scholarly journals Pandemic Threat Posed by Avian Influenza A Viruses

2001 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Taisuke Horimoto ◽  
Yoshihiro Kawaoka

SUMMARY Influenza pandemics, defined as global outbreaks of the disease due to viruses with new antigenic subtypes, have exacted high death tolls from human populations. The last two pandemics were caused by hybrid viruses, or reassortants, that harbored a combination of avian and human viral genes. Avian influenza viruses are therefore key contributors to the emergence of human influenza pandemics. In 1997, an H5N1 influenza virus was directly transmitted from birds in live poultry markets in Hong Kong to humans. Eighteen people were infected in this outbreak, six of whom died. This avian virus exhibited high virulence in both avian and mammalian species, causing systemic infection in both chickens and mice. Subsequently, another avian virus with the H9N2 subtype was directly transmitted from birds to humans in Hong Kong. Interestingly, the genes encoding the internal proteins of the H9N2 virus are genetically highly related to those of the H5N1 virus, suggesting a unique property of these gene products. The identification of avian viruses in humans underscores the potential of these and similar strains to produce devastating influenza outbreaks in major population centers. Although highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses had been identified before the 1997 outbreak in Hong Kong, their devastating effects had been confined to poultry. With the Hong Kong outbreak, it became clear that the virulence potential of these viruses extended to humans.

2006 ◽  
Vol 59 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 29-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivana Hrnjakovic-Cvjetkovic ◽  
Dejan Cvjetkovic ◽  
Vera Jerant-Patic ◽  
Vesna Milosevic ◽  
Jelena Tadic-Radovanov ◽  
...  

Introduction. Influenza A viruses can infect humans, some mammals and especially birds. Subtypes of human influenza A viruses: ACH1N1), ACH2N2) and A(H3N2) have caused pandemics. Avian influenza viruses vary owing to their 15 hemagglutinins (H) and 9 neuraminidases (N). Human cases of avian influenza A In the Netherlands in 2003, there were 83 human cases of influenza A (H7N7). In 1997, 18 cases of H5N1 influenza A, of whom 6 died, were found among residents of Hong Kong. In 2004, 34 human cases (23 deaths) were reported in Viet Nam and Thailand. H5N1 virus-infected patients presented with fever and respiratory symptoms. Complications included respiratory distress syndrome, renal failure, liver dysfunction and hematologic disorders. Since 1999, 7 cases of human influenza H9N2 infection have been identified in China and Hong Kong. The importance of human infection with avian influenza viruses. H5N1 virus can directly infect humans. Genetic reassortment of human and avian influenza viruses may occur in humans co infected with current human A(HIN1) or A(H3N2) subtypes and avian influenza viruses. The result would be a new influenza virus with pandemic potential. All genes of H5Nl viruses isolated from humans are of avian origin. Prevention and control. The reassortant virus containing H and N from avian and the remaining proteins from human influenza viruses will probably be used as a vaccine strain. The most important control measures are rapid destruction of all infected or exposed birds and rigorous disinfection of farms. Individuals exposed to suspected animals should receive prophylactic treatment with antivirals and annual vaccination. .


2017 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 339
Author(s):  
C. S. KYRIAKIS (Κ. ΣΠ. ΚΥΡΙΑΚΗΣ) ◽  
K. Van REETH

