Retailer Channel Strategy and its Impact on Fresh Supply Chain under the COVID-19

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shufan Feng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Channel Strategy

Pricing Strategy in Dual-Channel Supply Chains with Loss-Averse Consumers

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (05) ◽  
pp. 1950027
Author(s):  
Chengli Liu ◽  
C. K. M. Lee ◽  
K. H. Leung
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Basic Product ◽  
Luxury Goods ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Channel Strategy ◽  
Basic Goods ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

In this paper, loss-averse consumer behavior during purchase decision-making process in the dual-channel supply chain is modeled. Loss-averse consumers prefer avoiding losses to gain utility with respect to their reference point while purchasing the product. Two product categories are classified: (1) basic product and (2) luxury goods which have lower and higher reference utility to consumers, respectively. The research objective is to determine the optimal price strategy in dual-channel supply chains and discuss the decision behind loss-averse consumers. To model consumers’ valuation of a product, prospect theory is adopted to calculate the demands of each channel. Then, the optimal pricing strategy and the corresponding profits are found out in a Stackelberg game manner. The results encourage manufacturers of basic goods to engage in dual-channel strategy. Effect of “double marginalization” is reduced if consumers are loss-averse in the dual-channel supply chain. Furthermore, the direct channel online contributes larger demand to the manufacturer. However, manufacturers of luxury goods are not suggested for dual-channel strategy because the demand for direct channel online is negligible and the demand for the retail channel remains unchanged. Nevertheless, retailers cannot obtain benefit from dual-channel and as a result, the profit of basic goods retailers will be reduced.

Distribution Channel Strategies and Retailer Collusion in a Supply Chain with Multiple Retailers

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (03) ◽  
pp. 1850014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaona Zheng ◽  
Luping Sun ◽  
Andy A. Tsay
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Management ◽  
Discount Rate ◽  
Distribution Channel ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Variable Cost ◽  
Present Value ◽  
Direct Selling ◽  
Chain Management ◽  
Channel Strategy

Previous literature suggests that without regulations firms have incentives to collude by fixing price or reducing quantity. This paper sets up an infinitely repeated game to examine the interplay between the manufacturer’s channel strategy and the downstream retailers’ collusive behavior. The results show that the manufacturer can deter retailer collusion by strategically changing its channel strategy. This effect occurs when the discount rate (used to calculate the present value of future profits) is relatively large and the manufacturer’s direct selling efficiency is relatively high (i.e., the variable cost of direct selling is relatively low). With the deterrence of direct selling, retailers abandon collusion and “no collusion” is a win-win strategy for both levels in the supply chain. However, when the manufacturer is not efficient in direct selling or the discount rate is small, direct selling is not effective in deterring retailer collusion and the manufacturer is worse off. These findings provide insights into channel strategies and supply chain management.

scholarly journals Green Remanufacturer’s Mixed Collection Channel Strategy Considering Enterprise’s Environmental Responsibility and the Fairness Concern in Reverse Green Supply Chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (7) ◽  
pp. 3405
Author(s):  
Xigang Yuan ◽  
Fei Tang ◽  
Dalin Zhang ◽  
Xiaoqing Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Environmental Responsibility ◽  
Channel Strategy ◽  
Dynamic Game Model ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Mixed Collection

In reverse green supply chain, the mixed collection channel strategy of green remanufacturer is analyzed by building a dynamic game model in which we consider that the green remanufacturer undertakes the environmental responsibility and the green collector shows strong fairness concern for the profit. We analyze the impact of the environmental responsibility level of the green remanufacturer, the preference coefficient of the green remanufacturer, the fairness concern coefficient of the green collector, and the coefficient of cross collection price on optimal decision and profit of the green remanufacturer. The result shows that (1) the green remanufacturer can further improve the collection price, so that it makes many more customers participate in the collection activity; (2) the green remanufacturer pays more attention to fulfill the environmental responsibility, which will increase the intensity of collection of the waste green product, and improve the collection price, as the old green product’s remanufacturing cost is lower than the production cost of the new product, and it can improve the green remanufacturer’s profits; (3) the green remanufacturer’s profit in the mixed collection channel is higher than those in online or offline collection channels.

