Qatar could become a low-profile mediator

Significance This followed Qatar's December 14 rejection of Egyptian charges that it had assisted the Islamist perpetrator of a bomb attack on a cathedral in Cairo. The accusation is the legacy of a pre-2013 era of activist foreign policy and support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Under pressure from Saudi Arabia and others, the country has since returned to the Gulf Arab fold, but relations with Egypt remain tense. Impacts Even if recovering energy prices ease the fiscal situation in 2017, foreign policy is likely to be cautious. The legacy of previous unsuccessful mediation efforts in Yemen could compromise Qatar’s role in conflict-resolution efforts. Qatar is not as strongly involved in Libya as before, but maintains low-profile ties with Tripolitanian, Islamist-leaning groups. Ties with Riyadh could strengthen further after a high-profile visit by King Salman on December 5.

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-24
Author(s):  
Richard W. Bulliet

The causes and processes of the Arab Spring movements are less important for current political developments than the responses to those movements by states that were not directly involved. After discussing the Turkish, Israeli, Iranian, and American responses, the focus turns to the recently announced military cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Did the Saudi government conspire with the Egyptian high command to plot the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood regime in Cairo? If so, as seems likely, was the United States aware of the conspiracy? More importantly, what does the linkage between the Egyptian army and Saudi and Gulf financial support for President al-Sisi's regime suggest for the future of stability and legitimate rule in the Arab world?


Significance King Mohammed VI has committed forces to the Saudi-led coalition conducing operations in Yemen to reinforce the alliance with Gulf states. It may be because of these ties that Morocco's Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD) survived the regional political backlash against the Muslim Brotherhood -- with which the PJD has some parallels, but no formal links. Prime Minister and PJD leader Abdelilah Benkirane has developed a close working relationship with King Mohammed and the royal court. With the economy performing well, Benkirane's chances of prolonging his mandate look promising. Impacts Local elections will signal the level of popular support for the PJD. If Benkirane retains the premiership post-2016, he may seek a more prominent role for the PJD -- in cabinet and the civil service. This could bring him into conflict with the king.


Significance The deal aims to create a 'Government of National Accord' to resolve the rivalry between the two competing parliaments, the Tripoli-based General National Congress (GNC) and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR). Although the HoR signed the deal, the GNC refused to accept it. Yet several other important GNC allies signed the agreement. This skirted outright failure of the UN peace process, but gives the mooted unity government a very shaky basis on which to proceed. Impacts Fissures within the Muslim Brotherhood and the GNC will likely dilute their influence in Libya. The UN Security Council will increase pressure on rejectionists to come into the fold or face sanctions and isolation. The deal may well result in peaceful, functioning areas, such as Misrata, keen to attract investment. However, other areas, such as Benghazi, will likely continue to see violence, which would cloud prospects for investment in stable areas.


Significance This will be followed by a second round on November 22-23, with run-off votes after each round to decide seats with no clear majority. Impacts With pro-business figures expected to dominate, parliament is likely to support legislation encouraging foreign investment. The election could aggravate popular disaffection with a political process seen as serving the security state and big business. In a stark contrast to previous parliaments, the Muslim Brotherhood will have next to no representation in the legislature.


Significance The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N)’s five-year term ended on May 31. PML-N President Shehbaz Sharif faces a tough fight to become prime minister, with the main challenge set to come from Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and further opposition provided by Bilawal Bhutto Zardari’s Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). Impacts With Khan as prime minister, the military would likely have free rein to pursue an anti-India foreign policy. Khan would step up his criticisms of the war in Afghanistan and likely have a difficult relationship with US President Donald Trump. Pakistan under any government will pursue balanced diplomacy in the Middle East, seeking good ties with both Saudi Arabia and Iran.


Significance The Qatar crisis in June 2017 was similarly sparked by a piece of ‘fake news’ planted on Doha’s national news agency showing the Qatari emir as expressing support for Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood movement. The incidents are part of a rising trend of offensive cyber actions and government-backed social media contestation in the region. They may also be the first examples of a combined cyber and physical strategy achieving core foreign policy goals just short of actual conflict. Impacts The GCC’s high online presence and draconian regulatory framework will make social media a key arena for covert state action. Interpretation of past events will fragment, meaning divisions such as the GCC split harden over time and become difficult to reverse. As GCC states’ attitudes to Iran diverge further, their Western allies will find regional diplomacy more labour-intensive.


Headline SAUDI ARABIA/US: High-profile visit will change little


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hossein Aghaie Joobani ◽  
Umut Can Adısönmez

Throughout its Republican history, Turkey has attempted to formulate a “non-interventionist” foreign policy toward its neighbouring countries. Since the onset of the Arab Uprisings, however, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has abjured the traditional policy of “non-military engagement”, adopting instead an assertive and security-oriented foreign policy that has paved the way for the securitization of the Syrian conflict in terms of its Kurdish component and of wider geopolitical aspects. This article aims to explore why and in what ways this abrupt shift toward securitization has occurred while discussing its broader implications on Turkish domestic politics as well. Using the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory, the article will unpack and analyse the internal and external dimensions of threat construction and otherization processes underlying Ankara’s securitization policy toward Syria to make the case for the obsolescence of Turkey’s traditional non-interventionist policy, which, we argue, results from an ontological insecurity approach toward the Syrian conflict. The article finds that Turkey’s securitization policy (i.e. interventionist approach) was chiefly driven by the fear of Kurdish autonomy and the growing Russo-Assad-Iranian alliance in Syria; and by the grand ambition of bringing the Muslim Brotherhood into power in Syria and consolidating Turkey’s agential importance in Western security architecture under the aegis of the US.  


Subject The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. Significance After facing fragmentation in 2015, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan (MBJ) sought to re-engage in local politics. The September 2016 electoral success of its political wing, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), revitalised its role as a leading opposition movement. Following reports that the new US administration was debating the designation of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB), its parent movement, as a terrorist organisation, the MBJ on January 23 announced an end to its 14-year boycott of dialogue with Washington. Impacts Jordanian authorities could be suspicious of the MBJ’s outreach to Washington, fearing it might become a conduit for US pressure. Radical ideologies may become more prevalent because of rising unemployment, outflanking the MBJ but enhancing its ‘moderate’ credentials. Regional and international instability could force the government and Brotherhood to work together to manage domestic dissent.


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