The New Cold War: Consequences for Russian Society

2020 ◽  
Vol 90 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-200
Author(s):  
S. M. Rogov
Author(s):  
John W. Young ◽  
John Kent

This chapter examines how the world was divided into two opposing blocs, East and West, during the period 1945–1948. It begins with a discussion of the Marshall Plan, focusing on its implementation and its Cold War consequences, and the Western economic system. It then considers the Soviet Union’s takeover of Eastern and Central Europe, with emphasis on the split between Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia. It also looks at the struggle for influence in East Asia and concludes with an assessment of the division of Germany. The chapter suggests that the Berlin crisis was in many ways a symbolic crisis in a city which came to epitomize Cold War tensions until 1989; the crisis has also been regarded as an important cause of the militarization of the Cold War and the formation of NATO.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (10) ◽  
pp. 299-338
Author(s):  
A. Nemtsov

The article attempts to theoretically comprehend the transformation of liberal values in the process of economic and political reforms carried out in Russia after collapse of the USSR in 1991 and the collapse of the world system of socialism. Some approaches to the interpretation of the essence of the “cold war”, as well as its results and outcomes, are analyzed. The article describes the main problems faced by Russian society and the Russian government in connection with the abolition of the Communist ideology. Based on the analysis of these approaches, we propose a hypothetical model of coexistence and confrontation between “two worlds” and two types of man within the framework of the Cristian worldview paradigm, in essence, two concepts of humanism. The author reveals the specifics of Russia’s modern opposition with what took place during the cold war. An attempt is made to understand this confrontation in a more General way.


Explores the momentous changes that have taken place in the Russian national identity discourse since Putin’s return to the presidency Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 marked a watershed in post-Cold War European history and brought East–West relations to a low point. At the same time, by selling this fateful action in starkly nationalist language, the Putin regime achieved record-high popularity. This book shows how, after the large-scale 2011–2013 anti-Putin demonstrations in major Russian cities and the parallel rise in xenophobia related to the Kremlin’s perceived inability to deal with the influx of Central Asian labour migrants, the annexation of Crimea generated strong ‘rallying around the nation’ and ‘rallying around the leader’ effects. The contributors to this collection go beyond the news headlines, focusing on aspects of Russian society that have often passed under the radar, such as intellectual racism and growing xenophobia. These developments are contextualised by chapters that provide a broader overview of the latest developments in Russian nationalism – both state-level nationalism and independent, bottom–up-driven societal nationalism, and the tensions between the two are explored.


Author(s):  
John W. Young ◽  
John Kent

This chapter examines how the world was divided into two opposing blocs, East and West, during the period 1945–8. It begins with a discussion of the Marshall Plan, focusing on its implementation and its Cold War consequences, and the Western economic system. It then considers the Soviet Union’s takeover of Eastern and Central Europe, with emphasis on the split between Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia. It also looks at the struggle for influence in East Asia and concludes with an assessment of the division of Germany. The chapter suggests that the Berlin crisis was in many ways a symbolic crisis in a city which came to epitomize Cold War tensions until 1989; the crisis has also been regarded as an important cause of the militarization of the Cold War and the formation of NATO.


2020 ◽  
Vol 72 (4) ◽  
pp. 77-105
Author(s):  
Robert Kupiecki

The breach of commitments happen in international relations, sometimes followed by national narratives of betrayal, created and used as tools of foreign policy and domestic legitimisation. In this kind of narratives, the context, truth, disinformation, emotions and deliberate intents are of equal value for their content. This is how the modern myth of ‘Western betrayal’ – developed by Moscow after the end of the Cold War on the susceptible grounds of Russian and Soviet political tradition – should be understood. It has been the most persistent component of Russian information warfare against NATO and the key argument explaining its foreign policy actions. They are interpreted abroad as aggression, violation of international law or undermining the principles of international order, while domestically being portrayed as driven by purely defensive logic of the state surrounded by enemies responsible for the refusal to recognise Russia’s legitimate rights. This narrative also serves to consolidate Russian society around the state’s leadership.


Author(s):  
Mykola Saychuk

The paper deals with one of the most significant issue of the Cold War, – the plan “Dropshot”. The article analyzes the content and history of the creation and adoption of the US national war plan “Dropshoot”, as well as how it was reflected in Soviet and contemporary Russian researches. It is determined that both in the USSR and in modern Russia, the same theses (developed in the works of several Soviet researchers) are applied to “Dropshot” plan. Obviously, this is done in the interests of propaganda and justification of specific political interests, that have not changed in Russia since the collapse of the USSR. One of the more fascinating aspects of the plan that its target was Soviet (Russian) society which are very sensible concerning “belligerent the USA and the West phobia”. The article is built on comparative analysis of the key documents which are reviewed and evaluated in the context of Russian and US approaches concerning the issue. It also explores the ways of fulfillment of the plan as they were imagined in the USSR. After a detailed comparison of these Russian theses with the contents of the “Dropshoot” plan and an analysis of the events, in the context of which the plan was elaborated, a conclusion is drawn about their inconsistency. Both in the USSR and in Russia, the data on the decision to create mass armies for rapid offensive operations in Europe, adopted in early January 1951 in Moscow with the direct involvement of Stalin, remain secret. Instead, the “Dropshot” plan planned military operations against the USSR and its allies after their conquest of continental Europe. We prove here that the plan was mostly defensive and its offensive features were invented by Soviet propaganda. The Pentagon did not possess enough nuclear bombs to make it a reality and such called “preventive war” against the USSR was not possible. The only Soviet strategists and Stalin personally had strategic views to expand Soviet influence in Europe by all means.


2020 ◽  
Vol 65 (4) ◽  
pp. 1231-1244
Author(s):  
James Pettifer ◽  

The article is devoted to Sir Dmitri Dmitrievich Obolensky, Professor of Russian and Balkan history at Oxford University, who is known for his study of the “Byzantine Commonwealth” and its influence on the Eastern European Slavic peoples: Bulgarians, Serbs and Russians. As a well-known British scholarly historian and philologist and the son of a noble emigrant from Russian Empire, Prince Dimitri Alexandrovich Obolensky, Obolensky tried to remain in close intellectual contact with the Russian science throughout the entire period of the Cold War and until his death in 2001. Obolensky, as a very religious person, was interested not only in the processes of transformation of the Russian society after the end of the Cold War, but also in the Russian spiritual revival that took place in the country after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The article analyzes the changes in the academic and journalistic works by Obolensky in the context of both global processes — perestroika, the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, democratization, the growing influence of the Orthodox Church in Russia — and local issues — family drama, a decline in study of both Russian language and history in universities in Great Britain and in Europe. The personality of Dmitri Obolensky, his spiritual and his intellectual heritage as well as the results of his philosophical studies and forecasts for the development of the Russian society expressed during the last decade of his life are of undoubted interest to the Russian reader.


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