CARBON TAXES VERSUS CAP AND TRADE: A CRITICAL REVIEW

2013 ◽  
Vol 04 (03) ◽  
pp. 1350010 ◽  
Author(s):  
LAWRENCE H. GOULDER ◽  
ANDREW R. SCHEIN

We examine the relative attractions of a carbon tax, a "pure" cap-and-trade system, and a "hybrid" option (a cap-and-trade system with a price ceiling and/or price floor). We show that the various options are equivalent along more dimensions than often are recognized. In addition, we bring out important dimensions along which the approaches have very different impacts, including some dimensions that have received little attention in prior literature. Although no option dominates the others, a key finding is that exogenous emissions pricing (whether through a carbon tax or through the hybrid option) has a number of important attractions over pure cap and trade. Beyond helping prevent price volatility and reducing expected policy errors in the face of uncertainties, exogenous pricing helps avoid problematic interactions with other climate policies and helps avoid potential wealth transfers to oil-exporting countries.

Author(s):  
Leigh Raymond

After RGGI’s implementation in 2008, a series of political set backs led some to declare cap and trade “dead.” This chapter rejects the asserted demise of cap and trade, arguing that the public benefit model for climate policies offers the best hope for political progress. The chapter reviews post-2008 climate policies, noting thatdespite a few prominent failures,cap and trade with auction has become the most common approach to addressing climate change. In addition, the chapter documents how three policies—the EU ETS, California’s cap and trade program, and RGGI—used the public benefit frame to resist political challenges and strengthen their emissions goals. The chapter then describes additional potential applications for the public benefit model, including carbon tax policies and the new Clean Power Plan regulations promulgated by the U.S. EPA in 2015. As uses of the public benefit frame expand, the chapter notes, a key question for the future will be what types of policy designs will be perceived as “fitting” with the norms that constitute the frame. Finally, the chapter discusses how normative framing could improve the ability to understand and predict other sudden policy changes beyond the topic of climate change.


Author(s):  
Juan Carlos Belausteguigoitia ◽  
Vidal Romero ◽  
Alberto Simpser

AbstractPrice-based climate change policy instruments, such as carbon taxes or cap-and-trade systems, are known for their potential to generate desirable results such as reducing the cost of meeting environmental targets. Nonetheless, carbon pricing policies face important economic and political hurdles. Powerful stakeholders tend to obstruct such policies or dilute their impacts. Additionally, costs are borne by those who implement the policies or comply with them, while benefits accrue to all, creating incentives to free ride. Finally, costs must be paid in the present, while benefits only materialize over time. This chapter analyses the political economy of the introduction of a carbon tax in Mexico in 2013 with the objective of learning from that process in order to facilitate the eventual implementation of an effective cap-and-trade system in Mexico. Many of the lessons in Mexico are likely to be applicable elsewhere. As countries struggle to meet the goals of international environmental agreements, it is of utmost importance that we understand the conditions under which it is feasible to implement policies that reduce carbon emissions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 73 (05) ◽  
pp. 8-8
Author(s):  
Pam Boschee

Carbon credits, carbon taxes, and emissions trading systems are familiar terms in discussions about limiting global warming, the Paris Agreement, and net-zero emissions goals. A more recent addition to the glossary of climate policy is “carbon tariff.” While the concept is not new, it recently surfaced in nascent policymaking in the EU. In 2019, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen proposed a “carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)” as part of a proposed green deal. In March, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on a World Trade Organization (WTO)-compatible CBAM. A carbon tariff, or the EU’s CBAM, is a tax applied to carbon-intensive imports. Countries that have pledged to be more ambitious in reducing emissions—and in some cases have implemented binding targets—may impose carbon costs on their own businesses. Being eyed now are cross-border or overseas businesses that make products in countries in which no costs are imposed for emissions, resulting in cheaper carbon-intensive goods. Those products are exported to the countries aiming for reduced emissions. The concern lies in the risk of locally made goods becoming unfairly disadvantaged against competitors that are not taking similar steps to deal with climate change. A carbon tariff is being considered to level the playing field: local businesses in countries applying a tariff can better compete as climate policies evolve and are adopted around the world. Complying with WTO rules to ensure fair treatment, the CBAM will be imposed only on high-emitting industries that compete directly with local industries paying a carbon price. In the short term, these are likely to be steel, chemicals, fertilizers, and cement. The Parliament’s statement introduced another term to the glossary of climate policy: carbon leakage. “To raise global climate ambition and prevent ‘carbon leakage,’ the EU must place a carbon price on imports from less climate-ambitious countries.” It refers to the situation that may occur if businesses were to transfer production to other countries with laxer emission constraints to avoid costs related to climate policies. This could lead to an increase in total emissions in the higher-emitting countries. “The resolution underlines that the EU’s increased ambition on climate change must not lead to carbon leakage as global climate efforts will not benefit if EU production is just moved to non-EU countries that have less ambitious emissions rules,” the Parliament said. It also emphasized the tariff “must not be misused to further protectionism.” A member of the environment committee, Yannick Jadot, said, “It is a major political and democratic test for the EU, which must stop being naïve and impose the same carbon price on products, whether they are produced in or outside the EU, to ensure the most polluting sectors also take part in fighting climate change and innovate towards zero carbon. This will give us the best chance of remaining below the 1.5°C warming limit, whilst also pushing our trading partners to be equally ambitious in order to enter the EU market.” The Commission is expected to present a legislative proposal on a CBAM in the second quarter of 2021 as part of the European Green Deal.


