scholarly journals The Verdict of Five out of Six Civil Jurors: Constitutional Problems

1982 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Zeisel

A criminal jury of fewer than 6 members and a jury in which 5 out of 6 can find a verdict were held unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court for failing to meet the requirements of due process as mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment. In four states—Michigan is one of them—the 5 out of 6 jury is the standard civil jury. Two questions are raised: first, whether such a jury violates the Michigan state constitution; second, whether such a 5 out of 6 civil jury violates the federal Constitutiton even though the civil jury is not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Author(s):  
Donald W. Rogers

This chapter traces Hague’s appeal through the Third Circuit Court of Appeals into the U.S. Supreme Court under Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, showing how the Hughes court’s inner dynamics explain affirmation of the district court injunction. Observing flux in court personnel and law, the chapter shows that both courts embraced the contemporaneous civil liberties revolution by defending worker speech and assembly rights, but it reveals the Supreme Court as divided over constitutional logic. Justice Owen Roberts’s plurality opinion upheld speech and assembly rights under the Fourteenth Amendment privileges and immunities clause, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone’s concurrence incorporated the First Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment due-process clause, and dissenters rejected federal jurisdiction. The ruling reflected the contentious evolution of civil liberties jurisprudence, not antiboss or labor law politics.


2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-170
Author(s):  
Craig Hemmens ◽  
Elizabeth Dotson ◽  
Mary Miller

In this article, we review and analyze the criminal justice–related decisions of the 2018 term of the U.S. Supreme Court. We also provide a summary of the Court’s voting patterns and opinion authorship. Eighteen of the Court’s 72 decisions touched on criminal justice. There were significant decisions involving due process, sentencing, and federal criminal statutes. Each of these is discussed in turn.


1916 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 683-688
Author(s):  
Seba Eldridge

That final legislative authority in this country is lodged in the letter of a constitution that is amended with the greatest difficulty, and with a supreme court which is entirely independent of electoral control has become a commonplace of political discussion.To quote Professor Goodnow: “Acts of congress and of state legislatures are declared to be unconstitutional ‥‥ because they cannot be made to conform to a conception of the organization and powers of government which we have inherited from the eighteenth century;” and Dr. Blaine F. Moore: “If we may judge from the decisions based on the due process clause in the fourteenth amendment and applying to the States, the court has it in its power to make the similar clause in the fifth amendment cover practically all federal legislation dealing with new problems concerning which there are few or no precedents. If the court does make this entirely possible extension of its power, then the legislation dealing with the more recent and pressing questions is under the control of the popularly inaccessible justices of the supreme court.”Both these quotations are from studies published before the adoption of the sixteenth and seventeenth amendments, but they are only a little less true now than then, as an analysis of the history of those amendments will show.


2012 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-53
Author(s):  
David P. Stewart

On July 7, 2011, the United States Supreme Court declined to stay the execution of Humberto Leal García, a Mexican national who had been convicted some sixteen years ago in Texas of murder.1 Relying on the decision of the International Court of Justice (‘‘ICJ’’) in the Avena case,2 García contended that the United States had violated his right to consular notification and access under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (‘‘Consular Convention’’).3 He sought the stay so that the U.S. Congress could consider enactment of proposed legislation to implement the ICJ decision.4 In a 5-4 decision, the Court rejected his argument, stating that ‘‘[t]he Due Process Clause does not prohibit a State from carrying out a lawful judgment in light of unenacted legislation that might someday authorize a collateral attack on that judgment.’’5 García was executed by lethal injection that evening.


Author(s):  
Christopher Silver

Zoning is a legal tool employed by local governments to regulate land development. It determines the use, intensity, and form of development in localities through enforcement of the zoning ordinance, which consists of a text and an accompanying map that divides the locality into zones. Zoning is an exercise of the police powers by local governments, typically authorized through state statutes. Components of what became part of the zoning process emerged piecemeal in U.S. cities during the 19th century in response to development activities deemed injurious to the health, safety, and welfare of the community. American zoning was influenced by and drew upon models already in place in German cities early in the 20th century. Following the First National Conference on Planning and Congestion, held in Washington, DC in 1909, the zoning movement spread throughout the United States. The first attempt to apply a version of the German zoning model to a U.S. city was in New York City in 1916. In the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case, Ambler Realty v. Village of Euclid (1926), zoning was ruled as a constitutional exercise of the police power, a precedent-setting case that defined the perimeters of land use regulation the remainder of the 20th century. Zoning was explicitly intended to sanction regulation of real property use to serve the public interest, but frequently, it was used to facilitate social and economic segregation. This was most often accomplished by controlling the size and type of housing, where high density housing (for lower income residents) could be placed in relation to commercial and industrial uses, and in some cases through explicit use of racial zoning categories for zones. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled, in Buchanan v. Warley (1917), that a racial zoning plan of the city of Louisville, Kentucky violated the due process clause of the14th Amendment. The decision, however, did not directly address the discriminatory aspects of the law. As a result, efforts to fashion legally acceptable racial zoning schemes persisted late into the 1920s. These were succeeded by the use of restrictive covenants to prohibit black (and other minority) occupancy in certain white neighborhoods (until declared unconstitutional in the late 1940s). More widespread was the use of highly differentiated residential zoning schemes and real estate steering that imbedded racial and ethnic segregation into the residential fabric of American communities. The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SSZEA) of 1924 facilitated zoning. Disseminated by the U.S. Department of Commerce, the SSZEA created a relatively uniform zoning process in U.S. cities, although depending upon their size and functions, there were definite differences in the complexity and scope of zoning schemes. The reason why localities followed the basic form prescribed by the SSZEA was to minimize the chance of the zoning ordinance being struck down by the courts. Nonetheless, from the 1920s through the 1970s, thousands of court cases tested aspects of zoning, but only a few reached the federal courts, and typically, zoning advocates prevailed. In the 1950s and 1960s, critics of zoning charged that the fragmented city was an unintended consequence. This critique was a response to concerns that zoning created artificial separations among the various types of development in cities, and that this undermined their vitality. Zoning nevertheless remained a cornerstone of U.S. urban and suburban land regulation, and new techniques such as planned unit developments, overlay zones, and form-based codes introduced needed flexibility to reintegrate urban functions previously separated by conventional zoning approaches.


