scholarly journals Males as somatic investment in a parthenogenetic nematode

Science ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 363 (6432) ◽  
pp. 1210-1213 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manon Grosmaire ◽  
Caroline Launay ◽  
Marion Siegwald ◽  
Thibault Brugière ◽  
Lilia Estrada-Virrueta ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Reproductive Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategy ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Sperm Dna

We report the reproductive strategy of the nematode Mesorhabditis belari. This species produces only 9% males, whose sperm is necessary to fertilize and activate the eggs. However, most of the fertilized eggs develop without using the sperm DNA and produce female individuals. Only in 9% of eggs is the male DNA utilized, producing sons. We found that mixing of parental genomes only gives rise to males because the Y-bearing sperm of males are much more competent than the X-bearing sperm for penetrating the eggs. In this previously unrecognized strategy, asexual females produce few sexual males whose genes never reenter the female pool. Here, production of males is of interest only if sons are more likely to mate with their sisters. Using game theory, we show that in this context, the production of 9% males by M. belari females is an evolutionary stable strategy.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Stable Strategy for Postdisaster Insurance: Game Theory Approach

2015 ◽  
Vol 31 (6) ◽  
pp. 04015005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohamed S. Eid ◽  
Islam H. El-adaway ◽  
Kalyn T. Coatney
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategy ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Stable Strategy

scholarly journals Why would parthenogenetic females systematically produce males who never transmit their genes to females?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manon Grosmaire ◽  
Caroline Launay ◽  
Marion Siegwald ◽  
Marie-Anne Félix ◽  
Pierre-Henri Gouyon ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Genetic Diversity ◽  
Game Theory ◽  
Reproductive Strategy ◽  
Low Frequency ◽  
Mating Preference ◽  
Efficient Strategy ◽  
Sperm Dna ◽  
The Cost

SummaryIn pseudogamous species, females use the sperm of males from another species to activate their oocytes and produce females, without using the sperm DNA. Here we report a novel reproductive strategy found in the pseudogamous nematode Mesorhabditis belari, which produces its own males at low frequency. We find that the 8% of M. belari males are necessary to fertilize all oocytes but pass on their genes only to males, and never to females. Thus, the production of males has no impact on the genetic diversity of females. Using game theory, we show that the production of males at low frequency constitutes an efficient strategy only if sons are more likely to mate with their sisters. We validate this prediction experimentally by revealing a mating preference between siblings. We uncover the remarkable reproductive strategy of parthenogenetic females that pay the cost of producing males while males do not spread their genes.

Game theory and the evolution of behaviour

1979 ◽  
Vol 205 (1161) ◽  
pp. 475-488 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Field Studies ◽  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Conditional Strategy ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Frequency Dependent Selection ◽  
Contest Behaviour ◽  
Assessment Strategies ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

How far can game theory account for the evolution of contest behaviour in animals? The first qualitative prediction of the theory was that symmetric contests in which escalation is expensive should lead to mixed strategies. As yet it is hard to say how far this is borne out, because of the difficulty of distinguishing a ‘mixed evolutionarily stable strategy’ maintained by frequency-dependent selection from a ‘pure conditional strategy'; the distinction is discussed in relation to several field studies. The second prediction was that if a contest is asymmetric (e. g. in ownership) then the asymmetry will be used as a conventional cue to settle it. This prediction has been well supported by observation. A third important issue is whether or not information about intentions is exchanged during contests. The significance of ‘assessment’ strategies is discussed.

scholarly journals An Incentive Mechanism for Reporting Phishing E-Mails Based on the Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Mengli Wang ◽  
Lipeng Song
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolution Process ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Important Link ◽  
E Mail

The human is considered as the important link in the phishing attack, and the e-mail security provider encourages users to report suspicious e-mails. However, evidence suggests that reporting is scarce. Therefore, we study how to motivate users to report phishing e-mails in this paper. To solve the problem, a tripartite evolutionary game model among e-mail security providers, e-mail users, and attackers is constructed. We obtain the desired evolutionary stable strategy through solving the replicator dynamics equations. Moreover, the evolution process to the desired evolutionary stable strategy is derived, which can guide the e-mail security provider to make a reasonable incentive mechanism. Lastly, we experiment with a large real-world e-mail network. The experiment results show that our model is effective and practical.

scholarly journals Green Product Quality Supervision Strategy in Online Shopping With Consumer Evaluation and Complaint

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hui He ◽  
Siyi Zhang ◽  
Lilong Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Product Quality ◽  
Online Shopping ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategy ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Green Product ◽  
High Quality ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Strategy Combination

Green consumption is an important foundation for achieving stable and long-term economic development goals. With the rapid development of e-commerce and people’s widespread attention to sustainability, more and more consumers purchase green products online. Therefore, we consider consumer feedback mechanisms including evaluation and complaint and construct an evolutionary game model of green product quality supervision with the participation of governmental supervision department, third-party e-commerce platform, online seller and consumer, which analyzes the four parties’ evolutionary stable strategies. To verify the theoretical results, we conduct a numerical simulation by Matlab 2020b. Moreover, we study the conditions that make evolutionary stable strategy combination exist based on Lyapunov’s First Method. And we find that when consumer chooses complaint, (0, 0, 1) is likely to become an only evolutionary stable strategy combination. At this time, the online seller chooses to provide high-quality green product, third-party e-commerce platform chooses not to strengthen inspection, and governmental supervision department chooses to strictly supervise. Conversely, when the consumer chooses no complaint, (1, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 1) may become an evolutionary stable strategy combination. At this time, the online seller cannot be stable in providing high-quality green product. What’s more, governmental supervision department increases the penalty, which can incentivize a third-party e-commerce platform to strengthen inspection. Third-party e-commerce platform increases the reward and can promote online seller to provide high-quality green product. On the one hand, this paper enriches the theoretical basis of online shopping green product quality supervision. On the other hand, compared with existing literature, it extends the main body of the evolutionary game to four paries and broadens the application scope of the game model. In addition, it has put forward feasible suggestions for the government supervision department to strengthen the quality supervision, and provided decision-making support for the third-party e-commerce platform to assume the responsibility of quality inspection.

scholarly journals Research on Taxi Driver Strategy Game Evolution with Carpooling Detour

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Zhang ◽  
Ruichun He ◽  
Changxi Ma ◽  
Mingxia Gao
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Traffic Congestion ◽  
Strategy Choice ◽  
Taxi Driver ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Strategy Game ◽  
Evolution Game

For the problem of taxi carpooling detour, this paper studies driver strategy choice with carpooling detour. The model of taxi driver strategy evolution with carpooling detour is built based on prospect theory and evolution game theory. Driver stable strategies are analyzed under the conditions of complaint mechanism and absence of mechanism, respectively. The results show that passenger’s complaint mechanism can effectively decrease the phenomenon of driver refusing passengers with carpooling detour. When probability of passenger complaint reaches a certain level, the stable strategy of driver is to take carpooling detour passengers. Meanwhile, limiting detour distance and easing traffic congestion can decrease the possibility of refusing passengers. These conclusions have a certain guiding significance to formulating taxi policy.

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