Berlin crisis 1945-1961. How does American diplomacy in Germany reflect the overall scope of American foreign policy during the first phase of the Cold War?

The United States was so determined to resist the Soviet threat that it would go as far as to break international laws and commit espionage in Berlin to advance its goals. The contentious standoff that nearly resulted in war would be overshadowed by the Cuban Missile Crisis one year later in 1962. Regardless, American foreign policy formed in Berlin was reflective of the American approach to the global conflicts during the decades of the Cold War. The United States would formulate its foreign policy at the start of the Cold War during the division of Germany into zones of occupation, which led to the Berlin Blockade and Airlift, and continued to focus its efforts on demolishing the Berlin Wall, and subsequently uniting the city and Germany. These goals of American foreign policy were accomplished in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Berlin and Germany, with the end of the Cold War occurring shortly thereafter.

“Pavel Pavlovich” and Nikita Sergeevich: Soviet-Belgian Summits and the Informal Aspect of High Politics During the Cold War

Based on a comparative analysis of new evidence from the Russian and EU archives, the article shows the significance of the three meetings between Nikita Khrushchev and Paul-Henri Spaak in 1956, 1961, and 1963. The text highlights both new facts about Soviet-Belgium relations (and even wider, all-European discussions and initiatives) and personal aspects of conversations between the key political figures from different worlds, that is capitalism and communism. It shows that despite these differences Spaak and Krushchev shared a common language and common concerns of a necessity of peaceful coexistence, pragmatism in search for solutions on the issues of development in the East and West. For the first time, one can find a detailed analysis of the Belgian official delegation’s visit to the USSR in 1956. The article is the first to publish data from both sides concerning the talks between Paul Spaak and Andrei Vychinski on the “friendship pact” proposal between Belgium and the USSR in 1946. For the first time, the role of Spaak in attempts to resolve the Berlin crisis of 1961 is analyzed in detail. For the first time, the new data is published on informal interaction between the two politicians at the Konche Zaspa dacha near Kyiv in July 1963. For the first time, the author analyzes the story of appearance and use of the “Pavel Pavlovich” nickname given by Khrushchev to Spaak and a hypothesis on its connection with the figure of famous Russian writer Anton Pavlovich Chekov is put forward. The author comes to the conclusion about the importance of "intellectual ping-pong" for the success of personal diplomacy during the Cold War. The human dimension of high politics analyzed in the article demonstrates the importance of general knowledge in the field of humanities for establishing a respectful dialogue, which was the key to reducing the risk of rash actions on the part of both the USSR and the countries of the West. The cases of Spaak’s mediation between superpowers analyzed in the text allow one to talk about the potential for and interest in reducing the risks of confrontation between major powers on the part of small countries, such as Belgium.

The United Nations and the Soviet Union: Diplomacy and Propaganda in the Twilight of the Cold War

Referring to the preparation of Soviet diplomacy for the 3rd session of the UN General Assembly, this article examines the process behind the development of the political line of the Soviet delegation, as well as the principles of covering the “UN” theme by the press, informing the population and shaping public opinion on major international problems. On the basis of specific material, the author demonstrates the principles of Soviet diplomats’ work on the preparation of analytical materials, the development of recommendations, and the implementation of propaganda measures at the UN in response to the changing international situation. Archival materials allow us to understand the attitude of the Soviet political elite to multilateral diplomacy and reconstruct the USSR’s assessment of the effectiveness of the organisation’s activities both in the field of maintaining international security and in the non-political sphere. Referring to the analysis of materials from the Russian Foreign Policy Archive (AVP RF) and the Russian State Social and Political Archive (RGASPI), the author reconstructs the rationale behind the propaganda campaign in the Soviet press against Trygve Lie, the first UN Secretary-General, in connection with the publication of the annual report on the organisation’s work between 1947 and 1948. Coordinated criticism of the world’s highest-ranking diplomat became an integral part of the political game in connection with the settlement of the Berlin crisis, as well as an important element in the strategy of a massive propaganda offensive against the United States, aimed at portraying the Truman administration as the culprit of the imminent split in Europe and Germany.

A Reputation for Irresolute Action

This chapter studies how Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev viewed the resolve of President John F. Kennedy, looking at Khrushchev's decision making surrounding the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. According to evidence made available from declassified and translated Soviet archives, as well as information drawn from additional sources, Kennedy quickly formed a reputation for irresolute action largely because of his repeated failure to back up his strong rhetoric with firm action and his wavering support of the Bay of Pigs invasion early during his tenure. While Kennedy rather quickly established a poor reputation for resolve, it was difficult for him to alter this reputation. Throughout the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and during the early stages of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev continued to doubt Kennedy's firmness and determination, despite the president's repeated attempts to signal his resolve. Declassified Soviet documents further indicate that Kennedy was able to change this negative perception of his resolve during the Cuban Missile Crisis only by presenting a consistently resolute position and altering his signals of strategic interest. Thus, it was Kennedy's communication of high strategic interest in Cuba combined with his resolute behavior during the missile crisis that enabled him to alter his poor reputation.

A Reputation for Resolute Action

This chapter explores how Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev viewed the resolve of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, considering Khrushchev's decision making surrounding the 1958 Berlin Crisis. The historical record shows that Eisenhower's early statements were particularly influential to the formation of his reputation, as they created expectations of how he would behave in the future. However, Eisenhower was unable to solidify his reputation for resolve at the 1955 Geneva Summit, as Khrushchev perceived Secretary of State John Foster Dulles rather than President Eisenhower as being in direct control of negotiations at the summit. Yet, in the year leading up to the 1958 Berlin Ultimatum, Khrushchev's perception of who was in control of U.S. foreign policy shifted to emphasize the importance of Eisenhower to America's Berlin policy. And the president's statements leading up to the Berlin Crisis led Khrushchev to believe Eisenhower was unlikely to make major concessions on the issue. Eisenhower's subsequent firm response to the Berlin Crisis then confirmed Khrushchev's expectations of the president's resolve. Accordingly, Eisenhower established a reputation for resolute action that would last until the end of his presidency. Further evidence suggests that Eisenhower's actions as a general during World War II were influential to Khrushchev's early perceptions of the president.