The huge epizootics of highly pathogenic avian influenza (subtype H5N1) in Southeastern Asia over the last two years and especially the transmission of avian influenza viruses to humans have alerted the international scientific community. Many support that the threat of a new influenza pandemic appears greater today than ever before. During the 20th century, humanity has faced three pandemics, including the "Spanish flu" of 1918-19, which claimed over 20 to 40 million lives, and two less dramatic pandemics in 1957-58 and 1968-69. Influenza A viruses are single stranded RNA viruses belonging to the family Orthomyxoviridae. Their genome expresses only 10 proteins, most important of which are the two surface glycoproteins: haemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA). So far, 16 different types of haemagglutinin (HI to Η16) and 9 of neuraminidase (Nl to N9) have been recognized. Influenza A viruses are grouped into "subtypes", according to the HA and NA surface proteins they bear (for example Η I N I , H5N2). Natural reservoirs of influenza A viruses are the wild aquatic birds (migratory waterfowl), from which all types of HA and NA have been isolated. It is important to mention that migratory waterfowl do not show clinical signs of disease, but shed the virus through their excretions.The host range of flu viruses includes domestic poultry, and mammalian species from aquatic mammals to horses, humans and swine. Because of their segmented single stranded RNA genome, influenza viruses have a very high mutation rate (genetic drift) and the possibility to undergo reassortment. Reassortment may occur when more than one virus co-infect the same cell, exchange genes and as a result, provide a totally new influenza virus (genetic shift). At least two subtypes of influenza A viruses are currendy endemic within the human population (H1N1 and H3N2), causing every year outbreaks of disease with very low mortality, especially in elders. Unlike these endemic viruses, pandemic viruses have a much higher morbidity, affecting people of all ages. Η I N I , H3N2 and H1N2 influenza viruses are currently circulating in the European and American swine population. Some of the swine influenza virus subtypes, namely Η I N I and H3N2, are thus similar to those of humans, but there are still important antigenic differences between them. Only rarely swine influenza viruses may be transmitted or cause disease to humans. Unlike mammalian influenza viruses, influenza viruses of domestic birds are grouped in two "pathotypes": low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses, which cause localized infections and remain mild or subclinical, and highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses, which cause severe general infection with mortality up to 100% (fowl plague). The majority of avian influenza viruses are low pathogenic and only some, but not all, viruses of H5 and H7 subtypes are highly pathogenic. Occasionally low pathogenic Η5 or H7 viruses from wild birds transmit to poultry. Such viruses can undergo mutations in poultry as a result of which they may acquire a highly pathogenic phenotype. Until the recent avian influenza epizootics in Asia, the predominant theory for the creation of a pandemic virus supported that the pig was likely to act as an intermediate host for transmission of influenza viruses from birds to humans. The fact that genetic reassortment between human and avian viruses has also been shown to occur in pigs in nature, had led to the hypothesis that the pandemic viruses of 1957 and 1968 may have been generated through the pig. More recent data, however, come to question these theories and hypotheses: (a)the direct transmission of the H5N1 and H7N7 avian influenza viruses from birds to humans in Southeastern Asia and The Netherlands, and (b) the presence of cellular receptors recognized preferentially by the haemagglutinin of avian influenza viruses in the human conjunctiva and ciliated respiratory epithelial cells, which support that avian influenza viruses can be transmitted in toto (without reassortment) to and between humans or that humans can be the mixing vessel themselves. Furthermore, there is no solid scientific evidence to prove that any influenza virus reassortants, that have originated in swine, have posed a risk for humans. There are three criteria (conditions) an influenza virus must fulfill in order to be characterized as a pandemic virus: (a) it must be a new virus against which humans are immunologically naive, (b) it must be able to replicate in humans causing severe disease, and (c) it must be efficiendy transmitted among humans, causing wide outbreaks. So far the H5N1 influenza virus only fulfills the first and second condition, and even though it has been sporadically infecting humans for over two years, it has not yet been able to fully adapt to it's new host. Compared to the human population that may have been exposed to the H5N1 influenza virus in Asia, the number of patients and fatalities due to the H5N1 virus is very small. So far, it appears that swine do not play an important role in the epidemiology of this specific virus. Experimental infections of swine with highly pathogenic H5N1 virus have shown that it does not replicate extensively in pigs. Additionally, extensive serological investigations in the swine population of Viet Nam, indicated that the H5N1 virus merely spread to a very small number (~0.25%) of contact animals within the epizootic regions. Nevertheless, it is critical to continue monitor ring pigs and studying the behavior and spread of influenza viruses in these species.


2001 ◽  
Vol 45 (10) ◽  
pp. 2723-2732 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena A. Govorkova ◽  
Irina A. Leneva ◽  
Olga G. Goloubeva ◽  
Karen Bush ◽  
Robert G. Webster

