A Pre-Shipment Gas Generation Test Using a Bell Jar

Author(s):  
G. C. Rodrigues ◽  
S. J. Hensel

The primary purpose of a bell jar is to collect and measure out gassing from a container (e.g., food can) of plutonium bearing materials to evaluate potential pressurization within a shipping package containment vessel. The bell jar allows for testing of the actual cans to be shipped without repackaging or taking samples of the materials. Pressurization of the bell jar can be readily extrapolated to the conditions inside the shipping container containment vessel during a shipment. Bell jar testing is being used in conjunction with current plutonium surveillance techniques (lid deflection measuring) to demonstrate that the cans bearing plutonium material may be shipped safely across the Savannah River Site for processing. Statistical sampling of similar materials leverages the testing such that only population subsets need be tested. The pressurization (or depressurization) measured in the bell jar to date has been very small and of no concern from a shipping perspective.

Author(s):  
James E. Laurinat ◽  
Neal M. Askew ◽  
Steve J. Hensel ◽  
Narendra K. Gupta

Bare shipping package containment vessels can be utilized to stage plutonium oxide at the Savannah River Site. Pressurization and subsequent release could occur due to a hypothetical facility fire. Pressurization due to adsorbed moisture on the plutonium oxide and plastic packaging materials could result in rupture of the containment vessel. The containment vessel was evaluated to determine rupture pressure when subjected to the fire conditions. The rupture pressure is compared with pressures developed due to radiolytic gas generation.


Author(s):  
R. W. Watkins ◽  
R. D. Hill

Two cans containing plutonium bearing materials were found during radiography surveillance activities to be bulged. The cans had been stored in DOT 6M shipping containers at the Savannah River Site. The material in the first can (Item CZA96-179) was packaged can/bag/can configuration with the inner and outer cans being crimp sealed. The crimp sealed innermost can was clearly deformed from the radiography picture taken for surveillance purposes. This material had been stored in the shipping container since the mid 1970’s. The second can (Item 50014440) contained plutonium bearing material of a different origin. The material had been repackaged at the Savannah River Site in the mid 1990’s, and the repackaged can was stored in a 6M shipping drum. A special puncturing tool, which secured the can and allowed for a very controlled puncture of both outer and inner cans was used in a glovebox. The glovebox has a dry air system and an argon supply. The puncturing tool utilized a non-sparking punch and an argon purge. The cans were repackaged into filtered outer cans. A description of the puncturing tool, repackaging activities, and of the materials will be provided.


Author(s):  
Steve J. Hensel ◽  
Jonathan R. Kies

Seventy cans containing plutonium bearing materials have been tested for gas generation in bell jars at the Savannah River Site (SRS). Gas samples from five of the tests were taken and analyzed for hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, methane, carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, and nitrous oxide. Gas samples from all five cans showed significant oxygen consumption. Hydrogen and carbon dioxide were found in non-negligible quantities in all gas samples. Hydrogen and carbon dioxide generation rates are presented along with oxygen depletion rates. A description of the plutonium bearing materials is also provided.


Author(s):  
Lucas L. Kyriazidis ◽  
Steve J. Hensel ◽  
Jeff M. Jordan

Storage of plutonium bearing materials at the US Department of Energy Savannah River Site (SRS) typically are packaged in DOE-STD-3013 welded containers which are stored in 9975 shipping packages. However, some materials are packaged in non-welded metal containers which consist of a can-bag-can configuration. These non-welded containers and the 9975 package provide safe containment of the plutonium bearing materials. Additionally, the materials must be stabilized such that adverse reactions do not occur during storage. Lastly, a surveillance program of these containers provides field and laboratory data with respect to package aging and potential degradation. The packaging, material stabilization, and surveillance requirements are identified in an Interim Safe Storage Criteria (ISSC) Program at SRS. This paper provides a high level overview of the ISSC program. Interim storage is defined as the storage prior to long term plutonium disposition.


Author(s):  
Steve J. Hensel ◽  
Lucas L. Kyriazidis ◽  
Eric J. Skidmore ◽  
Neal M. Askew

This evaluation considers the storage of plutonium materials in 9975 shipping packages at the Savannah River Site (SRS) K-Area Complex (KAC). The materials are packaged in a can – bag – can configuration where the outer can is a screw lid filtered can and the inner can is a slip lid filtered can (filters for both cans are located in the can lid). The inner slip lid can is secured using polyvinyl chloride tape. A filtered plasticized polyvinyl chloride (pPVC) bag is used to bag out the slip lid can from the glove box where the plutonium oxide is packaged. The filtered bag and slip lid can are placed into the outer screw lid can outside the glove box. This can – bag – can configuration is packaged into a 9975 shipping package for storage. An empty “dummy” tin plated carbon steel can (with a hole in the lid) is packaged on top of the screw lid can inside the 9975 Primary Containment Vessel (PCV). The threshold heat generation such that the thermal decomposition of the pPVC bag is precluded is 7 Watts. In addition, the maximum 9975 PCV pressure is computed for normal conditions of storage of the 9975 shipping package in K-Area Complex (KAC).


Author(s):  
Lindsay R. Baxter ◽  
Stephen P. Harris

Savannah River Remediation, LLC (SRR) is implementing a statistical sampling strategy for in-service inspection (ISI) of liquid waste (LW) tanks at the United States Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site (SRS) in Aiken, South Carolina. As a component of SRS’s corrosion control program (CCP), the ISI program assesses tank wall structural integrity through the use of ultrasonic testing (UT). The statistical strategy for ISI is based on the random sampling of a number of vertically oriented unit areas, called “strips,” within each tank. The number of strips to inspect was determined so as to attain, over time, a high probability of observing at least one of the worst 5% in terms of pitting and corrosion across all tanks. The probability estimation to determine the number of strips to inspect was performed using the hypergeometric distribution. Statistical tolerance limits for pit depth and corrosion rates were calculated by fitting the lognormal distribution to the data. In addition to the strip sampling strategy, a single strip within each tank was identified to serve as the baseline for a longitudinal assessment of the tank safe operational life. The statistical sampling strategy enables the ISI program to develop individual profiles of LW tank wall structural integrity that collectively provide a high confidence in their safety and integrity over operational lifetimes.


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