scholarly journals Statistical properties of the aftershocks of stock market crashes revisited: Analysis based on the 1987 crash, financial-crisis-2008 and COVID-19 pandemic

Author(s):  
Anish Rai ◽  
Ajit Mahata ◽  
Md Nurujjaman ◽  
Om Prakash

During any unique crisis, panic sell-off leads to a massive stock market crash that may continue for more than a day, termed as mainshock. The effect of a mainshock in the form of aftershocks can be felt throughout the recovery phase of stock price. As the market remains in stress during recovery, any small perturbation leads to a relatively smaller aftershock. The duration of the recovery phase has been estimated using structural break analysis. We have carried out statistical analyses of 1987 stock market crash, 2008 financial crisis and 2020 COVID-19 pandemic considering the actual crash times of the mainshock and aftershocks. Earlier, such analyses were done considering absolute one-day return, which cannot capture a crash properly. The results show that the mainshock and aftershock in the stock market follow the Gutenberg–Richter (GR) power law. Further, we obtained higher [Formula: see text] value for the COVID-19 crash compared to the financial-crisis-2008 from the GR law. This implies that the recovery of stock price during COVID-19 may be faster than the financial-crisis-2008. The result is consistent with the present recovery of the market from the COVID-19 pandemic. The analysis shows that the high-magnitude aftershocks are rare, and low-magnitude aftershocks are frequent during the recovery phase. The analysis also shows that the inter-occurrence times of the aftershocks follow the generalized Pareto distribution, i.e. [Formula: see text], where [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] are constants and [Formula: see text] is the inter-occurrence time. This analysis may help investors to restructure their portfolio during a market crash.

Author(s):  
Kuo-Jung Lee ◽  
Su-Lien Lu

This study examines the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak on the Taiwan stock market and investigates whether companies with a commitment to corporate social responsibility (CSR) were less affected. This study uses a selection of companies provided by CommonWealth magazine to classify the listed companies in Taiwan as CSR and non-CSR companies. The event study approach is applied to examine the change in the stock prices of CSR companies after the first COVID-19 outbreak in Taiwan. The empirical results indicate that the stock prices of all companies generated significantly negative abnormal returns and negative cumulative abnormal returns after the outbreak. Compared with all companies and with non-CSR companies, CSR companies were less affected by the outbreak; their stock prices were relatively resistant to the fall and they recovered faster. In addition, the cumulative impact of the COVID-19 on the stock prices of CSR companies is smaller than that of non-CSR companies on both short- and long-term bases. However, the stock price performance of non-CSR companies was not weaker than that of CSR companies during times when the impact of the pandemic was lower or during the price recovery phase.


2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 574-602 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yixi Ning ◽  
Gubo Xu ◽  
Ziwu Long

Purpose This study aims to examine the venture capital (VC) industry in China. It has demonstrated a history of high growth with significant variations over time. The authors have examined the trends and determinants of VC investments in China over a 20-year period from 1995 to 2014. They find that the aggregate amount of VC investments, the total number of venture deals and the average amount of venture investments per deal in China are all significantly impacted by macroeconomic conditions (i.e. GDP, export, money supply), technology innovations and financial market indicators (i.e. initial public offerings (IPOs), interest rate, price-to-earnings ratio, etc.). They also find that the 2007 China A-Share stock market crash and the subsequent global financial crisis have motivated VCists in China to adjust their investment strategies and risk levels by allocating more capital to later-stage investments and securing more deals with later-round financings. However, after the 2008 global financial crisis, the China’s venture industry has recovered faster compared to the US counterpart response. Design/methodology/approach The authors first perform trend analysis of VC investments at an aggregate level, by stages of development, and across industry from 1995 to 2014.To test H1 and H2, the authors use multiple regression models with lagged explanatory variables. To test H3, the authors use univariate tests to compare the measures of VC investments at an aggregate level, stage funds ratios, stage deals ratios and financing series ratios during both a five-year and seven-year time windows around the 2007 A-Share stock market crash and the subsequent financial crisis. Findings The development of the VC industry in China has demonstrated a history of high growth with significant variation over time. The authors find that the aggregate amount of VC investments, the total number of venture deals and the average amount of venture investments per deal in China are all significantly impacted by macroeconomic conditions (i.e. GDP, export, money supply), technology innovations and financial market indicators (i.e. IPOs, interest rate, price-to-earnings ratio, etc.). The authors also find that the 2007 China A-Share stock market crash and the subsequent global financial crisis have motivated VCists in China to adjust their investment strategies and risk by allocating more capital to later-stage investments and securing more deals with later-round financings. However, the China VC industry has recovered faster compared to the USA just after the 2008 global financial crisis. Research limitations/implications There are also limitations in the study. The VC data in China in the earlier 1990s might not be very reliable due to the quality of statistics. Therefore, the trend analysis and discussions mainly focus on the time after 2000. Also, the authors cannot find VC financing sequence data for the analysis. Second, there is no doubt that the policy impact from Chinese transforming economic system and government policies on its VC industry is substantial (Su and Wang, 2013). However, they cannot find an appropriate variable to be included in the empirical models to consider this effect. Further study on this area would provide meaningful information. Third, although the authors have done comparison study between the VC industry in China in this study and the VC industry in the US documented in Ning et al. (2015) and discussed some interesting findings, more in-depth research in this area will be very useful. Practical implications The findings have meaningful implications for VCists and start-up companies seeking equity financings in China. VCists should closely monitor macroeconomic and market conditions to make appropriate adjustments to their risk and investment strategies. Entrepreneurs seeking equity financings for their business could also monitor the identified macroeconomic and market indicators, which can help them with their timing and to negotiate a better equity financing deal. VC financing is more likely to succeed when key macroeconomic and market indicators become favorable. Originality/value This paper contributes to the literature by testing the supply and demand theory on the VC market proposed by Poterba (1989) and Gompers and Lerner (1998) from the macroeconomic perspective using 20 years’ VC data from China. The authors also examine how the 2007 A-Share stock market crash and the subsequent financial crisis affected VCists to adjust their risk levels and investment strategies. It provides useful information for international academia and policymakers to understand the quick rise of China VC industry. The authors also find that the macroeconomic drivers of VC industry are somewhat different under different economic systems.


