scholarly journals Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions

2001 ◽  
Vol 91 (5) ◽  
pp. 1402-1422 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob K Goeree ◽  
Charles A Holt
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Laboratory Data ◽  
Theoretical Predictions ◽  
Payoff Structure ◽  
Observed Behavior

This paper reports laboratory data for games that are played only once. These games span the standard categories: static and dynamic games with complete and incomplete information. For each game, the treasure is a treatment in which behavior conforms nicely to predictions of the Nash equilibrium or relevant refinement. In each case, however, a change in the payoff structure produces a large inconsistency between theoretical predictions and observed behavior. These contradictions are generally consistent with simple intuition based on the interaction of payoff asymmetries and noisy introspection about others' decisions. (JEL C72, C92)

Game Theory and Other Modeling Approaches

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank C. Zagare ◽  
Branislav L. Slantchev
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Third Wave ◽  
Extensive Form ◽  
Interactive Decision Making ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Almost All

Game theory is the science of interactive decision making. It has been used in the field of international relations (IR) for over 50 years. Almost all of the early applications of game theory in international relations drew upon the theory of zero-sum games, but the first generation of applications was also developed during the most intense period of the Cold War. The theoretical foundations for the second wave of the game theory literature in international relations were laid by a mathematician, John Nash, a co-recipient of the 1994 Nobel Prize in economics. His major achievement was to generalize the minimax solution which emerged from the first wave. The result is the now famous Nash equilibrium—the accepted measure of rational behavior in strategic form games. During the third wave, from roughly the early to mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, there was a distinct move away from static strategic form games toward dynamic games depicted in extensive form. The assumption of complete information also fell by the wayside; games of incomplete information became the norm. Technical refinements of Nash’s equilibrium concept both encouraged and facilitated these important developments. In the fourth and final wave, which can be dated, roughly, from around the middle of the 1990s, extensive form games of incomplete information appeared regularly in the strategic literature. The fourth wave is a period in which game theory was no longer considered a niche methodology, having finally emerged as a mainstream theoretical tool.

Book Reviews

2021 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 653-658
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Experimental Game ◽  
Scientific Approach ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Experimental Game Theory

Sanjit Dhami of Department of Economics, Accounting, and Finance, University of Leicester reviews “Handbook of Experimental Game Theory” edited by C. M. Capra, Rachel T. A. Croson, Mary L. Rigdon, and Tanya S. Rosenblat. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Sixteen papers explore the study of game-theoretic propositions from a scientific approach, covering methodological innovations in the measurement of strategic behavior and static and dynamic games of both complete and incomplete information.”

Dilemmas of Interaction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Vanderschraaf
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Mathematical Theory ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Noncooperative Game ◽  
Noncooperative Game Theory ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Principles Of Justice

Problems of interaction, which give rise to justice, are structurally problems of game theory, the mathematical theory of interactive decisions. Five problems of interaction are introduced that are all intrinsically important and that help motivate important parts of the discussions in subsequent chapters: the Farmer’s Dilemma, impure coordination, the Stag Hunt, the free-rider problem, and the choice for a powerless party to acquiesce or resist. Elements of noncooperative game theory essential to analyzing problems of justice are reviewed, including especially games in the strategic and extensive forms, the Nash equilibrium, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and games of incomplete information. Each of the five motivating problems is reformulated game-theoretically. These game-theoretic reformulations reveal precisely why the agents involved would have difficulty arriving at mutually satisfactory resolutions, and why “solutions” for these problems call for principles of justice to guide the agents’ conduct.

scholarly journals An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory

1997 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Gibbons
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Main Theme ◽  
Sequential Equilibrium ◽  
Solution Concepts ◽  
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Games With Incomplete Information

This paper offers an introduction to game theory for applied economists. The author gives simple definitions and intuitive examples of four kinds of games and their corresponding solution concepts: Nash equilibrium in static games of complete information; subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in dynamic games of complete information; Bayesian Nash equilibrium in static games with incomplete (or 'private') information; and perfect Bayesian (or sequential) equilibrium in dynamic games with incomplete information. The main theme of the paper is that there are important differences among the games but important similarities among the solution concepts.