ABSTRACT The orally administered neuraminidase (NA) inhibitor RWJ-270201 was tested in parallel with zanamivir and oseltamivir against a panel of avian influenza viruses for inhibition of NA activity and replication in tissue culture. The agents were then tested for protection of mice against lethal H5N1 and H9N2 virus infection. In vitro, RWJ-270201 was highly effective against all nine NA subtypes. NA inhibition by RWJ-270201 (50% inhibitory concentration, 0.9 to 4.3 nM) was superior to that by zanamivir and oseltamivir carboxylate. RWJ-270201 inhibited the replication of avian influenza viruses of both Eurasian and American lineages in MDCK cells (50% effective concentration, 0.5 to 11.8 μM). Mice given 10 mg of RWJ-270201 per kg of body weight per day were completely protected against lethal challenge with influenza A/Hong Kong/156/97 (H5N1) and A/quail/Hong Kong/G1/97 (H9N2) viruses. Both RWJ-270201 and oseltamivir significantly reduced virus titers in mouse lungs at daily dosages of 1.0 and 10 mg/kg and prevented the spread of virus to the brain. When treatment began 48 h after exposure to H5N1 virus, 10 mg of RWJ-270201/kg/day protected 50% of mice from death. These results suggest that RWJ-270201 is at least as effective as either zanamivir or oseltamivir against avian influenza viruses and may be of potential clinical use for treatment of emerging influenza viruses that may be transmitted from birds to humans.


2001 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 1216-1224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Irina A. Leneva ◽  
Olga Goloubeva ◽  
Robert J. Fenton ◽  
Margaret Tisdale ◽  
Robert G. Webster

ABSTRACT In 1997, an avian H5N1 influenza virus, A/Hong Kong/156/97 (A/HK/156/97), caused six deaths in Hong Kong, and in 1999, an avian H9N2 influenza virus infected two children in Hong Kong. These viruses and a third avian virus [A/Teal/HK/W312/97 (H6N1)] have six highly related genes encoding internal proteins. Additionally, A/Chicken/HK/G9/97 (H9N2) virus has PB1 and PB2 genes that are highly related to those of A/HK/156/97 (H5N1), A/Teal/HK/W312/97 (H6N1), and A/Quail/HK/G1/97 (H9N2) viruses. Because of their similarities with the H5N1 virus, these H6N1 and H9N2 viruses may have the potential for interspecies transmission. We demonstrate that these H6N1 and H9N2 viruses are pathogenic in mice but that their pathogenicities are less than that of A/HK/156/97 (H5N1). Unadapted virus replicated in lungs, but only A/HK/156/97 (H5N1) was found in the brain. After three passages (P3) in mouse lungs, the pathogenicity of the viruses increased, with both A/Teal/HK/W312/97 (H6N1) (P3) and A/Quail/HK/G1/97 (H9N2) (P3) viruses being found in the brain. The neuraminidase inhibitor zanamivir inhibited viral replication in Madin-Darby canine kidney cells in virus yield assays (50% effective concentration, 8.5 to 14.0 μM) and inhibited viral neuraminidase activity (50% inhibitory concentration, 5 to 10 nM). Twice daily intranasal administration of zanamivir (50 and 100 mg/kg of body weight) completely protected infected mice from death. At a dose of 10 mg/kg, zanamivir completely protected mice from infection with H9N2 viruses and increased the mean survival day and the number of survivors infected with H6N1 and H5N1 viruses. Zanamivir, at all doses tested, significantly reduced the virus titers in the lungs and completely blocked the spread of virus to the brain. Thus, zanamivir is efficacious in treating avian influenza viruses that can be transmitted to mammals.


2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 8-14
Author(s):  
Vladimir Savić

Over the past and the current centuries, human influenza pandemics have been attributable to viruses with an avian ancestry. Birds are the main source of influenza A viruses and harbour a variety of antigenic subtypes. Certain avian influenza viruses are capable for cross-species transmission including human infections. Although sustained intrehuman transmission of such viruses has not been documented so far, each human infection with avian influenza viruses provides chances for the virus adaptation towards efficient transmission within human population. Here are reviewed currently circulating avian influenza viruses that are of major significance for public health.


1999 ◽  
Vol 73 (4) ◽  
pp. 3184-3189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peng Gao ◽  
Shinji Watanabe ◽  
Toshihiro Ito ◽  
Hideo Goto ◽  
Krisna Wells ◽  
...  