2021 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Imran Yousaf ◽  
Shoaib Ali

This study examines the return and volatility transmission between gold and nine emerging Asian Stock Markets during the global financial crisis and the Chinese stock market crash. We use the VAR-AGARCH model to estimate return and volatility spillovers over the period from January 2000 through June 30, 2018. The results reveal the substantial return and volatility spillovers between the gold and emerging Asian stock markets during the global financial crisis and the Chinese stock market crash. However, these return and volatility transmissions vary across the pairs of stock markets and the financial crises. Besides, we analyze the optimal portfolios and hedge ratios between gold and emerging Asian stock markets during all sample periods. Our findings have important implications for effective hedging and diversification strategies, asset pricing and risk management.


2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (4) ◽  
pp. 311-316 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanna Huikari ◽  
Jouko Miettunen ◽  
Marko Korhonen

BackgroundExisting research on the relationship between economic recessions and suicides has almost completely concentrated on the most recent global financial crisis (2008). We provide the most comprehensive explanation to date of how different types of economic/financial crises since 1970 have affected suicides in developed countries.MethodsNegative binomial regressions were used to estimate what the suicide rates would have been during and 1 year after each crisis began in 21 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries from 1970 to 2011 if the suicide rates had followed the pre-crisis trends.ResultsWe found that every economic/financial crisis since 1970, except the European Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis in 1992, led to excess suicides in developed countries. Among males, the excess suicide rate (per 100 000 persons) varied from 1.1 (95% CI 0.7 to 1.5) to 9.5 (7.6 to 11.2) and, among females, from 0 to 2.4 (1.9 to 2.9). For both sexes, suicides increased mostly due to stock market crashes and banking crises. In terms of actual numbers, the post-1969 economic/financial crises caused >60 000 excess suicides in the 21 developed countries. The Asian financial crisis in 1997 was the most damaging crisis when assessed based on excess suicides.ConclusionsEvidence indicates that, when considered in terms of effects on suicide mortality, the most recent global financial crisis is not particularly severe compared with previous global economic/financial crises. The distinct types of crises (ie, banking, currency and inflation crises, and stock market crashes) have different effects on suicide.


2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
DeokJong Jeong ◽  
Sunyoung Park

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to empirically analyze the effect of the increasing connectedness among financial institutions in the Korean financial market, as it affects the market microstructure in the stock market. Thus this work, first, analyzes the trend and characteristics of connectedness in the Korean financial sector. This work then demonstrates the impacts of connectedness on volatility and price discovery in the stock market. Design/methodology/approach The entire Korean financial sector is analyzed from January 1990 to July 2015, including the periods of the 1997 Asian crisis and the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. This paper quantifies the connectedness between financial institutions using network methodology. Densely connectedness specifically refers to the cases in which a node experiences strong-lagged return spillover from and/or to itself. Findings Connectedness is established as an important determinant of stock price discovery. This paper illustrates that connectedness increases on significant economic events such as the 1997 Asian crisis and the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. Furthermore, this paper demonstrates that the more densely connected a particular financial institution, the more volatile the stock price and the less accurate the stock price quality. Research limitations/implications Understanding the financial system from a network perspective has been on the rise after the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. This work helps regulators and policy makers understand the full implications of introducing new policies that can more closely connect financial institutions. Originality/value This paper precisely captures financial institutions’ connectedness by including all types of financial institutions at the micro level. Additionally, this paper links connectedness to market microstructure in the stock market.


