Killing and Allowing to Die: Another Look

1998 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel P. Sulmasy
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Assisted Suicide ◽  
Life Support ◽  
Physician Assisted Suicide ◽  
Important Distinction ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
The U.S

One of the most important questions in the debate over the morality of euthanasia and assisted suicide is whether an important distinction between killing patients and allowing them to die exists. The U.S. Supreme Court, in rejecting challenges to the constitutionality of laws prohibiting physician-assisted suicide (PAS), explicitly invoked this distinction, but did not explicate or defend it. The Second Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals had previously asserted, also without argument, that no meaningful distinction exists between killing and allowing to die. That court had reasoned that if this were so, it would be discriminatory to allow persons on life support to end their lives by removing such treatment, while those who are not connected to life support would be denied similar access to death.

Terminal Sedation: Palliative Care for Intractable Pain, Post Glucksberg and Quill

2003 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-76
Author(s):  
Rob McStay
Keyword(s):  
Palliative Care ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Assisted Suicide ◽  
Life Support ◽  
Intractable Pain ◽  
Terminal Sedation ◽  
Physician Assisted Suicide ◽  
The Right ◽  
Artificial Life Support ◽  
Unconscious State

In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court tacitly endorsed terminal sedation as an alternative to physician-assisted suicide, thus intensifying a debate in the legal and medical communities as to the propriety of terminal sedation and setting the stage for a new battleground in the “right to die” controversy. Terminal sedation is the induction of an unconscious state to relieve otherwise intractable distress, and is frequently accompanied by the withdrawal of any life-sustaining intervention, such as hydration and nutrition. This practice is a clinical option of “last resort” when less aggressive palliative care measures have failed. Terminal sedation has also been described as “the compromise in the furor over physician-assisted suicide.”Medical literature suggests that terminal sedation was a palliative care option long before the Supreme Court considered the constitutional implications of physician-assisted suicide. Terminal sedation has been used for three related but distinct purposes: (1) to relieve physical pain; (2) to produce an unconscious state before the withdrawal of artificial life support; and (3) to relieve non-physical suffering.

Right to Die

2019 ◽  
pp. 71-74
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Ford
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Assisted Suicide ◽  
Right To Die ◽  
Surrogate Decision Making ◽  
Physician Assisted Suicide ◽  
Life Sustaining Treatment ◽  
Surrogate Decision ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Right To Refuse

Chapter 7 describes three cases that involve an individual’s right, in certain circumstances, to choose death. Cruzan v. Missouri is more specifically about a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment and surrogate decision-making; Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill are physician-assisted suicide cases, both decided on the same day by the U.S. Supreme Court and both declaring the practice unconstitutional.

scholarly journals Constitutional Aspects of Physician-Assisted Suicide After Lee v. Oregon

1997 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-96
Author(s):  
Simon M. Canick
Keyword(s):  
Assisted Suicide ◽  
Due Process ◽  
Physician Assisted Suicide ◽  
Bodily Integrity ◽  
Equal Protection Clause ◽  
Ninth Circuit ◽  
Circuit Court ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
Ill Adults ◽  
The U.S

Dying is personal. And it is profound. For many, the thought of an ignoble end, steeped in decay, is abhorrent. A quiet, proud death, bodily integrity intact, is a matter of extreme consequence.—Justice William BrennanTwo recent circuit court decisions have reinvigorated the debate over the constitutional, practical and ethical ramifications of physician-assisted suicide. In Compassion in Dying v. Washington, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a liberty interest exists in choosing the time and manner of one’s death. The court found this right to outweigh all asserted state interests, and concluded that, with respect to competent, terminally ill adults, Washington’s prohibition of assisted suicide violates the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The ruling effectively strikes down laws against assisted suicide in all of the states in the Ninth Circuit.In April 1996, in Quill v. Vacco, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that New York’s prohibition of assisted suicide violates the U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.

Gut Reactions

2009 ◽  
Vol 20 (9) ◽  
pp. 1059-1063 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel C. Wisneski ◽  
Brad L. Lytle ◽  
Linda J. Skitka
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Assisted Suicide ◽  
Legal Status ◽  
Controversial Issues ◽  
Physician Assisted Suicide ◽  
Moral Conviction ◽  
Nationally Representative ◽  
The Right ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Moral Convictions

Theory and research point to different ways moral conviction and religiosity connect to trust in political authorities to decide controversial issues of the day. Specifically, we predicted that stronger moral convictions would be associated with greater distrust in authorities such as the U.S. Supreme Court making the “right” decisions regarding controversial issues. Conversely, we predicted that stronger religiosity would be associated with greater trust in authorities. We tested these hypotheses using a survey of a nationally representative sample of Americans (N = 727) that assessed the degree to which people trusted the U.S. Supreme Court to rule on the legal status of physician-assisted suicide. Results indicated that greater religiosity was associated with greater trust in the U.S. Supreme Court to decide this issue, and that stronger moral convictions about physician-assisted suicide were associated with greater distrust in the U.S. Supreme Court to decide this issue. Also, the processes underlying religious trust and distrust based on moral convictions were more quick and visceral than slow and carefully considered.

Right to Die

2014 ◽  
pp. 48-50
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Ford
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Assisted Suicide ◽  
Right To Die ◽  
Surrogate Decision Making ◽  
Physician Assisted Suicide ◽  
Department Of Health ◽  
Life Sustaining Treatment ◽  
Surrogate Decision ◽  
The U.S

Chapter 7 describes three cases that involve an individual’s right, in certain circumstances, to choose death. Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health is more specifically about a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment and surrogate decision-making; Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill are physician-assisted suicide cases, both decided on the same day by the U.S. Supreme Court and both declaring the practice unconstitutional.

