scholarly journals Zoonotic Potential of Currently Circulating Avian Influenza Viruses

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 8-14
Author(s):  
Vladimir Savić

Over the past and the current centuries, human influenza pandemics have been attributable to viruses with an avian ancestry. Birds are the main source of influenza A viruses and harbour a variety of antigenic subtypes. Certain avian influenza viruses are capable for cross-species transmission including human infections. Although sustained intrehuman transmission of such viruses has not been documented so far, each human infection with avian influenza viruses provides chances for the virus adaptation towards efficient transmission within human population. Here are reviewed currently circulating avian influenza viruses that are of major significance for public health.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dorothea Bestle ◽  
Hannah Limburg ◽  
Diana Kruhl ◽  
Anne Harbig ◽  
David A. Stein ◽  
...  

Cleavage of the influenza A virus (IAV) hemagglutinin (HA) by host proteases is indispensable for virus replication. Most IAVs possess a monobasic HA cleavage site cleaved by trypsin-like proteases. Previously, the transmembrane protease TMPRSS2 was shown to be essential for proteolytic activation of IAV HA subtypes H1, H2, H7 and H10 in mice. In contrast, additional proteases are involved in activation of certain H3 IAVs, indicating that HAs with monobasic cleavage site can differ in their sensitivity to host proteases. Here, we investigated the role of TMPRSS2 in proteolytic activation of avian HA subtypes H1 to H11 and H14 to H16 in human and mouse airway cell cultures. Using reassortant viruses carrying representative HAs, we analysed HA cleavage and multicycle replication in (i) lung cells of TMPRSS2-deficient mice and (ii) Calu-3 cells and primary human bronchial cells subjected to morpholino oligomer-mediated knockdown of TMPRSS2 activity. TMPRSS2 was found to be crucial for activation of H1 to H11, H14 and H15 in airway cells of human and mouse. Only H9 with an R-S-S-R cleavage site and H16 were proteolytically activated in the absence of TMPRSS2 activity, albeit with reduced efficiency. Moreover, a TMPRSS2-orthologous protease from duck supported activation of H1 to H11, H15 and H16 in MDCK cells. Together, our data demonstrate that in human and murine respiratory cells, TMPRSS2 is the major activating protease of almost all IAV HA subtypes with monobasic cleavage site. Furthermore, our results suggest that TMPRSS2 supports activation of IAV with monobasic cleavage site in ducks. Importance Human infections with avian influenza A viruses upon exposure to infected birds are frequently reported and have received attention as a potential pandemic threat. Cleavage of the envelope glycoprotein hemagglutinin (HA) by host proteases is a prerequisite for membrane fusion and essential for virus infectivity. In this study, we identify the transmembrane protease TMPRSS2 as the major activating protease of avian influenza virus HAs of subtypes H1 to H11, H14 and H15 in human and murine airway cells. Our data demonstrate that inhibition of TMPRSS2 activity may provide a useful approach for the treatment of human infections with avian influenza viruses that should be considered for pandemic preparedness as well. Additionally, we show that a TMPRSS2-orthologous protease from duck can activate avian influenza virus HAs with a monobasic cleavage site and thus represents a potential virus-activating protease in waterfowl, the primary reservoir for influenza A viruses.


Author(s):  
Jessica A. Belser ◽  
Taronna R. Maines ◽  
Terrence M. Tumpey ◽  
Jacqueline M. Katz

Efficient human-to-human transmission is a necessary property for the generation of a pandemic influenza virus. To date, only influenza A viruses within the H1–H3 subtypes have achieved this capacity. However, sporadic cases of severe disease in individuals following infection with avian influenza A viruses over the past decade, and the emergence of a pandemic H1N1 swine-origin virus in 2009, underscore the need to better understand how influenza viruses acquire the ability to transmit efficiently. In this review, we discuss the biological constraints and molecular features known to affect virus transmissibility to and among humans. Factors influencing the behaviour of aerosols in the environment are described, and the mammalian models used to study virus transmission are presented. Recent progress in understanding the molecular determinants that confer efficient transmission has identified crucial roles for the haemagglutinin and polymerase proteins; nevertheless, influenza virus transmission remains a polygenic trait that is not completely understood. The clinical implications of this research, including methods currently under investigation to mitigate influenza virus human-to-human transmission, are discussed. A better understanding of the viral determinants necessary for efficient transmission will allow us to identify avian influenza viruses with pandemic potential.


mBio ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bartram L. Smith ◽  
Guifang Chen ◽  
Claus O. Wilke ◽  
Robert M. Krug