Author(s):  
Nancy Woloch

This chapter assesses Muller v. Oregon (1908), its significance, and the law it upheld: Oregon's ten-hour law of 1903. Convicted of violating Oregon's law of 1903 that barred the employment of women in factories and laundries for more than ten hours a day, Curt Muller—the owner of a Portland laundry—challenged the constitutionality of the law, which he claimed violated his right of freedom to contract under the due process of the Fourteenth Amendment. On February 24, 1908, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Oregon law. This decision marked a momentous triumph for progressive reformers and a turning point in the movement for protective laws. At the same time, by declaring woman “in a class by herself,” the Supreme Court embedded in constitutional law an axiom of female difference. The Muller decision thus pushed public policy forward toward modern labor standards and simultaneously distanced it from sexual equality.


1983 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 359-373
Author(s):  
William Contente

AbstractCity of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital presented the United States Supreme Court with its first opportunity to consider whether a state or municipality has a constitutional duty to pay for medical treatment received by an individual in police custody. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had held that the city had an eighth amendment duty to pay for an arrestee's treatment. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, observing that eighth amendment rights and duties are not implicated prior to conviction and that fourteenth amendment due process concerns were met once the arrestee received adequate medical care. No obligation to pay arises, the Court held, absent a specific state law provision requiring such payment. Because arrestees are subject to physical restraints similar to those imposed on convicted prisoners, this Case Comment argues that courts undertaking to determine the scope of a state's duty to provide treatment to arrestees should apply a due process standard which draws upon eighth amendment analysis. The Comment concludes that under such an eighth amendment equivalence approach, no duty to pay arises because the state's failure to pay the health care provider does not reflect "deliberate indifference" towards the recipient of the treatment.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 181-208
Author(s):  
G.P. Marcar

AbstractWithin the United States, legal challenges to the death penalty have held it to be a “cruel and unusual” punishment (contrary to the Eighth Amendment) or arbitrarily and unfairly enacted (contrary to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments). The Eighth Amendment requires that punishments not be disproportionate or purposeless. In recent rulings, the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a piecemeal approach to this matter. In regard to particular classes of defendant, the Court has sought to rule on whether death is likely to be a proportional and purposeful punishment, as well as whether—given the condition of these defendants—such a determination can be reliably and accurately gauged. This article will suggest a different approach. Instead of asking whether, given the nature of certain categories of human defendant, the death penalty is constitutional in their case, I will begin by asking what—given the nature of the U.S. death penalty—one must believe about human beings for death to be a proportionate punishment. From this, I will argue that to believe that these penal goals are capable of fulfilment by the death penalty entails commitment to an empirically unconfirmable philosophical anthropology. On this basis, it will be further argued that the beliefs required for the U.S. death penalty's proportional and purposeful instigation (pursuant to the Eighth Amendment) are not congruent with the demands of legal due process.


2013 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-162
Author(s):  
Douglas S. Broyles

As issues such as the nature of the sexual, marital, and other relationships and claims—both personal and economic—continue to face Americans and America’s lawyers, the question of how we as a people distinguish fundamental from non-fundamental rights is one of first importance. In constitutional law, the Supreme Court has addressed this question through the doctrine of “Substantive Due Process.” In his lengthy dissent in McDonald v. Chicago—his final opinion as a Supreme Court Justice—Justice John Paul Stevens claimed that substantive due process is fundamentally a matter of how we interpret the meaning of the word “liberty.” The issue as to whether the right is specifically enumerated in the Amendments is irrelevant, Stevens argues, if the interest is naturally within the definition of “liberty.” Moreover, Justice Stevens’s argument in McDonald was approved by his liberal colleagues on the Court, which indicates that his theory of liberty may well become the baseline for determining what are, and what are not, fundamental rights. However, in the recent case of United States v. Windsor, the Court refused to employ the substantive due process doctrine, as traditionally understood, as the basis for striking down the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). Instead, the Court employed rational basis review, finding that the legislative purpose and effect behind DOMA was “to disparage and to injure” those wishing to enter into same-sex marriages, and thus served “no legitimate purpose.” Still, Justice Kennedy clearly signals in his Windsor opinion that some formulation of the substantive due process doctrine remains alive and well as a constitutional basis for deciding Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process “liberty” interests such as same-sex marriage. Indeed, both Justices share a conceptual core in their understandings of what constitutes a constitutionally protected liberty interest.


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