The Problem of Scientific and Technical Manpower in Western Europe, Canada and the United States . 2nd report. Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, Paris, 1958. 221 pp. $2.

Science ◽  
1958 ◽  
Vol 128 (3315) ◽  
pp. 82-82
Author(s):  
Dael Wolfle
1950 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 342-346

In February 1950 the annual report of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation was presented to the United States Economic Cooperation Administration. The report stated that future progress of European recovery would depend to a large extent upon the level of economic activity in the United States, upon United States tariff policy; and upon international investments made by the United States. The forecasts of European trade were based on the assumption that United States business activity would remain at least as high as in the second and third quarter of 1949; it was pointed out that even small setbacks in the United States economy would have disproportionately large consequences for western Europe whose reserves were not great enough to stand much strain. The report insisted that what remained to be done to solve the dollar problem was not a task for Europe alone but was rather a “joint problem.” Western Europe's dollar deficit could not be eliminated unless its exports to the United States amounted to 75 percent of its imports in value. It was necessary that the emphasis shift from the expansion of total production to the development of dollar earning and dollar saving types of production, as well as a reduction in costs. Inflationary pressure had been greatly relieved but nearly all the Marshall Plan countries were still suffering from some inflationary pressure which tended to reduce their exports and increase their imports. This pressure was likely to continue unless a world depression developed.


1953 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 313-329
Author(s):  
John Hulley

The postwar drive to liberalize trade, increase competition, and thereby improve productivity within Western Europe has met with determined opposition, as have similar attempts at reducing trade barriers in the United States. This resistance has come from a variety of groups which fear that their interests will be jeopardized as a result of keener competition, and its magnitude can hardly be overestimated. Indeed, it probably constitutes the major single barrier to European economic unification. Certainly, it can no longer be passed off with lectures on the virtues of competition, mobility of the factors of production, and international division of labor.


Slavic Review ◽  
1972 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeanette E. Tuve

In the nineteenth century Russia and the United States emerged as nations on the periphery of the West European economic and political vortex. Their relations with each other had been, for the most part, prompted by or integrated with some larger issue involving the powers of Western Europe. Economic relations were no exception. Both nations were traditionally exporters of raw materials to industrialized, urbanized nations, which in turn were prepared and eager to exchange manufactured goods for raw materials. Russian and American products were therefore competitive rather than reciprocal, and profitable mutual exchange of goods had not developed. Both nations were debtor nations and had relied on the surplus capital of the small and large investors of Western Europe to provide the beginnings of internal transportation and industrialization.


1991 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 213-217
Author(s):  
Mir Annice Mahmood

Foreign aid has been the subject of much examination and research ever since it entered the economic armamentarium approximately 45 years ago. This was the time when the Second World War had successfully ended for the Allies in the defeat of Germany and Japan. However, a new enemy, the Soviet Union, had materialized at the end of the conflict. To counter the threat from the East, the United States undertook the implementation of the Marshal Plan, which was extremely successful in rebuilding and revitalizing a shattered Western Europe. Aid had made its impact. The book under review is by three well-known economists and is the outcome of a study sponsored by the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development. The major objective of this study was to evaluate the impact of assistance, i.e., aid, on economic development. This evaluation however, was to be based on the existing literature on the subject. The book has five major parts: Part One deals with development thought and development assistance; Part Two looks at the relationship between donors and recipients; Part Three evaluates the use of aid by sector; Part Four presents country case-studies; and Part Five synthesizes the lessons from development assistance. Part One of the book is very informative in that it summarises very concisely the theoretical underpinnings of the aid process. In the beginning, aid was thought to be the answer to underdevelopment which could be achieved by a transfer of capital from the rich to the poor. This approach, however, did not succeed as it was simplistic. Capital transfers were not sufficient in themselves to bring about development, as research in this area came to reveal. The development process is a complicated one, with inputs from all sectors of the economy. Thus, it came to be recognized that factors such as low literacy rates, poor health facilities, and lack of social infrastructure are also responsible for economic backwardness. Part One of the book, therefore, sums up appropriately the various trends in development thought. This is important because the book deals primarily with the issue of the effectiveness of aid as a catalyst to further economic development.


Geography ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
pp. 218-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heike C. Alberts ◽  
Julie L. Cidell

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