Game Theory: Static and Dynamic Games

2011 ◽  
pp. 89-139
Author(s):  
Hassan Benchekroun ◽  
Ngo Van Long
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Dynamic Games

Noncooperative Game Theory

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
João P. Hespanha
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Computer Science ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Noncooperative Game ◽  
Noncooperative Game Theory ◽  
Original Design ◽  
Theoretical Perspectives ◽  
Engineering Designs ◽  
Zero Sum

This book is aimed at students interested in using game theory as a design methodology for solving problems in engineering and computer science. The book shows that such design challenges can be analyzed through game theoretical perspectives that help to pinpoint each problem's essence: Who are the players? What are their goals? Will the solution to “the game” solve the original design problem? Using the fundamentals of game theory, the book explores these issues and more. The use of game theory in technology design is a recent development arising from the intrinsic limitations of classical optimization-based designs. In optimization, one attempts to find values for parameters that minimize suitably defined criteria—such as monetary cost, energy consumption, or heat generated. However, in most engineering applications, there is always some uncertainty as to how the selected parameters will affect the final objective. Through a sequential and easy-to-understand discussion, the book examines how to make sure that the selection leads to acceptable performance, even in the presence of uncertainty—the unforgiving variable that can wreck engineering designs. The book looks at such standard topics as zero-sum, non-zero-sum, and dynamic games and includes a MATLAB guide to coding. This book offers students a fresh way of approaching engineering and computer science applications.

Game Theory and Other Modeling Approaches

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank C. Zagare ◽  
Branislav L. Slantchev
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Third Wave ◽  
Extensive Form ◽  
Interactive Decision Making ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Almost All

Game theory is the science of interactive decision making. It has been used in the field of international relations (IR) for over 50 years. Almost all of the early applications of game theory in international relations drew upon the theory of zero-sum games, but the first generation of applications was also developed during the most intense period of the Cold War. The theoretical foundations for the second wave of the game theory literature in international relations were laid by a mathematician, John Nash, a co-recipient of the 1994 Nobel Prize in economics. His major achievement was to generalize the minimax solution which emerged from the first wave. The result is the now famous Nash equilibrium—the accepted measure of rational behavior in strategic form games. During the third wave, from roughly the early to mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, there was a distinct move away from static strategic form games toward dynamic games depicted in extensive form. The assumption of complete information also fell by the wayside; games of incomplete information became the norm. Technical refinements of Nash’s equilibrium concept both encouraged and facilitated these important developments. In the fourth and final wave, which can be dated, roughly, from around the middle of the 1990s, extensive form games of incomplete information appeared regularly in the strategic literature. The fourth wave is a period in which game theory was no longer considered a niche methodology, having finally emerged as a mainstream theoretical tool.

scholarly journals Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions

2001 ◽  
Vol 91 (5) ◽  
pp. 1402-1422 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob K Goeree ◽  
Charles A Holt
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Laboratory Data ◽  
Theoretical Predictions ◽  
Payoff Structure ◽  
Observed Behavior

This paper reports laboratory data for games that are played only once. These games span the standard categories: static and dynamic games with complete and incomplete information. For each game, the treasure is a treatment in which behavior conforms nicely to predictions of the Nash equilibrium or relevant refinement. In each case, however, a change in the payoff structure produces a large inconsistency between theoretical predictions and observed behavior. These contradictions are generally consistent with simple intuition based on the interaction of payoff asymmetries and noisy introspection about others' decisions. (JEL C72, C92)

Book Reviews

2021 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 653-658
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Experimental Game ◽  
Scientific Approach ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Experimental Game Theory

Sanjit Dhami of Department of Economics, Accounting, and Finance, University of Leicester reviews “Handbook of Experimental Game Theory” edited by C. M. Capra, Rachel T. A. Croson, Mary L. Rigdon, and Tanya S. Rosenblat. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Sixteen papers explore the study of game-theoretic propositions from a scientific approach, covering methodological innovations in the measurement of strategic behavior and static and dynamic games of both complete and incomplete information.”

scholarly journals An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory

1997 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Gibbons
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Main Theme ◽  
Sequential Equilibrium ◽  
Solution Concepts ◽  
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Games With Incomplete Information

This paper offers an introduction to game theory for applied economists. The author gives simple definitions and intuitive examples of four kinds of games and their corresponding solution concepts: Nash equilibrium in static games of complete information; subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in dynamic games of complete information; Bayesian Nash equilibrium in static games with incomplete (or 'private') information; and perfect Bayesian (or sequential) equilibrium in dynamic games with incomplete information. The main theme of the paper is that there are important differences among the games but important similarities among the solution concepts.

scholarly journals Challenges and opportunities facing game theory and control: an interview with Tamer Başar

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (7) ◽  
pp. 1142-1146
Author(s):  
By Ji-Feng Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Computer Engineering ◽  
Multi Agent Systems ◽  
Challenges And Opportunities ◽  
Control Community ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The University ◽  
And Control

Abstract The Control community has recently witnessed an almost exponentially growing interest in the application of game-theoretic concepts and tools in research on control, multi-agent systems, and networks. In an interview with NSR, Professor Tamer Başar, a member of the US National Academy of Engineering, Swanlund Endowed Chair and CAS Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering, and Director of the Center for Advanced Study at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in the USA, former president of both the IEEE Control Systems Society and the American Automatic Control Council, and the founding president of the International Society of Dynamic Games, talked about the recently emerging role of game theory in control and networking research, how it broadens the territorial boundaries of control into disciplines outside engineering, and opportunities and challenges that lie ahead.

ARGUMENTATION AND CP-BOOLEAN GAMES

2010 ◽  
Vol 19 (04) ◽  
pp. 487-510 ◽  
Author(s):  
ELISE BONZON ◽  
CAROLINE DEVRED ◽  
MARIE-CHRISTINE LAGASQUIE-SCHIEX
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Argumentation Framework ◽  
Boolean Games ◽  
Do So

There already exist some links between argumentation and game theory. For instance, dynamic games can be used for simulating interactions between agents in an argumentation process. In this paper, we establish a new link between these domains in a static framework: we show how an argumentation framework can be translated into a CP-Boolean game and how this translation can be used for computing extensions of argumentation semantics. We give formal algorithms to do so.

Insights into Game Theory

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ein-Ya Gura ◽  
Michael Maschler
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory
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