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-291 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saqib Sharif

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the market reaction to the decision made by the management of the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) to impose a price floor that resulted in trading curbs in 2008. The paper analyzes if regulatory intervention helped in restoring investor confidence. Design/methodology/approach – The paper examines the effect of enforcement of a price floor and trading curbs by splitting the time period studied into two periods: pre-floor and post-floor period. The parametric t-statistics and non-parametric Mann-Whitney test are used to compare the abnormal returns (ARs), abnormal trading volume, bid-ask spread, Amihud illiquidity ratio, and price volatility between the two periods. Event study was conducted to observe the behavior of market returns surrounding market-wide price floor. Finally, multivariate regression analysis was also applied by controlling for factors that might influence valuation, liquidity, and volatility. The standard errors have been corrected for cross-sectional clustering due to market-wide restrictions. Findings – The study found an adverse impact of price freeze and trading curb in the KSE, following the relaxation of floor (resumption of active trading). First, the price of securities (or ARs) significantly declined following the relaxation of the price freeze. Second, the market liquidity deteriorated following the relaxation of the price floor. Third, the price volatility increased in the post-floor period. It seems that the decision made by the KSE’s board to implement lower cap on prices for an extended period was ineffective. Practical implications – Market intervention by regulators to bring calm in the financial markets have negative consequences across the globe. The results presented in this paper suggest that implementing price floor brought inefficiency in the market and prevented firms from raising capital to finance their future investments. The author believe this study will add to the knowledge base of regulatory intervention and its impact on the performance of financial markets. Originality/value – There is no empirical evidence on the impact of price limits on volatility in emerging markets. The author selected Pakistan as a case study, where we particularly focus upon impact of the enforcement of a price floor around the peak of Global Financial Crisis (or market intervention) in Pakistan. This study also documents the effect of trading curb on liquidity and volatility in an emerging market, given that a majority of research on trading halt/price limits is based on developed markets.


Author(s):  
T. A. Malova ◽  
V. I. Sisoeva

The article provides an analysis of change of the world oil market in the face of new "oil" reality. Factors of formation of new "oil" reality in the global world defined. Scientific background and current state of research of the problem are described. It is shownthat in the Russian and foreign literature the considerable attention is paid to the analysis of dynamics of the quantitative variables characterizing fluctuations and shocks in the oil market. At the same time the search for balance in the new "oil" reality are not considerably investigated yet. The proposed approach allows toreveal the substance of the transformation of the world oil market, to assess the changes in the oil market with the development of rhenium in terms of efficiency and functioning of the mechanism, the prospects of price volatility in the oil market. The main directions of transformation of the oil market are follows. Development of a subject basis of the oil market due to changes of a role of the main market players whose structure includes the USA, Saudi Arabia, Russia now. The impact of regulatory factors complex in the oil market towards equilibrium, which include activity of OPEC, supply of shale oil, future market,activity of the uniform regulator and national regulators. Transformation of the oil market in the direction of perfection of the competitive relations, achievement of optimum market balance as a result of coordination and interaction of interests of participants of the global oil market.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document