Applications to Game Theory

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob K. Goeree ◽  
Charles A. Holt ◽  
Thomas R. Palfrey
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Feedback Effects ◽  
Symmetric Game ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The World ◽  
Game Theoretic

This chapter explores several applications of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) to specific games in order to illustrate and expand on the wide range of game-theoretic principles and phenomena associated with QRE that have been highlighted in the previous chapters. The first application considered belongs to the class of continuous games. With a continuum of decisions, QRE predicts a choice distribution that is not merely a (possibly asymmetric) spread to each side of a Nash equilibrium, since “feedback effects” from deviations by one player alter others' expected payoff profiles, which would induce further changes. The second application is a symmetric game with binary actions where players have continuously distributed private information about an unknown state of the world that affects both players' payoffs. The remainder of the chapter looks at three applications to extensive-form games, all of which are games of incomplete information.

Noncooperative Game Theory

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
João P. Hespanha
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Computer Science ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Noncooperative Game ◽  
Noncooperative Game Theory ◽  
Original Design ◽  
Theoretical Perspectives ◽  
Engineering Designs ◽  
Zero Sum

This book is aimed at students interested in using game theory as a design methodology for solving problems in engineering and computer science. The book shows that such design challenges can be analyzed through game theoretical perspectives that help to pinpoint each problem's essence: Who are the players? What are their goals? Will the solution to “the game” solve the original design problem? Using the fundamentals of game theory, the book explores these issues and more. The use of game theory in technology design is a recent development arising from the intrinsic limitations of classical optimization-based designs. In optimization, one attempts to find values for parameters that minimize suitably defined criteria—such as monetary cost, energy consumption, or heat generated. However, in most engineering applications, there is always some uncertainty as to how the selected parameters will affect the final objective. Through a sequential and easy-to-understand discussion, the book examines how to make sure that the selection leads to acceptable performance, even in the presence of uncertainty—the unforgiving variable that can wreck engineering designs. The book looks at such standard topics as zero-sum, non-zero-sum, and dynamic games and includes a MATLAB guide to coding. This book offers students a fresh way of approaching engineering and computer science applications.

scholarly journals Holding a group together: non-game-theory vs. game-theory

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Richter ◽  
Ariel Rubinstein
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Competitive Equilibrium ◽  
Solution Concept ◽  
Equilibrium Concept

Abstract Each member of a group chooses a position and has preferences regarding his chosen position. The group’s harmony depends on the profile of chosen positions meeting a specific condition. We analyse a solution concept (Richter and Rubinstein, 2020) based on a permissible set of individual positions, which plays a role analogous to that of prices in competitive equilibrium. Given the permissible set, members choose their most preferred position. The set is tightened if the chosen positions are inharmonious and relaxed if the restrictions are unnecessary. This new equilibrium concept yields more attractive outcomes than does Nash equilibrium in the corresponding game.

scholarly journals Quantum Mean-Field Games with the Observations of Counting Type

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 7
Author(s):  
Vassili N. Kolokoltsov
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Open Problem ◽  
Existence And Uniqueness ◽  
Existence Of Solutions ◽  
Mean Field ◽  
Mean Field Games ◽  
Quantum Game ◽  
Quantum Games ◽  
Interesting Open Problem

Quantum games and mean-field games (MFG) represent two important new branches of game theory. In a recent paper the author developed quantum MFGs merging these two branches. These quantum MFGs were based on the theory of continuous quantum observations and filtering of diffusive type. In the present paper we develop the analogous quantum MFG theory based on continuous quantum observations and filtering of counting type. However, proving existence and uniqueness of the solutions for resulting limiting forward-backward system based on jump-type processes on manifolds seems to be more complicated than for diffusions. In this paper we only prove that if a solution exists, then it gives an ϵ-Nash equilibrium for the corresponding N-player quantum game. The existence of solutions is suggested as an interesting open problem.

High-speed impacts of slender bodies into non-smooth, complex fluids

2018 ◽  
Vol 861 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ishan Sharma
Keyword(s):  
Penetration Depth ◽  
High Speed ◽  
Complex Fluids ◽  
Laboratory Data ◽  
Impact Speed ◽  
High Speed Impact ◽  
Smooth Complex ◽  
Theoretical Predictions ◽  
Slender Bodies ◽  
The Impact

We present a simple hydrodynamical model for the high-speed impact of slender bodies into frictional geomaterials such as soils and clays. We model these materials as non-smooth, complex fluids. Our model predicts the evolution of the impactor’s speed and the final penetration depth given the initial impact speed, and the material and geometric parameters of the impactor and the impacted material. As an application, we investigate the impact of deep-penetrating anchors into seabeds. Our theoretical predictions are found to match field and laboratory data very well.

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