scholarly journals Strategic Analysis of Dual-Channel Green Supply Chain with an Unreliable and Competitive Supplier

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (10) ◽  
pp. 5371
Author(s):  
Chongfeng Lan ◽  
Zhongzhen Miao ◽  
Huanyong Ji
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Production Technology ◽  
Public Awareness ◽  
Green Marketing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Channel Strategy ◽  
Retail Channel ◽  
Green Production ◽  
Online Channel

With the increasing public awareness of environmental issues, green production has become an important issue for supply chain management. This study proposes an analytical model to investigate the dual-channel green supply chain decisions of a retailer and a competitive supplier; the latter suffers from unreliable production yield. The retailer’s environmental responsibility is considered as a two-echelon supply chain in which the retailer promotes the green product in their marketplace through green marketing. This problem is analyzed and modeled under three available channel strategies, considered in the order in which channel selections are made: a single online channel strategy, a single retail channel strategy, and a dual-channel strategy. The results show that the wholesale price of the manufacturer and the green-marketing effect of the retailer increase with the improvement in the level of the green production technology. Interestingly, the result reveals that a retailer’s expected profit is unimodal in the production technology level under the dual-channel strategy, which suggests that the retailer may not be incentivized to encourage the manufacturer to improve its production technology once a threshold has been reached. Further, we develop the channel selection: the retailer is strictly better off in the single retail channel scenario than that in the dual-channel scenario; however, while the unreliable supplier is better off in the single online channel scenario than that in the single retail channel scenario, its best option is still the dual-channel strategy. Additionally, numerical results illustrate that the expected profits of supply chain parties decrease with the improvement in customer acceptance of the online channel.

Mary Kay Inc.: Direct Selling and the Challenge of Online Channels

2017 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Anne Coughlan ◽  
Erica Goldman
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Consumer Behavior ◽  
Chain Structure ◽  
Internet Technology ◽  
Channel Strategy ◽  
The World ◽  
Women's Lives ◽  
Compensation Plan ◽  
Supply Chain Structure ◽  
And Behavior

Mary Kay is one of the best-known direct sellers of women's cosmetics in the world. Its channel strategy is to use independent beauty consultants, who are independent distributors, to sell directly to consumers. Its compensation plan is multilevel, providing commissions to distributors on their own sales as well as the sales of the distributors they recruit. At the time of the case, the company is grappling with a well-established change in consumer behavior—the decline of the stay-at-home mom as she returns to the workforce—combined with the opportunities offered by Internet selling. Focuses on the company's efforts to move with consumer demand and behavior, while remaining true to its core goal of “Improving Women's Lives.” Discusses ways Internet technology can be used throughout the company's channel and supply chain structure, not just as a route to market.

scholarly journals Effect of Capital Constraint in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Lang Xu ◽  
Jia Shi ◽  
Jihong Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Channel Strategy ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
Online Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

Capital constraint is a significant factor that mainly restricts the development of small- and medium-sized enterprises. This paper explores the channel strategy and pricing decision in a dual-channel supply chain, which consists of one supplier and one retailer. Adequate and inadequate capital constraints for the supplier are distinguished by determining whether open the retail channel to sell. The observations offer managerial insights into supply chain member. First, the results indicate that the capital constraint is a key factor affecting channel strategies and pricing decisions. With the increased value of capital constraint, the wholesale price of offline channel and the selling price of online channel firstly decrease and then remain constant. Second, the results demonstrate that, with capital constraint, the supplier pays more attention to consumers’ brand loyalty if it chooses to open the online channel only. Additionally, the price-sensitivity parameter has no effect on the strategy of opening only the offline channel. Moreover, when the channel competition is too intense, the supplier will choose to only open the online channel strategy and increase the online selling price if the capital is insufficient.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document