Moral status of the fetus and the permissibility of abortion: a contractarian response to Thomson’s violinist thought experiment

2021 ◽  
pp. medethics-2020-106810
Author(s):  
Matthew John Minehan
Keyword(s):  
Pregnant Woman ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Current Paper ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Judith Jarvis Thomson ◽  
Dependence Relationship

Judith Jarvis Thomson famously argued that abortion is permissible even if we accept that a fetus qualifies as a person and possesses a right to life. The current paper presents two arguments that undermine Thomson’s position. First, the paper sketches a contractarian argument that explores Thomson’s violinist thought experiment from behind a veil of ignorance, which suggests that if we had an equal likelihood of being an unwanted fetus and a pregnant woman, it would be rational for us to oppose abortion. Second, the paper discusses the hypothetical self-aborting fetus, a thought experiment that reverses the dependence relationship between a woman and a fetus. It is argued that in this scenario, where fetuses have agency of their own, Thomson’s position would counterintuitively prohibit a woman from temporarily curtailing the freedom of her fetus even to save her own life.

Contractual Reconstructions

2020 ◽  
pp. 365-386
Author(s):  
Albert Weale
Keyword(s):  
Utility Theory ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Contract Theory ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Single Agent ◽  
Essential Element ◽  
Essential Elements ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Practical Syllogism ◽  
Mutual Advantage

In the twilight of utilitarianism contract theorist sought to respond to the problems that utilitarianism had thrown up. How successful were they? Our review of contract theory has shown that it is not possible to base a contract theory on a utility theory of rationality, even though some have claimed that such a theory states the essential elements of rational behaviour. The axioms of utility theory are controversial in themselves, and do not give an account of prudence. To have an account of prudence, we need to turn to the deliberative account of rationality, and the idea of intelligibility. The practical syllogism will only take us so far, however, and will not deal with cases where interests conflict. There is no need to make a sharp distinction between contract theories in which there is a plurality of agents, without a veil of ignorance, and a single agent behind a veil of ignorance. The singular veil of ignorance construction can be regarded as a more abstract thought experiment in situation of moral perplexity. Similarly, the distinction between mutual advantage theories, which involve essential reference to a baseline of non-cooperation, and baseline independent theories is not clear, since much depends on the character of the baseline. The problem of obligation remains unresolved, but its lack of resolution underlines a conclusion of Hart to the effect that coercion is an essential element of a large-scale society.

Does the Unborn Child Have a Right to Life? The Insufficient Answer of the European Court of Human Rights in the Judgment Vo v. France

2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 433-444 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jakob Pichon
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Pregnant Woman ◽  
Criminal Code ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Unborn Child ◽  
Criminal Proceedings ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
European Court ◽  
French Court ◽  
The Right

In the July 8, 2004 case of Vo v. France, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) dealt with the question of whether the embryo/fetus (“the fetus”) enjoys the protection of the right to life provided by Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”). Below, a pregnant woman lost her fetus due to an error made by the attending doctor, and the Cour de Cassation, the French court of last instance, acquitted the doctor of involuntary homicide on the grounds that a fetus is not a person within the meaning of the French Criminal Code. Claiming a violation of her child's right to life within the meaning of the Convention, the woman appealed to the ECtHR. The ECtHR left open the question whether or not a fetus falls within the scope of Article 2; declaring that, even assuming Article 2 was applicable to a fetus, there had been no failure by France to comply with its obligations under Article 2, because the ECtHR deemed the institution of criminal proceedings unnecessary. Rather, it considered the possibility for the applicant to bring an action for damages as sufficient and therefore found that there had been no violation of the fetus's right to life.

scholarly journals SOCIAL JUSTICE, GENOMIC JUSTICE AND THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE: HARSANYI MEETS MENDEL

2012 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samir Okasha
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Evolutionary Biology ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Mendelian Genetics ◽  
Division Process ◽  
Impartial Observer ◽  
The Veil ◽  
John Harsanyi ◽  
Shed Light

John Harsanyi and John Rawls both used the veil of ignorance thought experiment to study the problem of choosing between alternative social arrangements. With his ‘impartial observer theorem’, Harsanyi tried to show that the veil of ignorance argument leads inevitably to utilitarianism, an argument criticized by Sen, Weymark and others. A quite different use of the veil-of-ignorance concept is found in evolutionary biology. In the cell-division process called meiosis, in which sexually reproducing organisms produce gametes, the chromosome number is halved; when meiosis is fair, each gene has only a fifty percent chance of making it into any gamete. This creates a Mendelian veil of ignorance, which has the effect of aligning the interests of all the genes in an organism. This paper shows how Harsanyi's version of the veil-of-ignorance argument can shed light on Mendelian genetics. There turns out to be an intriguing biological analogue of the impartial observer theorem that is immune from the Sen/Weymark objections to Harsanyi's original.

scholarly journals Group Agents and Moral Status: What Can We Owe to Organizations?

