scholarly journals An Incentive Mechanism for Reporting Phishing E-Mails Based on the Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Mengli Wang ◽  
Lipeng Song
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategy ◽  
Evolution Process ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Important Link ◽  
E Mail

The human is considered as the important link in the phishing attack, and the e-mail security provider encourages users to report suspicious e-mails. However, evidence suggests that reporting is scarce. Therefore, we study how to motivate users to report phishing e-mails in this paper. To solve the problem, a tripartite evolutionary game model among e-mail security providers, e-mail users, and attackers is constructed. We obtain the desired evolutionary stable strategy through solving the replicator dynamics equations. Moreover, the evolution process to the desired evolutionary stable strategy is derived, which can guide the e-mail security provider to make a reasonable incentive mechanism. Lastly, we experiment with a large real-world e-mail network. The experiment results show that our model is effective and practical.

scholarly journals Green Product Quality Supervision Strategy in Online Shopping With Consumer Evaluation and Complaint

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hui He ◽  
Siyi Zhang ◽  
Lilong Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Product Quality ◽  
Online Shopping ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategy ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Green Product ◽  
High Quality ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Strategy Combination

Green consumption is an important foundation for achieving stable and long-term economic development goals. With the rapid development of e-commerce and people’s widespread attention to sustainability, more and more consumers purchase green products online. Therefore, we consider consumer feedback mechanisms including evaluation and complaint and construct an evolutionary game model of green product quality supervision with the participation of governmental supervision department, third-party e-commerce platform, online seller and consumer, which analyzes the four parties’ evolutionary stable strategies. To verify the theoretical results, we conduct a numerical simulation by Matlab 2020b. Moreover, we study the conditions that make evolutionary stable strategy combination exist based on Lyapunov’s First Method. And we find that when consumer chooses complaint, (0, 0, 1) is likely to become an only evolutionary stable strategy combination. At this time, the online seller chooses to provide high-quality green product, third-party e-commerce platform chooses not to strengthen inspection, and governmental supervision department chooses to strictly supervise. Conversely, when the consumer chooses no complaint, (1, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 1) may become an evolutionary stable strategy combination. At this time, the online seller cannot be stable in providing high-quality green product. What’s more, governmental supervision department increases the penalty, which can incentivize a third-party e-commerce platform to strengthen inspection. Third-party e-commerce platform increases the reward and can promote online seller to provide high-quality green product. On the one hand, this paper enriches the theoretical basis of online shopping green product quality supervision. On the other hand, compared with existing literature, it extends the main body of the evolutionary game to four paries and broadens the application scope of the game model. In addition, it has put forward feasible suggestions for the government supervision department to strengthen the quality supervision, and provided decision-making support for the third-party e-commerce platform to assume the responsibility of quality inspection.

scholarly journals How to Promote Compliance Management in the Electricity Market? An Analysis Based on the Evolutionary Game Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luosong Jin ◽  
Cheng Chen ◽  
Yun Li ◽  
Xiangyang Wang ◽  
Yuanyuan Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Electricity Market ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolution Process ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Dynamic Evolution ◽  
Model Parameters ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Compliance Cost ◽  
Compliance Management ◽  
The Government

In this paper, we aim to analyze how to effectively promote compliance management in the electricity market. We construct an evolutionary game model under the two different scenarios, i.e., the scenario without governmental supervision and the scenario with governmental supervision, and explicitly describes the strategic behaviors and dynamic evolution process of power enterprises and regulators in the power market. According to the results of the evolutionary stable strategy, we find that, in the absence of governmental supervision, the long-term stable equilibrium of power enterprises' choice of strategy “Compliance” and regulatory agencies' choice of strategy “Not bribery” is hard to be realized. Only if the government effectively supervises the compliance management of the electricity market can the ideal compliance behavior of the two stakeholders be achieved. Furthermore, we conduct a simulation study to analyze the impacts of the various model parameters on the dynamic evolution process. The specific results show that the lower compliance cost, the higher psychological cost, and the larger profit loss of the power enterprises, as well as the lower inspection cost, the higher psychological cost, and the larger rewards of the regulatory agencies, can promote the formation of compliance management. Besides, the larger penalty charged by the government is also conducive to the compliance management of the electricity market.

scholarly journals Does Whistleblowing Work for Air Pollution Control in China? A Study Based on Three-party Evolutionary Game Model under Incomplete Information

