scholarly journals An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory

1997 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Gibbons
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Main Theme ◽  
Sequential Equilibrium ◽  
Solution Concepts ◽  
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Games With Incomplete Information

This paper offers an introduction to game theory for applied economists. The author gives simple definitions and intuitive examples of four kinds of games and their corresponding solution concepts: Nash equilibrium in static games of complete information; subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in dynamic games of complete information; Bayesian Nash equilibrium in static games with incomplete (or 'private') information; and perfect Bayesian (or sequential) equilibrium in dynamic games with incomplete information. The main theme of the paper is that there are important differences among the games but important similarities among the solution concepts.

Analysis of Combined Activity in Collaborative Information Seeking Based on Game Theory

2013 ◽  
Vol 850-851 ◽  
pp. 1044-1047
Author(s):  
Hai Dong Yu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Model ◽  
Information Seeking ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Compensation Policy ◽  
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Work Tasks ◽  
Collaborative Information Seeking ◽  
The Stability

The paper studied the game strategy decisions of alliance leader and members in collaborative information seeking. Based on basic Nash equilibrium model with complete information, it researched Bayesian-Nash equilibrium under incomplete information condition which further implied that the incompleteness of information had effected on the alliance leader’s compensation policy. Furthermore, it revealed a methodology to analyze the stability of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium and gave a detailed algorithm. It provided a framework to systematically explore the relationships between alliance leader and other members while solving work tasks in collaboration.

Game Theory and Other Modeling Approaches

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank C. Zagare ◽  
Branislav L. Slantchev
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Third Wave ◽  
Extensive Form ◽  
Interactive Decision Making ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Almost All

Game theory is the science of interactive decision making. It has been used in the field of international relations (IR) for over 50 years. Almost all of the early applications of game theory in international relations drew upon the theory of zero-sum games, but the first generation of applications was also developed during the most intense period of the Cold War. The theoretical foundations for the second wave of the game theory literature in international relations were laid by a mathematician, John Nash, a co-recipient of the 1994 Nobel Prize in economics. His major achievement was to generalize the minimax solution which emerged from the first wave. The result is the now famous Nash equilibrium—the accepted measure of rational behavior in strategic form games. During the third wave, from roughly the early to mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, there was a distinct move away from static strategic form games toward dynamic games depicted in extensive form. The assumption of complete information also fell by the wayside; games of incomplete information became the norm. Technical refinements of Nash’s equilibrium concept both encouraged and facilitated these important developments. In the fourth and final wave, which can be dated, roughly, from around the middle of the 1990s, extensive form games of incomplete information appeared regularly in the strategic literature. The fourth wave is a period in which game theory was no longer considered a niche methodology, having finally emerged as a mainstream theoretical tool.

scholarly journals Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions

2001 ◽  
Vol 91 (5) ◽  
pp. 1402-1422 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob K Goeree ◽  
Charles A Holt
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Laboratory Data ◽  
Theoretical Predictions ◽  
Payoff Structure ◽  
Observed Behavior

This paper reports laboratory data for games that are played only once. These games span the standard categories: static and dynamic games with complete and incomplete information. For each game, the treasure is a treatment in which behavior conforms nicely to predictions of the Nash equilibrium or relevant refinement. In each case, however, a change in the payoff structure produces a large inconsistency between theoretical predictions and observed behavior. These contradictions are generally consistent with simple intuition based on the interaction of payoff asymmetries and noisy introspection about others' decisions. (JEL C72, C92)

Research of Railway Capacity Strengthening Scheme Decision Method Based on Game Theory

2014 ◽  
Vol 505-506 ◽  
pp. 571-576
Author(s):  
Xiang Xu ◽  
Xing Chen Zhang ◽  
Bin Xu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Optimization Model ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Evaluation Index ◽  
Capacity Strengthening ◽  
Static Game ◽  
Decision Method ◽  
Railway Capacity

Firstly, established the optimization model based on complete information static game theory, which see evaluation index as the participants of a game, capacity strengthening strategies as the strategies of participants, and the strategies contained in the Nash equilibrium of the game as the first step optimization results. Then structure an algorithm to secondary selection, which makes there is only one strategy in the final result. At last given a case study combined with Baoshen railway capacity strengthening scheme decision. The result indicated that the model has good applicability, and can reduce the subjective error effectively.

Game Theory

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina Bicchieri ◽  
Giacomo Sillari
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Correlated Equilibrium ◽  
Extensive Form

Game theory aims to understand situations in which decision-makers interact strategically. Chess is an example, as are firms competing for business, politicians competing for votes, animals fighting over prey, bidders competing in auctions, threats and punishments in long-term relationships, and so on. In such situations, the outcome depends on what the parties do jointly. Decision-makers may be people, organizations, animals, or even genes. In this chapter, the authors review fundamental notions of game theory and their application to philosophy of science. In particular, Section 1 looks at games of complete information through normal and extensive form representations, introduce the notion of Nash equilibrium and its refinements. Section 2 touches on epistemic foundations and correlated equilibrium, and Section 3 examines repeated games and their importance for the analysis of altruism and cooperation. Section 4 deals with evolutionary game theory.

scholarly journals A Game Theoretic Study of Enterprise Mergers and Acquisitions: The Case of RJR Nabisco Being Acquired by KKR

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 21
Author(s):  
Yanqing Jiang ◽  
Jian Yuan ◽  
Mengmeng Zeng
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Mergers And Acquisitions ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Micro Level ◽  
Information Dynamic

There are both macro- and micro-level studies concerning enterprise mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Past studies have focused on M&A valuation, utility of the M&A motives and the strategic behavior during of the M&A process. Few game theory methods in the application of M&A stay mostly in the analysis of Nash equilibrium under the complete information static game. This paper thus aims to analyze the M&A behavior of enterprises within the framework of incomplete information dynamic game, combined with sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of complete information dynamic game and Bayesian Nash equilibrium of incomplete information.

Applications to Game Theory

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob K. Goeree ◽  
Charles A. Holt ◽  
Thomas R. Palfrey
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Feedback Effects ◽  
Symmetric Game ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The World ◽  
Game Theoretic

This chapter explores several applications of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) to specific games in order to illustrate and expand on the wide range of game-theoretic principles and phenomena associated with QRE that have been highlighted in the previous chapters. The first application considered belongs to the class of continuous games. With a continuum of decisions, QRE predicts a choice distribution that is not merely a (possibly asymmetric) spread to each side of a Nash equilibrium, since “feedback effects” from deviations by one player alter others' expected payoff profiles, which would induce further changes. The second application is a symmetric game with binary actions where players have continuously distributed private information about an unknown state of the world that affects both players' payoffs. The remainder of the chapter looks at three applications to extensive-form games, all of which are games of incomplete information.

scholarly journals A Procedural Characterization of Solution Concepts in Games

2014 ◽  
Vol 49 ◽  
pp. 143-170 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Y. Halpern ◽  
Y. Moses
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Correlated Equilibrium ◽  
Sequential Equilibrium ◽  
Solution Concepts ◽  
Knowledge Based ◽  
Precise Sense ◽  
Uniform Definition ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Theoretic Solution

We show how game-theoretic solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, rationalizability, and sequential equilibrium can be given a uniform definition in terms of a knowledge-based program with counterfactual semantics. In a precise sense, this program can be viewed as providing a procedural characterization of rationality.

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