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Adam Lovett ◽  
Stefan Riedener
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
Right To Vote ◽  
Group Agents

Abstract Organizations have neither a right to vote nor a right to life. But we can owe them to keep our promises or show them gratitude. So we owe some things to organizations, but not everything we owe to people. What explains this? Individualistic views explain it just in terms of features of organizations’ individual members. Collectivistic views explain it just in terms of features of those organizations. Neither view works. Instead, we need to synthesize these approaches. Some individual interests are distinctively collective. Individuals have an interest in participating in successful collective action. This explains organizations’ apparently fragmented moral status.

scholarly journals Does impartial reasoning matter in economic decisions? An experimental result about distributive (un)fairness in a production context

2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 217
Author(s):  
Laura Marcon ◽  
Pedro Francés-Gómez ◽  
Marco Faillo
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Experimental Result ◽  
Main Hypothesis ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Economic Decisions ◽  
The Veil ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Impartial Reasoning

The Rawlsian social contract presents the veil of ignorance as a thought experiment that should induce agents to behave more fairly within a distributive context. This study uses a laboratory experiment to test the effect of actual reasoning behind the veil, as a moral cue, in a Dictator Game with taking and production. The main hypothesis claims that reflection from an impartial perspective should lead subjects to put themselves in the shoes of who could be the least benefited. Against our expectations, the impact of the moral cue was null and no attempt to rebalance the unjustified differences was observed.

scholarly journals Artificial Beings Worthy of Moral Consideration in Virtual Environments: An Analysis of Ethical Viability

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Gualeni
Keyword(s):  
Virtual Environments ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Classical Problem ◽  
Digital Games ◽  
Moral Consideration ◽  
Entertainment Education ◽  
Immoral Action ◽  
Moral Status Of Animals ◽  
And Training

This article explores whether and under which circumstances it is ethically viable to include artificial beings worthy of moral consideration in virtual environments. In particular, the article focuses on virtual environments such as those in digital games and training simulations – interactive and persistent digital artifacts designed to fulfill specific purposes, such as entertainment, education, training, or persuasion.The article introduces the criteria for moral consideration that serve as a framework for this analysis. Adopting this framework, the article tackles the question of whether including artificial intelligences that are entitled to moral consideration in virtual environments constitutes an immoral action on the part of human creators. To address this problem, the article draws on three conceptual lenses from the philosophical branch of ethics: the problem of parenthood and procreation, the question concerning the moral status of animals, and the classical problem of evil.Using a thought experiment, the concluding section proposes a contractualist answer to the question posed in this article. The same section also emphasizes the potential need to reframe our understanding of the design of virtual environments and their future stakeholders.

scholarly journals O PRAWNOKARNEJ OCHRONIE NASCITURUSA W III STATUCIE LITEWSKIM

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 175
Author(s):  
Sławomir Godek
Keyword(s):  
Pregnant Woman ◽  
Death Penalty ◽  
Capital Punishment ◽  
Criminal Responsibility ◽  
German Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
The Third ◽  
Criminal Protection ◽  
The One

Legal and Criminal Protection of ‘nasciturus’ in the Third Lithuanian StatuteSummary The Third Lithuanian Statute of 1588 regulated the issue specified in the title only partly and quite inconsistently. On the one hand, the Third Statute introduced criminal responsibility for injuring a pregnant woman, which caused a miscarriage; nevertheless, the penalty was insignificant. On the other hand, the legislation stipulated that carrying out a capital punishment must be put off until a child’s birth, which shows the the Lithuanian legislator’s intention to respect the fetus’ right to life. The Statute also provided for the death penalty for abortion and infanticide; nevertheless - contrary to the German law applied in cities - it did notintroduce an explicit distinction between these two crimes. Another inconsistency of the Statute is a lack of punishment in case of a homicide of a bastard child.

Thomson's Violinist and Conjoined Twins

1999 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 428-435 ◽  
Author(s):  
KENNETH EINAR HIMMA
Keyword(s):  
Conjoined Twins ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
Judith Jarvis Thomson

It is commonly taken for granted that abortion is necessarily impermissible if the fetus is a person with a right to life. In her influential essay “A Defense of Abortion,” Judith Jarvis Thomson offers what I will call the violinist example to show that merely having a right to life does not in and of itself give rise in the fetus to a right to use the mother's body. On Thomson's view, if the fetus has a right to use the mother's body that precludes terminating its life by means of an abortion, it is because the mother did something to give the fetus that right. Thus she concludes that the proposition that the fetus is a person does not imply that abortion is morally impermissible.

A SHORT ARGUMENT AGAINST ABORTION RIGHTS

Think ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (34) ◽  
pp. 57-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack Mulder
Keyword(s):  
Right To Life ◽  
Abortion Rights ◽  
Judith Jarvis Thomson ◽  
The Right ◽  
In Pregnancy ◽  
Fetal Personhood

In this paper I will put forward a brief argument against abortion rights. The argument concerns itself with the two main ways in which defenders of abortion rights develop their position. The first strategy through which they tend to do this is by arguing against the personhood of the fetus. The second strategy, made famous by Judith Jarvis Thomson, is to argue that, even if the fetus were a person, its right to life would not entail the right to draw upon the resources of the woman in pregnancy, and so the pregnancy can be terminated (even if the fetus loses its life in the process). My argument will provide reasons to suspect that attacks on fetal personhood are based on a questionable notion of personhood, and that the most common attempts to show that the fetus does not have the right to draw on the resources of the woman in pregnancy also have considerable problems. This will buttress the case for the view that the fetus is a person and that it has the right to draw on the resources of the woman in pregnancy.

scholarly journals How the Criminal Law in Australia Has Failed to Promote the Right to Life for Unborn Children: A Need for Uniform Criminal Laws on Abortion across Australia

2012 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 43
Author(s):  
Patrick Ferdinands
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Pregnant Woman ◽  
Pregnant Women ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Intrinsic Value ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
The Moment ◽  
The Right ◽  
Potential Use

This article contends that human life has an intrinsic value from the moment of its conception based on its potential use to the community. This value to the community demands protection from the state. However, there is also a need to balance this aim against the legitimate health interests of pregnant women. Abortions should be permitted only in circumstances where the abortion is necessary to preserve the pregnant woman from any serious danger to her physical or mental health. This article shows that the lack of uniformity in Australia’s criminal law in the area of abortion plays a part in unduly undermining the right to life of unborn children. Accordingly, there is a need for effective uniform criminal laws throughout Australia that properly protect the right to life of unborn children and are duly sensitive to the valid health interests of pregnant women that give rise to circumstances justifying abortion.

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