Between Foreign Policy and the Umma : The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan

2019 ◽  
Vol 109 (3) ◽  
pp. 240-260 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alia Al Kadi

Significance This followed Qatar's December 14 rejection of Egyptian charges that it had assisted the Islamist perpetrator of a bomb attack on a cathedral in Cairo. The accusation is the legacy of a pre-2013 era of activist foreign policy and support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Under pressure from Saudi Arabia and others, the country has since returned to the Gulf Arab fold, but relations with Egypt remain tense. Impacts Even if recovering energy prices ease the fiscal situation in 2017, foreign policy is likely to be cautious. The legacy of previous unsuccessful mediation efforts in Yemen could compromise Qatar’s role in conflict-resolution efforts. Qatar is not as strongly involved in Libya as before, but maintains low-profile ties with Tripolitanian, Islamist-leaning groups. Ties with Riyadh could strengthen further after a high-profile visit by King Salman on December 5.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hossein Aghaie Joobani ◽  
Umut Can Adısönmez

Throughout its Republican history, Turkey has attempted to formulate a “non-interventionist” foreign policy toward its neighbouring countries. Since the onset of the Arab Uprisings, however, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has abjured the traditional policy of “non-military engagement”, adopting instead an assertive and security-oriented foreign policy that has paved the way for the securitization of the Syrian conflict in terms of its Kurdish component and of wider geopolitical aspects. This article aims to explore why and in what ways this abrupt shift toward securitization has occurred while discussing its broader implications on Turkish domestic politics as well. Using the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory, the article will unpack and analyse the internal and external dimensions of threat construction and otherization processes underlying Ankara’s securitization policy toward Syria to make the case for the obsolescence of Turkey’s traditional non-interventionist policy, which, we argue, results from an ontological insecurity approach toward the Syrian conflict. The article finds that Turkey’s securitization policy (i.e. interventionist approach) was chiefly driven by the fear of Kurdish autonomy and the growing Russo-Assad-Iranian alliance in Syria; and by the grand ambition of bringing the Muslim Brotherhood into power in Syria and consolidating Turkey’s agential importance in Western security architecture under the aegis of the US.  


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 83-103
Author(s):  
Mai Mogib Mosad

This paper maps the basic opposition groups that influenced the Egyptian political system in the last years of Hosni Mubarak’s rule. It approaches the nature of the relationship between the system and the opposition through use of the concept of “semi-opposition.” An examination and evaluation of the opposition groups shows the extent to which the regime—in order to appear that it was opening the public sphere to the opposition—had channels of communication with the Muslim Brotherhood. The paper also shows the system’s relations with other groups, such as “Kifaya” and “April 6”; it then explains the reasons behind the success of the Muslim Brotherhood at seizing power after the ousting of President Mubarak.


Author(s):  
Kira D. Jumet

This chapter outlines the individual grievances arising from political, economic, social, and religious conditions under the government of Mohamed Morsi that became the foundations of opposition to his rule. It focuses on democracy in Egypt, the 2012 presidential elections, and the expectations and promises put forth by Morsi. The chapter also covers popular perceptions of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Freedom and Justice Party, grievances surrounding electricity and gas, security and sexual harassment, Morsi’s speeches and representation of Egypt on the international stage, and Morsi’s political appointments. The chapter relies on interview data and fieldwork conducted in Egypt during the year of Morsi’s presidency.


2017 ◽  
Vol 57 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 329-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katarína Škrabáková

This paper examines the legislative recruitment of women from conservative Islamist parties. It questions the common assumption that generally all Islamist parties are equally hostile to political participation and representation of women. For this purpose, two of the electorally most successful Islamist groups in the MENA region are compared, namely the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and its Moroccan offshoot, the Party of Justice and Development (PJD). The article seeks an explanation for diverging trends in female candidacy between these conservative religious movements, using the traditional supply and demand model of candidate selection. It argues that the less centralized and the more institutionalized parties (as is the case with the PJD) seem to be better equipped to facilitate women’s candidacy than the more oligarchic ones (the MB). In order to fully grasp the reasons behind the diverging trends in the nomination of female candidates from both Islamist parties, cultural factors are scrutinized as well. The article highlights the limits of the supply and demand model of candidate selection, which cannot explain instances of unexpected change in recruitment strategies based on external interference. Furthermore, it does not provide us the means to assess the impact of individual candidates’ ‘feminist credentials’ on overall female representation.



2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Hae Won Jeong

Summary What are the public diplomacy strategies for legitimising a pro-Islamist foreign policy? This research unveils how Turkey, which has been a vocal supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates across the Middle East since the Arab Spring, draws on pan-Islamic soft power, neo-Ottoman myth-making and public diplomacy strategies embedded in the precepts of the strategic depth doctrine to rationalise its pro-Hamas foreign policy position under the Justice and Development Party (AKP). By employing critical discourse analysis to the political speeches delivered by the Turkish government officials in domestic and international fora, this article suggests that Turkey has sought to legitimise its pro-Islamist foreign policy and subvert the terrorist designation of Hamas internationally through the humanitarian, Islamic and neo-Ottoman framings of the Palestinian issue. It is argued that Turkey’s public diplomacy of Hamas constitutes part and parcel of the AKP’s grand strategy to project Islamic soft power.


2017 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Özgür Özdamar ◽  
Sercan Canbolat

Political Islam and Islamist organizations have broadly gained strength across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in the post-Cold War era. Following the Arab uprisings, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), generally viewed as the world’s largest and most influential Islamist organization, has shaped the wider landscape of MENA politics. This study examines MB leadership by comparing M. Morsi of Egypt, R. Ghannouchi of Tunisia, and K. Meshaal of Gaza as examples of Islamist leaders to explain their political belief systems and predict their foreign-policy behavior. We use the operational code approach, a content-analysis software and statistical tests to conduct the study. Results show that the three leaders’ foreign policy beliefs are analogous to the averages of world leaders. Results also partially support the hypothesis that their foreign-policy propensities are similar to each other. We conclude that despite the conventional portrayal of MB leadership, these leaders use negotiation and cooperation to settle their differences in foreign affairs, and the best way to approach them is to engage in a Rousseauvian assurance game that emphasizes international social cooperation. Results also suggest important implications in terms of mainstream international relations theories.


2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 733-762
Author(s):  
Hossam ElDeeb

The article analyses a communication submitted by the Muslim Brotherhood group (mb) to the International Criminal Court (icc) relating to alleged crimes in Egypt. After the ousting of Morsi, hundreds of Morsi supporters were killed during the dispersal of two sit-in camps. The mb lawyers argued that the ousted, Morsi, is still the legitimate president of Egypt and hence can accept the Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute. It is argued that such controversial communications submitted to the Court have serious implications other than the intended purpose of communications. The article briefly reviews the situation of Egypt’s criminal justice system in relation to the alleged crimes and the legal position of the mb, then analyses the scope of Article 12(3) before it critically argues that the communication submitted to the icc was for political gain and the Court should restrain itself from entering into political debates.


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