1988 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 3-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Greenwald ◽  
Jeremy Stein

This paper was prepared for the Symposium on the [October 1987] Stock Market Crash, held February 8, 1988, at Princeton University. The article provides a framework for thinking about the recommendations made by the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms. Three conclusions can be drawn from the Task Force's findings: First, the proper focus of analysis of the events of the October crash should be on “market mechanisms” rather than on fundamental imbalances in the economy as a whole. Second, the instability evident in the events of October 1987 was not the inexorable limit of a steadily increasing level of day-to-day stock price volatility. Third, under the sorts of conditions that prevailed on late Monday and Tuesday, an orderly halt to trading (and subsequent orderly reopening) would have been preferable to what actually took place. We describe how the data collected by the Task Force leads us to these three broad conclusions.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-45
Author(s):  
Tobin Hanspal ◽  
Annika Weber ◽  
Johannes Wohlfart

We survey a representative sample of US households to study how exposure to the COVID-19 stock market crash affects expectations and planned behavior. Wealth shocks are associated with upward adjustments of expectations about retirement age, desired working hours, and household debt, but have only small effects on expected spending. We provide correlational and experimental evidence that beliefs about the duration of the stock market recovery shape households’ expectations about their own wealth and their planned investment decisions and labor market activity. Our findings shed light on the implications of household exposure to stock market crashes for expectation formation.


Author(s):  
Corinne Crawford

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; mso-pagination: none;"><span style="font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;; color: black; font-size: 10pt; mso-themecolor: text1;">The Glass-Steagall Act was passed in 1933 in response to the failure of the banks following the Great Depression.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>One out of every five banks failed in the aftermath of the stock market crash. Legislators and regulators questioned the role the underwriting of securities played in the financial collapse. Many believed these investment banking activities caused a conflict of interest in that banks often suggested that their customers purchase securities the banks had underwritten.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>They believed that this conflict of interest contributed significantly to the stock market crash and the bank failures.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>The Glass-Steagall Act forced banks to choose between being a commercial bank or an investment bank, in effect constructing a wall between commercial banking and investing banking activities.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>The Glass- Steagall Act was the first law signed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt upon taking the oath of office.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Almost immediately upon enactment, the financial community lobbied to have the Act repealed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Over the years, this persistent lobbying led to a continual reinterpretation and liberalization of the Glass-Steagall Act, until the Act was repealed in 1999.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>On the dawn of repeal, the late Senator Paul Wellstone made an impassioned plea on the Senate floor. He said the repeal of Glass-Steagall would enable the creation of financial conglomerates which would be too big to fail.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Furthermore, he believed that the regulatory structure would not be able to monitor the activities of these financial conglomerates and they would eventually fail due to engaging in excessively risky financial transactions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Ultimately, he said, prophetically, that the taxpayers would be forced to bail out these too-big-to-fail financial institutions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Clearly, Senator Wellstone was in the minority as the legislation repealing the Glass-Steagall Act was passed in both the House and the Senate with large majorities.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>President Bill Clinton signed the legislation into law in late November, 1999.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>It has now been over ten years since the repeal of Glass-Steagall and the United States is in the grip of the largest financial crisis since the Great Depression.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Legislators and regulators are again questioning the role that the investment banking activities of commercial banks have played in a financial crisis.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Some believe the repeal of Glass-Steagall contributed significantly to the current financial crisis.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Others believe that if Glass-Steagall had still been in place, the financial crisis would be much worse.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>This paper examines the role that the repeal of Glass-Steagall played in the current financial crisis.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</span></span></p>


2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 83-98
Author(s):  
Ilhan Meric ◽  
Lan Ma Nygren ◽  
Jerome T. Bentley ◽  
Charles W. McCall

Abstract Empirical studies show that correlation between national stock markets increased and the benefits of global portfolio diversification decreased significantly after the global stock market crash of 1987. The 1987 and 2008 crashes are the two most important global stock market crashes since the 1929 Great depression. Although the effects of the 1987 crash on the comovements of national stock markets have been investigated extensively, the effects of the 2008 crash have not been studied sufficiently. In this paper we study this issue with a research sample that includes the U.S stock market and twenty European stock markets. We find that correlation between the twenty-one stock markets increased and the benefits of portfolio diversification decreased significantly after the 2008 stock market crash.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document