ABSTRACTInfluenza A viruses cause an annual contagious respiratory disease in humans and are responsible for periodic high-mortality human pandemics. Pandemic influenza A viruses usually result from the reassortment of gene segments between human and avian influenza viruses. These avian influenza virus gene segments need to adapt to humans. Here we focus on the human adaptation of the synonymous codons of the avian influenza virus PB1 gene of the 1968 H3N2 pandemic virus. We generated recombinant H3N2 viruses differing only in codon usage of PB1 mRNA and demonstrated that codon usage of the PB1 mRNA of recent H3N2 virus isolates enhances replication in interferon (IFN)-treated human cells without affecting replication in untreated cells, thereby partially alleviating the interferon-induced antiviral state. High-throughput sequencing of tRNA pools explains the reduced inhibition of replication by interferon: the levels of some tRNAs differ between interferon-treated and untreated human cells, and evolution of the codon usage of H3N2 PB1 mRNA is skewed toward interferon-altered human tRNA pools. Consequently, the avian influenza virus-derived PB1 mRNAs of modern H3N2 viruses have acquired codon usages that better reflect tRNA availabilities in IFN-treated cells. Our results indicate that the change in tRNA availabilities resulting from interferon treatment is a previously unknown aspect of the antiviral action of interferon, which has been partially overcome by human-adapted H3N2 viruses.IMPORTANCEPandemic influenza A viruses that cause high human mortality usually result from reassortment of gene segments between human and avian influenza viruses. These avian influenza virus gene segments need to adapt to humans. Here we focus on the human adaptation of the avian influenza virus PB1 gene that was incorporated into the 1968 H3N2 pandemic virus. We demonstrate that the coding sequence of the PB1 mRNA of modern H3N2 viruses enhances replication in human cells in which interferon has activated a potent antiviral state. Reduced interferon inhibition results from evolution of PB1 mRNA codons skewed toward the pools of tRNAs in interferon-treated human cells, which, as shown here, differ significantly from the tRNA pools in untreated human cells. Consequently, avian influenza virus-derived PB1 mRNAs of modern H3N2 viruses have acquired codon usages that better reflect tRNA availabilities in IFN-treated cells and are translated more efficiently.


2017 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 339
Author(s):  
C. S. KYRIAKIS (Κ. ΣΠ. ΚΥΡΙΑΚΗΣ) ◽  
K. Van REETH

The huge epizootics of highly pathogenic avian influenza (subtype H5N1) in Southeastern Asia over the last two years and especially the transmission of avian influenza viruses to humans have alerted the international scientific community. Many support that the threat of a new influenza pandemic appears greater today than ever before. During the 20th century, humanity has faced three pandemics, including the "Spanish flu" of 1918-19, which claimed over 20 to 40 million lives, and two less dramatic pandemics in 1957-58 and 1968-69. Influenza A viruses are single stranded RNA viruses belonging to the family Orthomyxoviridae. Their genome expresses only 10 proteins, most important of which are the two surface glycoproteins: haemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA). So far, 16 different types of haemagglutinin (HI to Η16) and 9 of neuraminidase (Nl to N9) have been recognized. Influenza A viruses are grouped into "subtypes", according to the HA and NA surface proteins they bear (for example Η I N I , H5N2). Natural reservoirs of influenza A viruses are the wild aquatic birds (migratory waterfowl), from which all types of HA and NA have been isolated. It is important to mention that migratory waterfowl do not show clinical signs of disease, but shed the virus through their excretions.The host range of flu viruses includes domestic poultry, and mammalian species from aquatic mammals to horses, humans and swine. Because of their segmented single stranded RNA genome, influenza viruses have a very high mutation rate (genetic drift) and the possibility to undergo reassortment. Reassortment may occur when more than one virus co-infect the same cell, exchange genes and as a result, provide a totally new influenza virus (genetic shift). At least two subtypes of influenza A viruses are currendy endemic within the human population (H1N1 and H3N2), causing every year outbreaks of disease with very low mortality, especially in elders. Unlike these endemic viruses, pandemic viruses have a much higher morbidity, affecting people of all ages. Η I N I , H3N2 and H1N2 influenza viruses are currently circulating in the European and American swine population. Some of the swine influenza virus subtypes, namely Η I N I and H3N2, are thus similar to those of humans, but there are still important antigenic differences between them. Only rarely swine influenza viruses may be transmitted or cause disease to humans. Unlike mammalian influenza viruses, influenza viruses of domestic birds are grouped in two "pathotypes": low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses, which cause localized infections and remain mild or subclinical, and highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses, which cause severe general infection with mortality up to 100% (fowl plague). The majority of avian influenza viruses are low pathogenic and only some, but not all, viruses of H5 and H7 subtypes are highly pathogenic. Occasionally low pathogenic Η5 or H7 viruses from wild birds transmit to poultry. Such viruses can undergo mutations in poultry as a result of which they may acquire a highly pathogenic phenotype. Until the recent avian influenza epizootics in Asia, the predominant theory for the creation of a pandemic virus supported that the pig was likely to act as an intermediate host for transmission of influenza viruses from birds to humans. The fact that genetic reassortment between human and avian viruses has also been shown to occur in pigs in nature, had led to the hypothesis that the pandemic viruses of 1957 and 1968 may have been generated through the pig. More recent data, however, come to question these theories and hypotheses: (a)the direct transmission of the H5N1 and H7N7 avian influenza viruses from birds to humans in Southeastern Asia and The Netherlands, and (b) the presence of cellular receptors recognized preferentially by the haemagglutinin of avian influenza viruses in the human conjunctiva and ciliated respiratory epithelial cells, which support that avian influenza viruses can be transmitted in toto (without reassortment) to and between humans or that humans can be the mixing vessel themselves. Furthermore, there is no solid scientific evidence to prove that any influenza virus reassortants, that have originated in swine, have posed a risk for humans. There are three criteria (conditions) an influenza virus must fulfill in order to be characterized as a pandemic virus: (a) it must be a new virus against which humans are immunologically naive, (b) it must be able to replicate in humans causing severe disease, and (c) it must be efficiendy transmitted among humans, causing wide outbreaks. So far the H5N1 influenza virus only fulfills the first and second condition, and even though it has been sporadically infecting humans for over two years, it has not yet been able to fully adapt to it's new host. Compared to the human population that may have been exposed to the H5N1 influenza virus in Asia, the number of patients and fatalities due to the H5N1 virus is very small. So far, it appears that swine do not play an important role in the epidemiology of this specific virus. Experimental infections of swine with highly pathogenic H5N1 virus have shown that it does not replicate extensively in pigs. Additionally, extensive serological investigations in the swine population of Viet Nam, indicated that the H5N1 virus merely spread to a very small number (~0.25%) of contact animals within the epizootic regions. Nevertheless, it is critical to continue monitor ring pigs and studying the behavior and spread of influenza viruses in these species.