Montana's courting of physician aid in dying: Could Des Moines follow suit?

2010 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 2-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur G. Svenson
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Assisted Suicide ◽  
Life Support ◽  
Lethal Dose ◽  
Terminally Ill ◽  
The United States ◽  
Equal Protection ◽  
Appellate Court ◽  
Physician Assisted Suicide ◽  
Aid In Dying

Montana recently joined Oregon and Washington as the only states in the nation to legalize the choice among terminally ill adults to hasten death by self-administering a lethal dose of drugs prescribed by a physician. Unlike Oregon and Washington, however, Montana's legalization of physician aid in dying (PAID) resulted not from public consideration of a statewide initiative, but from the judicial resolution of a lawsuit, Baxter v. Montana. As originally conceived, a trial judge reasoned that the unenumerated right to PAID is embraced by enumerated state constitutional rights to privacy and dignity. On appeal, Montana's supreme court jettisoned this construct, and, in its place, fashioned a legal home for PAID out of state homicide, consent defense, and end-of-life statutes. Central to this court's statutory rendering is the finding that state law, allowing terminally ill Montanans sustained by life support to withdraw such treatment and die, discriminates against terminally ill Montanans not sustained by life support who seek death; these classes are similar, the justices reckoned, entitling both to choose death. This analysis examines Montana's courting of PAID, offering textual examination of state trial and appellate court opinions, an accounting of legal strategies advanced in amici curiae briefs, and commentary about the problems and prospects with Baxter's holding. I argue, ultimately, that the equality principles statutorily conceived in Baxter (1) could be parroted in the vast majority of states that both criminalize assisted suicide and enumerate constitutional equal protection guarantees, and (2) could replace sub silentio the equal protection paradigm applied to “physician-assisted suicide” by the United States Supreme Court in its landmark Vacco v. Quill ruling.

Antitrust: U.S. Supreme Court Affirms FTC Jurisdiction but Vacates Scope of Analysis on CDA Policy

1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-198
Author(s):  
Joseph R. Zakhary
Keyword(s):  
Public Relations ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Trade Commission ◽  
Ninth Circuit ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
For Profit ◽  
Rule Of Reason ◽  
Antitrust Analysis ◽  
Business Financing ◽  
The U.S

In California Dental Association v. FTC, 119 S. Ct. 1604 (1999), the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that a nonprofit affiliation of dentists violated section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (1998), which prohibits unfair competition. The Court examined two issues: (1) the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) jurisdiction over the California Dental Association (CDA); and (2) the proper scope of antitrust analysis. The Court unanimously held that CDA was subject to FTC's jurisdiction, but split 5-4 in its finding that the district court's use of abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis was inappropriate.CDA is a voluntary, nonprofit association of local dental societies. It boasts approximately 19,000 members, who constitute roughly threequarters of the dentists practicing in California. Although a nonprofit, CDA includes for-profit subsidiaries that financially benefit CDA members. CDA gives its members access to insurance and business financing, and lobbies and litigates on their behalf. Members also benefit from CDA marketing and public relations campaigns.

An Angle of Vision

2020 ◽  
pp. 43-54
Author(s):  
Edward A. Jr. Purcell
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Death Penalty ◽  
Assisted Suicide ◽  
Personal Values ◽  
Gay Marriage ◽  
True Nature ◽  
The U.S

This chapter discusses the variety of types of cases Justice Antonin Scalia heard on the U.S. Supreme Court and notes their variety as well as the fact that in a few areas Scalia took originalist positions that brought results commonly regarded as “liberal,” such as his interpretation of the Confrontation Clause. The chapter then turns to the bulk of the cases where he supported “conservative” results. It points out that he used his originalist jurisprudence vigorously to defend certain positions that involved his own most intensely held personal values (those dealing with abortion, gay marriage, the death penalty, and assisted suicide), and it suggests that his originalism may have been designed to justify his views on those issues. The chapter then suggests that the true test of his jurisprudence and methodology lay not in his actions in those cases but rather in the more general run of cases where he applied his jurisprudential principles inconsistently, failed to apply them at all, or actually rejected them. That large and final category of cases constituted the majority of his decisions and opinions, the chapter argues, and it provides the best ground for testing his jurisprudential claims and ultimately identifying the true nature of his jurisprudence and the significance of his judicial career.

The Justiciability of Paraguay’s Claim of Treaty Violation

1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 697-704 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lori Fisler Damrosch
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
International Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Domestic Courts ◽  
Judicial Remedy ◽  
The U.S

The U.S. Government’s position asserting nonjusticiability of the treaty claims raised by Paraguay in the domestic and international lawsuits is disturbing. The Government’s amicus filings at the court of appeals and the Supreme Court denied that Paraguay’s claims belonged in federal court (or indeed in any court at all); at die International Court of Justice, the United States admitted a treaty violation but denied the competence of that tribunal to enter a judicial remedy. At one or another phase of these proceedings, the U.S. Government pressed a variety of arguments that (if accepted) would rule out virtually any judicial consideration of a treaty-based claim. The haste with which the Supreme Court denied a stay in Breard’s case foreclosed adequate consideration of the justiciability of such claims in domestic courts and also effectively barred Paraguay from achieving the relief it sought on the international plane.

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