Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection: Implications for Discount Window Stigma

2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (7) ◽  
pp. 1737-1764 ◽  
Author(s):  
HUBERTO M. ENNIS
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Discount Window

Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection: Implications for Discount Window Stigma

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (01) ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huberto Ennis ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Discount Window

Overcoming Discount Window Stigma: An Experimental Investigation

2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (12) ◽  
pp. 5630-5659 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Armantier ◽  
Charles A Holt
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Investigation ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Coordination Game ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
Discount Window

Abstract A core responsibility of the Federal Reserve is to ensure financial stability by acting as the “lender of last resort” through its discount window (DW). Historically, however, the DW has not been effective because its usage is stigmatized. In this paper, we develop a coordination game with adverse selection, and we test in the lab policies that have been proposed to mitigate DW stigma. We find that lowering the DW cost and making DW borrowing difficult to detect are ineffective, but regular random DW borrowing can overcome DW stigma. Implications for other forms of stigma in finance are discussed.

AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

Adverse Selection, Lemon Shocks and Business Cycles

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 (361) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daisuke Ikeda ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Business Cycles ◽  
Adverse Selection

Tick Size and Adverse Selection: Spurious Effects Arising from Serial Correlation

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lynn Doran ◽  
Michael A. Goldstein ◽  
Evgenia V. Golubeva ◽  
Eric N. Hughson
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Serial Correlation ◽  
Tick Size
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