2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liang Chen ◽  
Feng Zhu ◽  
Chenglong Xiong ◽  
Zhijie Zhang ◽  
Lufang Jiang ◽  
...  

In 2013, two new avian influenza viruses (AIVs) H7N9 and H10N8 emerged in China caused worldwide concerns. Previous studies have studied their originations independently; this study is the first time to investigate their co-originating characteristics. Gene segments of assorted subtype influenza A viruses, as well as H10N8 and H7N9, were collected from public database. With the help of series software, small and large-scale phylogenetic trees, mean evolutionary rates, and divergence years were obtained successionally. The results demonstrated the two AIVs co-originated from H9N2, and shared a spectrum of mutations in common on many key sites related to pathogenic, tropism and epidemiological characteristics. For a long time, H9N2 viruses had been circulated in eastern and southern China; poultry was the stable and lasting maintenance reservoir. High carrying rate of AIVs H9N2 in poultry had an extremely high risk of co-infections with other influenza viruses, which increased the risk of virus reassortment. It implied that novel AIVs reassortants based on H9N2 might appear and prevail at any time in China; therefore, surveillance of H9N2 AIVs should be given a high priority.


2006 ◽  
Vol 59 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 29-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivana Hrnjakovic-Cvjetkovic ◽  
Dejan Cvjetkovic ◽  
Vera Jerant-Patic ◽  
Vesna Milosevic ◽  
Jelena Tadic-Radovanov ◽  
...  

Introduction. Influenza A viruses can infect humans, some mammals and especially birds. Subtypes of human influenza A viruses: ACH1N1), ACH2N2) and A(H3N2) have caused pandemics. Avian influenza viruses vary owing to their 15 hemagglutinins (H) and 9 neuraminidases (N). Human cases of avian influenza A In the Netherlands in 2003, there were 83 human cases of influenza A (H7N7). In 1997, 18 cases of H5N1 influenza A, of whom 6 died, were found among residents of Hong Kong. In 2004, 34 human cases (23 deaths) were reported in Viet Nam and Thailand. H5N1 virus-infected patients presented with fever and respiratory symptoms. Complications included respiratory distress syndrome, renal failure, liver dysfunction and hematologic disorders. Since 1999, 7 cases of human influenza H9N2 infection have been identified in China and Hong Kong. The importance of human infection with avian influenza viruses. H5N1 virus can directly infect humans. Genetic reassortment of human and avian influenza viruses may occur in humans co infected with current human A(HIN1) or A(H3N2) subtypes and avian influenza viruses. The result would be a new influenza virus with pandemic potential. All genes of H5Nl viruses isolated from humans are of avian origin. Prevention and control. The reassortant virus containing H and N from avian and the remaining proteins from human influenza viruses will probably be used as a vaccine strain. The most important control measures are rapid destruction of all infected or exposed birds and rigorous disinfection of farms. Individuals exposed to suspected animals should receive prophylactic treatment with antivirals and annual vaccination. .