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 324 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yunpeng Yang ◽  
Weixin Yang
Keyword(s):  
Air Pollution ◽  
Local Government ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Local Government Officials

During China’s air pollution campaign, whistleblowing has become an important way for the central government to discover local environmental issues. The three parties involved in whistleblowing are: the central government environmental protection departments, the local government officials, and the whistleblowers. Based on these players, this paper has constructed an Evolutionary Game Model under incomplete information and introduced the expected return as well as replicator dynamics equations of various game agents based on analysis of the game agents, assumptions, and payoff functions of the model in order to study the strategic dynamic trend and stability of the evolutionary game model. Furthermore, this paper has conducted simulation experiments on the evolution of game agents’ behaviors by combining the constraints and replicator dynamics equations. The conclusions are: the central environmental protection departments are able to effectively improve the environmental awareness of local government officials by measures such as strengthening punishment on local governments that do not pay attention to pollution issues and lowering the cost of whistleblowing, thus nurturing a good governance and virtuous circle among the central environmental protection departments, local government officials, and whistleblowers. Based on the study above, this paper has provided policy recommendations in the conclusion.

scholarly journals Evaluation of the Quality Supervision System for Construction Projects in China Considering the Quality Behavior Risk Transmission

Symmetry ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (10) ◽  
pp. 1660
Author(s):  
Jingchun Feng ◽  
Yuting Wang ◽  
Ke Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Construction Projects ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Evolutionary System ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Supervision System ◽  
System A ◽  
Low Efficiency ◽  
The Stability

In construction projects, improper quality behavior of a participant results in quality behavior risks, which can transmit to the downstream participants and may cause detrimental effects on the quality of the entity finally constructed. Controlling the transmission of quality behavior risks is the key to effectively supervising and ensuring the quality of construction projects. In this study, the effectiveness of the quality supervision system of construction projects in China was investigated by considering the transmission of quality behavior risks. A multi-player evolutionary game model consisting of the players of quality supervision of a government department, upstream participant (UP), and downstream participant (DP) was generated. By using the system dynamics theory, the game model was simulated to determine the stability of the evolutionary system and to evaluate the effectiveness of China’s current quality supervision system under different scenarios. The results showed that there is no evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) in the evolutionary system of the current quality supervision system in China and there are fluctuations in the evolution process. It revealed that high risk exists in the current quality supervision system in China. To resolve the problem of the low efficiency of the current Chinese supervision system, a dynamic penalty and incentive method is developed, which has been proven to be able to effectively control the quality behavior risks in construction projects and hence ensuring the quality of the entity finally constructed.

scholarly journals Can Status Inequality Organize Cooperation in Multi-leader Systems? An Evolutionary Theory

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hsuan-Wei Lee ◽  
Yen-Ping Chang ◽  
Yen-Sheng Chiang
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Task Groups ◽  
Cooperative Interactions ◽  
Evolutionary Function ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Status Inequality ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Multiple Leaders

Abstract Status hierarchies often emerge in small collective task groups. In these groups, clearly defined hierarchies facilitate and stabilize structured cooperative interactions among group members, supporting their evolutionary function in the real world. What the existing research in this field has failed to consider, however, is that cooperation matters in these hierarchies with clear status inequality, as well as in other more realistic, multiple-leader groups with less clear hierarchies. Multi-leadership is ubiquitous but, by definition, flattens status inequality and may, in turn, jeopardize its capacity to sustain cooperation. Leveraging the relationship between multi-leadership and cooperation, our evolutionary game model reveals that hierarchies, in general, promote cooperation in groups with multiple leaders, but these hierarchies only do that up to a point, after which multi-leadership backfires. Accordingly, the model provides not only a theoretical account for how multi-leadership coexists with cooperation but also the conditions under which the coexistence would break.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Model of Stock Price Synchronicity from Investor Behavior

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Yue Dong ◽  
Yuhao Zhang ◽  
Jinnan Pan ◽  
Tingqiang Chen
Keyword(s):  
Stock Market ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Individual Investors ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stock Price Synchronicity ◽  
The Cost

Institutional and individual investors are the two important players in the stock market. Together, they determine the price of the stock market. In this paper, an evolutionary game model that contains the two groups of players is proposed to analyze the stock price synchronicity considering the impacts of investors’ decisions on stock investment. Factors affecting investors’ decisions include the potential revenue or loss, the probability of gain or loss, and the cost of corresponding behavior. The proposed game model is analyzed by replicator dynamics equations and simulation of the evolutionary equilibrium strategy under different circumstances. The analysis shows that the operating cost of institutional investors, the cost of information collection before trading, and the expected loss that may be punished by regulators are the key factors that affect the evolutionary game system between institutional investors and individual investors. In addition, reducing the speculation in the market and increasing the information access of investors through the serious operation mode of institutional investors and the strengthening of the market information disclosure mechanism are beneficial to alleviate price synchronicity in stock market.

