The interest group theory of financial development in China: Openness and the role of interest groups

World Economy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 982-999
Author(s):  
Chengsi Zhang ◽  
Yueteng Zhu
2019 ◽  
pp. 201-218
Author(s):  
Rainer Eising

This chapter examines the role of interest groups in European Union (EU) politics. It also considers the way in which the EU institutions influence interest group structures and activities. The chapter begins with an overview of the relationship between the EU institutions and interest groups and examines the steps taken thus far to regulate that relationship. It then looks at the evolution and the structure of the interest group system, focusing in particular on two salient aspects: the difference between national and EU organizations; and the difference between specific and diffuse interests.


2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 513-541
Author(s):  
Stephanie L. DeMora ◽  
Loren Collingwood ◽  
Adriana Ninci

In recent years scholarship has drawn attention to the role of large multi-issue interest groups in policy networks and in public policy diffusion. This paper develops this field of study by demonstrating empirically the leverage of the ‘sustained organisational influence’ theory of policy diffusion. Specifically, it focuses on the role of the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) in diffusing the Stand Your Ground policy across US state legislatures. By comparing ALEC’s template policy to bills introduced and legislation subsequently enacted within state legislatures, we demonstrate that ALEC has positioned itself as a ‘super interest group’, exerting sustained organisational influence across an expanding number of states. In doing so, this paper moves theory beyond the typical advocacy coalition framework that implicitly assumes policymaking occurs discretely among specialists on an issue-by-issue basis. It also highlights the democratic implications of the role of super interest groups in shaping policy behind the scenes.


2020 ◽  
Vol 44 ◽  
pp. 7-25
Author(s):  
Jessica Nuske

Debates on the issue of representation have since long started to transcend elections and topographically bound constituencies by addressing self-appointed representatives in form of interest groups. However, with no elections and a mere claim to represent a constituency, who gets to judge and consequently authorises the claims and demands accountability? Deriving from Saward’s constructivist approach on the representative claim, this article introduces a revisited approach to interest groups by adjusting constructivism with respect to crucial insights derived from interest group theory, provided by Montanaro and Strolovitch. Building on this revisited approach, this article re-evaluates questions on who gets to authorise and account representatives and consequently presents a holistic constructivist framework not only on the nature of claim-based representation, but also on its potential and pitfalls. Additionally, it provides incentives for research on the disjunction between constituency and interest groups provoked by a (structural) occurrence of non-authorisation and non-accountability.


1969 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip D. Stewart

The role of interest groups in the policy process has long engaged the attention of students of democratic politics. Only recently, however, have Soviet interest groups been studied systematically. This lag can be explained by two facts: the employment of the totalitarian model, emphasizing hierarchical controls and ignoring or denying significant political conflict; and the considerable difficulties of applying group theory to nondemocratic societies.


Slavic Review ◽  
1972 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 136-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
David E. Langsam ◽  
David W. Paul

One of the “Great Debates” among Soviet specialists in the social sciences today concerns the applicability of interest group theory to the study of Soviet politics. Though a large number of specialists have accepted the notion that interest groups do indeed play a certain kind of role in the Soviet system, there are still those who hold to the opinion, once taken for granted but in recent years challenged, that interest group theory simply does not apply to the Soviet Union. The strength of the latter argument lies in the fact that in the USSR interest groups do not operate publicly and openly, as they do in the United States; therefore, interest group theory as developed to fit the American context cannot describe or explain the dynamic processes of policymaking in Russia.


2013 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 895-906 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Hauner ◽  
Alessandro Prati ◽  
Cagatay Bircan

2012 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 626-643 ◽  
Author(s):  
O. Becerra ◽  
E. Cavallo ◽  
C. Scartascini

Author(s):  
Anne Skorkjær Binderkrantz

Interest groups are key actors in the Danish political system. This chapter discusses the origin and development of the interest group system and the political role of groups. The focus is on interest groups both as membership-based associations and as political actors. The chapter discusses how the early mobilization of farmers, workers, and businesses interacted with emerging corporatist structures in shaping the contours of the interest group system. Later developments led to a shift towards more groups representing citizen interests rather than economic groups. The political role of groups traditionally centred on access to public decision-making through, for example, representation in boards and committees. Today, interest groups operate across multiple arenas, and Parliament and the news media have become central. New actors such as think tanks and public affairs agencies have gained importance, but traditional interest groups remain the most prominent policy advocates in Denmark.


2004 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 456-479 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben Ross Schneider

A recent wave of deep empirical research provides a solid basis for a comparative reassessment of the role of coalitions in the politics of market reform in Latin America in the 1990s. This research confirms earlier findings that interest groups and distributional coalitions were not major protagonists in either antireform or proreform coalitions. The new research goes further empirically into analyzing the origins of interests, especially business interests, and finds them to be much more ambiguous and dynamic than assumed in earlier studies. Consequendy, other factors, especially organizations and the evolving macroeconomic context, were stronger influences on preferences regarding reform. Given the relative weakness of interest group coalitions, the article provides a typology and preliminary analysis of other kinds of coalitions—electoral, legislative, and policy—that have become more central to reform politics. These other types of coalitions still require further theoretical elaboration and empirical investigation in order to determine how they can best be deployed to illuminate reform politics.


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