ABSTRACT An H5N1 avian influenza A virus was transmitted to humans in Hong Kong in 1997. Although the virus causes systemic infection and is highly lethal in chickens because of the susceptibility of the hemagglutinin to furin and PC6 proteases, it is not known whether it also causes systemic infection in humans. The clinical outcomes of infection in Hong Kong residents ranged widely, from mild respiratory disease to multiple organ failure leading to death. Therefore, to understand the pathogenesis of influenza due to these H5N1 isolates, we investigated their virulence in mice. The results identified two distinct groups of viruses: group 1, for which the dose lethal for 50% of mice (MLD50) was between 0.3 and 11 PFU, and group 2, for which the MLD50 was more than 103 PFU. One day after intranasal inoculation of mice with 100 PFU of group 1 viruses, the virus titer in lungs was 107 PFU/g or 3 log units higher than that for group 2 viruses. Both types of viruses had replicated to high titers (>106 PFU/g) in the lungs by day 3 and maintained these titers through day 6. More importantly, only the group 1 viruses caused systemic infection, replicating in nonrespiratory organs, including the brain. Immunohistochemical analysis demonstrated the replication of a group 1 virus in brain neurons and glial cells and in cardiac myofibers. Phylogenetic analysis of all viral genes showed that both groups of Hong Kong H5N1 viruses had formed a lineage distinct from those of other viruses and that genetic reassortment between H5N1 and H1 or H3 human viruses had not occurred. Since mice and humans harbor both the furin and the PC6 proteases, we suggest that the virulence mechanism responsible for the lethality of influenza viruses in birds also operates in mammalian hosts. The failure of some H5N1 viruses to produce systemic infection in our model indicates that multiple, still-to-be-identified, factors contribute to the severity of H5N1 infection in mammals. In addition, the ability of these viruses to produce systemic infection in mice and the clear differences in pathogenicity among the isolates studied here indicate that this system provides a useful model for studying the pathogenesis of avian influenza virus infection in mammals.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hongliang Chai ◽  
Xiang Li ◽  
Minghui Li ◽  
Xinru Lv ◽  
Wentao Yu ◽  
...  

A 2-year surveillance study of influenza A viruses in migratory birds was conducted to understand the subsequent risk during the migratory seasons in Dandong Yalu River Estuary Coastal Wetland National Nature Reserve, Liaoning Province, China, a major stopover site on the East Asian-Australasian flyway. Overall, we isolated 27 influenza A viruses with multiple subtypes, including H3N8 (n=2), H4N6 (n=2), H4N7 (n=2), H7N4 (n=9), H7N7 (n=1), H10N7 (n=7), and H13N6 (n=4). Particularly, a novel reassortant influenza A(H7N4) virus was first identified in a woman and her backyard poultry flock in Jiangsu Province, China, posing a serious threat to public health. Here, we describe the genetic characterization and pathogenicity of the nine influenza A(H7N4) isolates. Phylogenetic analysis indicated that complex viral gene flow occurred among Asian countries. We also demonstrated a similar evolutionary trajectory of the surface genes of the A(H7N4) isolates and Jiangsu human-related A(H7N4) viruses. Our A(H7N4) isolates exhibited differing degrees of virulence in mice, suggesting a potential risk to other mammalian species, including humans. We revealed multiple mutations that might affect viral virulence in mice. Our report highlights the importance and needs for the long-term surveillance of avian influenza virus in migratory birds, combined with domestic poultry surveillance along migratory routes and flyways, and thereby develop measures to manage potential health threats. Importance The H7 subtype avian influenza viruses, such as H7N2, H7N3, H7N4, H7N7, and H7N9, were documented being capable of infecting humans, and the H7 subtype low pathogenic avian influenza viruses are capable of mutating into highly pathogenic avian influenza; therefore, they pose a serious threat to public health. Here, we investigated the evolutionary history, molecular characteristics, and pathogenicity of shorebird-origin influenza A(H7N4) viruses, showing a similar evolutionary trajectory with Jiangsu human A(H7N4) viruses in HA and NA genes. Moreover, our isolates exhibited variable virulence (including moderate virulence) in mice, suggesting a potential risk to other mammalian species, including humans.