Behavior Analysis of Together-Conspired Bidding Based on the Evolutionary Game

2012 ◽  
Vol 209-211 ◽  
pp. 1513-1516
Author(s):  
Qian Li
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Behavior Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Theoretical Basis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Research Work ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Periodic Fluctuation ◽  
Construction Market

Based on the “replication dynamics” ideas, the paper establishes asymmetric evolutionary game model of together-conspired bidding using evolutionary game theory, and obtains its evolutionary stable strategy under the present governmental supervision that surround-bidder and accompanying-bidder’s proportion is periodic fluctuation of the center stability, explains the reason why together-conspired bidding is difficult to be prevented effectively. In order to find the decisive factor of the evolutionary drift, further investigation shows that the evolutionary drift is converged to the different evolutionary stable properties when evolution conditions change, such as the supervision target, supervision strength. Through the analysis to the punishment extent on surround-bidder and accompanying-bidder, the conclusion is arrived that the strength of punishment and execution on the surround-bidder can effectively control together-conspired bidding, which provides the theoretical basis to governmental supervision department for the management and research work on together-conspired bidding in the construction market.

scholarly journals Packet Forwarding Strategies in Multiagent Systems: An Evolutionary Game Approach

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Yuanjie Li ◽  
Xiaojun Wu
Keyword(s):  
Multiagent Systems ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Packet Forwarding ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Incentive Mechanisms ◽  
Average Probability ◽  
Save Energy ◽  
Stable Points

In multiagent systems (MASs), agents need to forward packets to each other to accomplish a target task. In this paper, we study packet forwarding among agents using evolutionary game theory under the mechanisms of Carrier Sense Multiple Access/Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA). Packet forwarding among agents plays a key role to stabilize the whole MAS. We study the transfer probability of packet forwarding of agents at the idle state or the busy state and computer the probability of the packet forwarding for a MAS. When agents make their decisions to select Forward or No-Forward strategy, a packet forwarding evolutionary game model is built to reflect the utilities of different packet forwarding strategies. Two incentive mechanisms are introduced into the game model. One is to motivate agents to strengthen cooperation; the other is to encourage agents to select the No-Forward strategy to save energy while they are in the busy state. The parameter value that encourages an agent to select the No-Forward strategy is inversely proportional to the average probability of the packet forwarding. The replicator dynamics of agent packet forwarding strategy evolution are given. We propose and prove the theorems indicating that evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) can be attained. The results of simulation experiments verify the correctness of the proposed theorems and the effects of the two incentive mechanisms and the probability of packet forwarding, which assures the robustness of evolutionary stable points among agents in MASs.

scholarly journals Cooperation or Competition: An Evolutionary Game Study between Commercial Banks and Big Data-Based E-Commerce Financial Institutions in China

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi Zhao ◽  
Dong Li ◽  
Liqiang Pan
Keyword(s):  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Commercial Banks ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Business Case ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategy ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Supply Chain Financing

On the premise of participants’ bounded rationality and information asymmetry, this paper focuses on the cooperation or competition relationship between Chinese e-commerce financial institutions and commercial banks from the perspective of dynamic game. Theoretical mathematical model is built to analyze an evolutionary stable strategy under different conditions. We adopt real-life data set collected in Alibaba’s network credit loan business case and Jingdong’s supply chain financing business case to verify the evolution process of cooperation and competition relationship. The results show that (cooperation, cooperation) is bound to be the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) and cooperation tends to be increasingly in-depth and expansive for commercial banks as well as e-commerce financial institutions in China. The complementarity of participants’ core competitiveness is explored as the root of cooperation. Finally, strategic suggestions are put forward on cooperation between e-commerce financial institutions and commercial banks.

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