Disability & ADA: Disparate Insurance Coverage for Physical and Psychological Disabilities Does Not Violate ADA

2000 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 92-94
Author(s):  
Nicklas A. Akers

In Kimber v. Thiokol Corp., 196 F.3d 1092 (10th Cit. 1999), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld a U.S. District Court's grant of summary judgment against an employee's claim that an employeroperated disability insurance plan, which offered different levels of compensation for disabilities due to mental and physical conditions, violated Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The Court of Appeals found that (1) the Thiokol plan administrator's interpretations of the plan were not arbitrary and capricious, and that (2) the plan's different treatment of disabilities caused by physical and mental conditions did not violate the ADA.

2003 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-170 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hemanth Gundavaram

In Del Carmen Guadalupe v. Agosto, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a hospital fulfills its statutory duty to screen patiens in is emergency room if it provides for a “screening examination reasonably calculated to identify critical medical conditions” that may be afflicting symptomatic patients and if it “provides that level of screening uniformly to all those who present substantially similar complaints.” The First Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision to grant summary judgment to the hospital in a claim raised under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA).Maria del Carmen Guadalupe brought her husband, Narciso Figueroa, to the Hospital Interamericano De Medicina Avanzada, Inc., (HIMA) on October 3, 1998, with symptoms of urinary retention, edema in the legs, high blood pressure, pain, increased respiratory difficulty, a dry cough, fever, and drowsiness.


1997 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 314-327

Disability & ADA: Sixth Circuit Affirms Congressional Intent of Title IIIIn an appeal from a claim brought under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held in Parker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance CO. that Title III's prohibitions do not apply to employer-sponsored benefit plans. The court reasoned that employer- sponsored plans do not qualify under Title III because it prohibits discriminatory practices by places of public accommodation and employer sponsored plans are not goods offered by places of public accommodation. The court also stated that the purpose of the ADA was to prevent discrimination among nondisabled and disabled persons, not to ensure equal treatment for people with different disabilities.


1995 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 408-408
Author(s):  
B.G.

On December 7, 1994, the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of Illinois ruled that ERISA preempts a participant in an ERISA plan from suing the plan's administrator under a state common law theory of respondeat superior (Rice v. Panchal, 875 F. Supp. 471 (N.D. Ill. 1994)) (see, “Recent Developments in Health Laws,” Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 23 (1995): at 208). On September 12, 1995, the Seventh Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals reversed this decision and ordered that the case be tried in state court (Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995)). The court held that the case had been improperly removed to federal court. The court of appeals stated that the federal court did not have jurisdiction because the plaintiff's claim did not fall within ERISA's provisions.In this case, plaintiff David Rice brought a medical malpractice suit against two doctors who provided treatment to him in accordance with his ERISA insurance plan.


2003 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 159-160
Author(s):  
Ed Caldie

In Vencor, Inc. v. National States Insurance Co., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a Medigap insurance provider was only obligated to pay the rates that Medicare would have paid for the same care.Clarence Rollins purchased a Medigap insurance policy from National States Insurance Company (NSIC) to supplement his Medicare coverage. When Rollins became ill and required care beyond that which Medicare would cover, he received his medical treatment from Vencor Hospital-Phoenix (Vencor). Upon Rollins's death, NSIC paid Vencor $38,760. Vencor claimed that NSIC owed an additional $132,438 because NSIC was not entitled to the lower care rates established by Medicare. NSIC refused to pay Vencor's higher rates. As a result, Vencor sued NSIC for breach of contract.The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona held, on a motion for summary judgment, that no breach occurred, and that NSIC was obligated to pay only the lower rates established by Mediare. The Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision.


1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-205
Author(s):  
choeffel Amy

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld, in Presbyterian Medical Center of the University of Pennsylvania Health System v. Shalala, 170 F.3d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1999), a federal district court ruling granting summary judgment to the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) in a case in which Presbyterian Medical Center (PMC) challenged Medicare's requirement of contemporaneous documentation of $828,000 in graduate medical education (GME) expenses prior to increasing reimbursement amounts. DHHS Secretary Donna Shalala denied PMC's request for reimbursement for increased GME costs. The appellants then brought suit in federal court challenging the legality of an interpretative rule that requires requested increases in reimbursement to be supported by contemporaneous documentation. PMC also alleged that an error was made in the administrative proceedings to prejudice its claims because Aetna, the hospital's fiscal intermediary, failed to provide the hospital with a written report explaining why it was denied the GME reimbursement.


1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-198
Author(s):  
Joseph R. Zakhary

In California Dental Association v. FTC, 119 S. Ct. 1604 (1999), the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that a nonprofit affiliation of dentists violated section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (1998), which prohibits unfair competition. The Court examined two issues: (1) the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) jurisdiction over the California Dental Association (CDA); and (2) the proper scope of antitrust analysis. The Court unanimously held that CDA was subject to FTC's jurisdiction, but split 5-4 in its finding that the district court's use of abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis was inappropriate.CDA is a voluntary, nonprofit association of local dental societies. It boasts approximately 19,000 members, who constitute roughly threequarters of the dentists practicing in California. Although a nonprofit, CDA includes for-profit subsidiaries that financially benefit CDA members. CDA gives its members access to insurance and business financing, and lobbies and litigates on their behalf. Members also benefit from CDA marketing and public relations campaigns.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Kevin D. Benish

On May 18, 2020, the United States Supreme Court denied a request by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and its state-owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), to review the merits of Crystallex Int'l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. In Crystallex, the Third Circuit affirmed a trial court's determination that PDVSA is the “alter ego” of Venezuela itself, thus permitting Crystallex to enforce a $1.4 billion judgment against Venezuela by attaching property held in PDVSA's name. Given the Supreme Court's decision to leave the Third Circuit's opinion undisturbed, Crystallex is a significant decision that may affect parties involved in transnational litigation for years to come—especially those pursuing or defending against U.S. enforcement proceedings involving the property of foreign states.


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