2014 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kinga Urbaniak ◽  
Andrzej Kowalczyk ◽  
Iwona Markowska-Daniel

Influenza A viruses (IAVs) are zoonotic agents, capable of crossing the species barriers. Nowadays, they still constitute a great challenge worldwide. The natural reservoir of all influenza A viruses are wild aquatic birds, despite the fact they have been isolated from a number of avian and mammalian species, including humans. Even when influenza A viruses are able to get into another than waterfowl population, they are often unable to efficiently adapt and transmit between individuals. Only in rare cases, these viruses are capable of establishing a new lineage. To succeed a complete adaptation and further transmission between species, influenza A virus must overcome a species barrier, including adaptation to the receptors of a new host, which would allow the virus-cell binding, virus replication and, then, animal-to-animal transmission. For many years, pigs were thought to be intermediate host for adaptation of avian influenza viruses to humans, because of their susceptibility to infection with both, avian and human influenza viruses, which supported hypothesis of pigs as a 'mixing vessel'. In this review, the molecular factors necessary for interspecies transmission are described, with special emphasis on adaptation of avian influenza viruses to the pig population. In addition, this review gives the information about swine influenza viruses circulating around the world with special emphasis on Polish strains.


2015 ◽  
Vol 90 (4) ◽  
pp. 1872-1879 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoxiao Feng ◽  
Zeng Wang ◽  
Jianzhong Shi ◽  
Guohua Deng ◽  
Huihui Kong ◽  
...  

ABSTRACTWe isolated two H5N1 viruses, A/duck/Hunan/S4020/2008 (DK/08) and A/chicken/Guangxi/S2039/2009 (CK/09), from live-bird markets during routine surveillance and found that these two viruses are genetically similar but differ in their replication and virulence in mice. The CK/09 virus is lethal for mice with a 50% mouse lethal dose (MLD50) of 1.6 log1050% egg infectious doses (EID50), whereas the DK/08 virus is nonpathogenic for mice with an MLD50value of 6.2 log10EID50. We explored the genetic basis of the virulence difference of these two viruses by generating a series of reassortant viruses and mutants in the lethal virus CK/09 background and evaluating their virulence in mice. We found that the PB1 gene of the DK/08 virus dramatically attenuated the virulence of the CK/09 virus and that the amino acid at position 622 in PB1 made an important contribution. We further demonstrated that the mutation of glycine (G) to aspartic acid (D) at position 622 in PB1 partially impaired the binding of PB1 to viral RNA, thereby dramatically decreasing the polymerase activity and attenuating H5N1 virus virulence in mice. Our results identify a novel virulence-related marker of H5N1 influenza viruses and provide a new target for live attenuated vaccine development.IMPORTANCEH5N1 avian influenza viruses have caused the deaths of nearly 60% of the humans that they have infected since 1997 and clearly represent a threat to public health. A thorough understanding of the genetic basis of virulence determinants will provide important insights for antiviral drug and live attenuated vaccine development. Several virulence-related markers in the PB2, PA, M1, and NS1 proteins of H5N1 viruses have been identified. In this study, we isolated two H5N1 avian influenza viruses that are genetically similar but differ in their virulence in mice, and we identified a new virulence-related marker in the PB1 gene. We found that the mutation of glycine (G) to aspartic acid (D) at position 622 in PB1 partially impairs the binding of PB1 to viral RNA, thereby attenuating H5N1 virus virulence in mice. This newly identified virulence-related marker could be applied to the development of live attenuated vaccines against H5N1 influenza.


2005 ◽  
Vol 79 (15) ◽  
pp. 9926-9932 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyoko Shinya ◽  
Masato Hatta ◽  
Shinya Yamada ◽  
Ayato Takada ◽  
Shinji Watanabe ◽  
...  

ABSTRACT In 2003, H5N1 avian influenza virus infections were diagnosed in two Hong Kong residents who had visited the Fujian province in mainland China, affording us the opportunity to characterize one of the viral isolates, A/Hong Kong/213/03 (HK213; H5N1). In contrast to H5N1 viruses isolated from humans during the 1997 outbreak in Hong Kong, HK213 retained several features of aquatic bird viruses, including the lack of a deletion in the neuraminidase stalk and the absence of additional oligosaccharide chains at the globular head of the hemagglutinin molecule. It demonstrated weak pathogenicity in mice and ferrets but caused lethal infection in chickens. The original isolate failed to produce disease in ducks but became more pathogenic after five passages. Taken together, these findings portray the HK213 isolate as an aquatic avian influenza A virus without the molecular changes associated with the replication of H5N1 avian viruses in land-based poultry such as chickens. This case challenges the view that adaptation to land-based poultry is a prerequisite for the replication of aquatic avian influenza A viruses in humans.


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