on causal effect estimation and hypothesis testing in Mendelian randomization analyses. We show that winner's curse substantially amplifies the magnitude of weak instrument bias, though any inflation of false discovery rates tends to be low or modest. We designed a process of pseudo-replication within the UK Biobank data to generate GWAS estimates that minimise bias in MR studies using these data. Our resource is integrated into the OpenGWAS platform and enables a convenient framework for researchers to minimise bias or maximise precision of causal effect estimates.

The Value of Victory - Neural Mechanisms of the Winner's Curse

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wouter van den Bos ◽  
Arjun Talwar ◽  
Samuel McClure
Keyword(s):  
Neural Mechanisms ◽  
Winner's Curse ◽  
Winner’S Curse

The Real Winner's Curse

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leopoldo Fergusson ◽  
Pablo Querubin ◽  
Nelson A. Ruiz ◽  
Juan F. Vargas
Keyword(s):  
Winner's Curse ◽  
The Real ◽  
Winner’S Curse

scholarly journals An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects

2004 ◽  
Vol 94 (5) ◽  
pp. 1452-1475 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence M Ausubel
Keyword(s):  
Privacy Preservation ◽  
Winner's Curse ◽  
Multiple Objects ◽  
Vickrey Auction ◽  
Treasury Bills ◽  
Winner’S Curse ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Interdependent Values ◽  
Private Values ◽  
Current Price

When bidders exhibit multi-unit demands, standard auction methods generally yield inefficient outcomes. This article proposes a new ascending-bid auction for homogeneous goods, such as Treasury bills or telecommunications spectrum. The auctioneer announces a price and bidders respond with quantities. Items are awarded at the current price whenever they are “clinched,” and the price is incremented until the market clears. With private values, this (dynamic) auction yields the same outcome as the (sealed-bid) Vickrey auction, but has advantages of simplicity and privacy preservation. With interdependent values, this auction may retain efficiency, whereas the Vickrey auction suffers from a generalized Winner's Curse.

Anomalies: The Winner's Curse

1988 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 191-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard H Thaler
Keyword(s):  
Field Studies ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Common Phenomenon ◽  
Winner's Curse ◽  
Winner’S Curse ◽  
Empirical Question ◽  
Common Value ◽  
Winning Bidder ◽  
Common Value Auction ◽  
Very High

Next time that you find yourself a little short of cash for lunch, try the following experiment in your class. Take a jar and fill it with coins, noting the total value of the coins. Now auction off the jar to your class (offering to pay the winning bidder in bills to control for penny aversion). Chances are very high that the following results will be obtained: (1) the average bid will be significantly less than the value of the coins (bidders are risk averse); (2) the winning bid will exceed the value of the jar. Therefore, you will have money for lunch, and your students will have learned first-hand about the “winner's curse.” The winner's curse cannot occur if all the bidders are rational, so evidence of a winner's curse in market settings would constitute an anomaly. However, acting rationally in a common value auction can be difficult. Solving for the optimal bid is not trivial. Thus, it is an empirical question whether bidders in various contexts get it right or are cursed. I will present some evidence, both from experimental and field studies, suggesting that the winner's curse may be a common phenomenon.

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