2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liangsheng Zhang ◽  
Zhenguo Zhang

In this study, we retraced the origin of the reported avian influenza A H6N1 virus infecting a 20-year-old woman in Taiwan. As we know, this is the first reported case of human infection by the H6N1 virus, because this subtype virus usually circulates in birds and poultry. Therefore it is crucial to know how this virus attained the ability to infect humans. Using phylogenetic analysis, we found that this virus was derived from reassortments of multiple lineages of H6N1 viruses and H5N2 viruses. The results deepen our understanding of how the new human-infecting virus originated and based on these we discussed possible explanations for the H6N1 infection of humans. Our results, together with recent studies of H7N9 viruses which result in severe disorders, suggest that reassortments among avian-type viruses are quite often, which may sometimes result in fatal infections in humans. Thus a close watch on the circulation of avian influenza viruses is pretty necessary.


2017 ◽  
Vol 214 (5) ◽  
pp. 1239-1248 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph M. Deeg ◽  
Ebrahim Hassan ◽  
Pascal Mutz ◽  
Lara Rheinemann ◽  
Veronika Götz ◽  
...  

Zoonotic transmission of influenza A viruses can give rise to devastating pandemics, but currently it is impossible to predict the pandemic potential of circulating avian influenza viruses. Here, we describe a new mouse model suitable for such risk assessment, based on the observation that the innate restriction factor MxA represents an effective species barrier that must be overcome by zoonotic viruses. Our mouse lacks functional endogenous Mx genes but instead carries the human MX1 locus as a transgene. Such transgenic mice were largely resistant to highly pathogenic avian H5 and H7 influenza A viruses, but were almost as susceptible to infection with influenza viruses of human origin as nontransgenic littermates. Influenza A viruses that successfully established stable lineages in humans have acquired adaptive mutations which allow partial MxA escape. Accordingly, an engineered avian H7N7 influenza virus carrying a nucleoprotein with signature mutations typically found in human virus isolates was more virulent in transgenic mice than parental virus, demonstrating that a few amino acid changes in the viral target protein can mediate escape from MxA restriction in vivo. Similar mutations probably need to be acquired by emerging influenza A viruses before they can spread in the human population.


Author(s):  
Mohamed Derouich

Throughout the world, seasonal outbreaks of influenza affect millions of people, killing about 500,000 individuals every year. Human influenza viruses are classified into 3 serotypes: A, B, and C. Only influenza A viruses can infect and multiply in avian species. During the last decades, important avian influenza epidemics have occurred and so far, the epidemics among birds have been transmitted to humans; but the most feared problem is the risk of pandemics that may be caused by person-to person transmission. The present mathematical model deals with the dynamics of human infection by avian influenza both in birds and in humans. Stability analysis is carried out and the behaviour of the disease is illustrated by simulation with different parameters values.


2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alam Jahangir ◽  
Sakchai Ruenphet ◽  
Nadia Sultana ◽  
Dany Shoham ◽  
Kazuaki Takehara

The pandemic influenza virus strains of 1918 (H1N1), 1957 (H2N2), 1968 (H3N2), and 2009 (H1N1) have genes related to avian influenza viruses (AIVs). The nonstructural (NS) gene of AIVs plays a significant role in host-viral interaction. However, little is known about the degree of diversity of this gene in Northern pintail (Anas acuta) ducks wintering in Japan. This study describes characteristics of pintail-originated H1N1, H1N2, H1N3, H5N2, H5N3, H5N9, and H7N7 viruses. Most of the viruses were revealed to be avian strains and not related to pandemic and seasonal flu strains. Nevertheless, the NP genes of 62.5% (5/8) viruses were found closely related to a A/swine/Korea/C12/08, indicating exchange of genetic material and ongoing mammalian-linked evolution of AIVs. Besides, all the viruses, except Aomori/422/07 H1N1, contain PSIQSR*GLF motif usually found in avian, porcine, and human H1 strains. The Aomori/422/07 H1N1 has a PSVQSR*GLF motif identical to a North American strain. This findings linked to an important intercontinental, Asian-American biogeographical interface. Phylogenetically all the viruses were clustered in Eurasian lineage. Cocirculation of allele A and B (NS gene) viruses was evident in the study implying the existence of a wide reservoir of influenza A viruses in pintail wintering in Japan.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document