scholarly journals Research on the Fresh Agricultural Product Supply Chain Coordination with Supply Disruptions

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sun Guohua
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Planning Horizon ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Agricultural Product ◽  
Supply Disruptions ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Lump Sum ◽  
Coordination Contract

This paper develops a dynamic model in a one-supplier-one-retailer fresh agricultural product supply chain that experiences supply disruptions during the planning horizon. The optimal solutions in the centralized and decentralized supply chains are studied. It is found that the retailer’s optimal order quantity and the maximum total supply chain profit in the decentralized supply chain with wholesale price contract are less than that in the centralized supply chain. A two-part tariff contract is proposed to coordinate the decentralized supply chain with which the maximum profit can be achieved. It is found that the optimal wholesale price should be a decreasing piecewise function of the final output. To ensure that the supplier and the retailer both have incentives to accept the coordination contract, a lump-sum fee is offered. The interval of lump-sum fee is given leaving both the supplier and the retailer better off with the two-part tariff contract.

scholarly journals Emergency Coordination Model of Fresh Agricultural Products’ Three-Level Supply Chain with Asymmetric Information

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Yang ◽  
Haorui Liu ◽  
Xuedou Yu ◽  
Fenghua Xiao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Nonlinear Function ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Agricultural Product ◽  
Coordination Model ◽  
Emergency Events

In consideration of influence of loss, freshness, and secret retailer cost of products, how to handle emergency events during three-level supply chain is researched when market need is presumed to be a nonlinear function with retail price in fresh agricultural product market. Centralized and decentralized supply chain coordination models are studied based on asymmetric information. Optimal strategy of supply chain in dealing with retail price perturbation is caused by emergency events. The research reveals robustness for optimal production planning, wholesale price for distributors, wholesale price for retailers, and retail price of three-level supply chain about fresh agricultural products. The above four factors can keep constant within a certain perturbation of expectation costs for retailers because of emergency events; the conclusions are verified by numerical simulation. This paper also can be used for reference to the other related studies in how to coordinate the supply chain under asymmetric and punctual researches information response to disruptions.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Coordination with a Loss-Averse Retailer and Combined Contract

Mathematics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 586
Author(s):  
Wei Liu ◽  
Shiji Song ◽  
Ying Qiao ◽  
Han Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Loss Aversion ◽  
Value At Risk ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Conditional Value At Risk ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Confidence Levels ◽  
Quantity Flexibility ◽  
Quantity Flexibility Contract

This paper studies the supply chain coordination where the retailer is loss-averse, and a combined buyback and quantity flexibility contract is introduced. The loss-averse retailer’s objective is to maximize the Conditional Value-at-Risk of utility. It is shown the combined contract can coordinate the chain and a unique coordinating wholesale price exists if the confidence level is below a threshold. Moreover, the retailer’s optimal order quantity, expected utility and coordinating wholesale price are decreasing in loss aversion and confidence levels, respectively. We also find that when the contract parameters are restricted, the combined contract may coordinate the supply chain even though neither of its component contracts coordinate the chain.

Supply Chain Coordination under Asymmetric Disruptive Demand

2010 ◽  
Vol 44-47 ◽  
pp. 96-100
Author(s):  
Chuan Bo Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Optimal Capacity ◽  
Capacity Reservation ◽  
Chain Operation ◽  
Baseline Case ◽  
Supply Chain Operation ◽  
Better Than

Under the circumstance of disruptive demand, the decision-making and coordination of enterprise’s capacity is directly related to the efficiency of supply chain operation. On the basis of the baseline case, capacity reservation contract sees that the performance of decentralized supply chain is equal to the centralized supply chain, and better than the level of the optimal supply chain capacity under the wholesale price contract. For disruptive demand, this paper discusses the conditions of capacity expansion and supply chain coordination through the capacity reservation contract in two cases, i.e., symmetric disruptive information, asymmetric disruptive information, and compares the optimal capacity and the corresponding profit.

Wholesale Price for Supply Chain Coordination via Conditional Value-at-Risk Minimization

2010 ◽  
Vol 20-23 ◽  
pp. 88-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chuan Xu Wang
Keyword(s):  
At Risk ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Value At Risk ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Conditional Value At Risk ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Individual Member ◽  
Risk Minimization ◽  
Proposed Model

The theory of the conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) in financial risk management is considered in this paper to develop a model of supply chain coordination with a wholesale pricing policy. The proposed model solves the drawbacks of objective function in current supply chain coordination model. A numerical example is given to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed model. The following helpful conclusions are drawn from the paper: with the increase of the degree of risk averting for supply chain individual member, the optimal order quantity of supply chain is decreasing, while the optimal profit is decreasing; If supplier’s risk averting degree increases, supplier has to increase wholesale price to achieve supply chain coordination; If retailer’s risk averting degree increases, supplier has to decrease wholesale price to achieve supply chain coordination.

Decision-Making on the Supply Chain of Fresh Agricultural Products with Two-Period Price and Option Contract

2020 ◽  
pp. 2050038
Author(s):  
Bo Yan ◽  
Gaodi Liu ◽  
Xiaohua Wu ◽  
Jiwen Wu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Agricultural Product ◽  
Fixed Cost ◽  
Option Contract ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making

The price risk of fresh agricultural products has been a significant topic in recent years. Taking the two-level fresh agricultural product supply chain as the research object, this paper studies the optimal ordering and coordination of supply chain based on two-period price, wholesale price and option contract. The optimal order decision of the retailer at the single period price and the optimal decision corresponding to the supplier are obtained when the output of the supplier is uncertain under decentralized decision-making. The range of penalty cost parameter that avoids supplier default is also obtained. The effect of two-period price on the optimal order decision and supply chain profits is discussed when the production yield of the supplier is fixed. Cost-sharing contract is introduced to increase the order quantity and achieve coordination because the option contract cannot completely make the supply chain coordination with two-period price. This paper provides a low-cost approach that can be applied in fresh agricultural supply chain to solve financing and order problems.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Decision-Making Based on Warehouse Receipt Pledge and Risk Consideration under Twice Ordering Mode

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Liang Wang ◽  
Tingjia Xu ◽  
Shi Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Risk Control ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Monotonically Increasing Function ◽  
Increasing Function

This paper studies supply chain decisions making between the retailer, supplier, and bank based on warehouse receipt pledge and risk consideration under twice ordering mode. The decentralized supply chain and centralized supply chain are divided by whether the supplier provides repurchase guarantees and whether the retailer offers revenue sharing. We develop a Stackelberg game model to analyze the influential mechanism among various actors and use the method of downside risk control to discuss the bank’s expected loss and the optimal loan pledge ratio. We carry out a simulation analysis, and the result is shown as follows: (i) either for decentralized or centralized supply chain, the retailer’s optimal order quantity and the optimal proportion that the number of goods pledged by the retailer’s twice ordering accounts for the number of first-ordering goods are all unique; (ii) the bank’s loan pledge ratio is a monotonically increasing function of disposal value of the unit remaining commodity; (iii) for centralized supply chain, the bank’s loan pledge ratio is the monotonically increasing function of repurchase ratio and wholesale price provided by the supplier, respectively; (iv) in the decentralized supply chain, the supplier’s return mainly comes from the wholesale revenue and is positively related to the wholesale volume and wholesale price; in the centralized supply chain, the supplier’s return is mainly from the retailer’s revenue sharing.

scholarly journals Coordinating a Supply Chain with Risk-Averse Agents under Demand and Consumer Returns Uncertainty

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jian Liu ◽  
Yong He
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Risk Attitude ◽  
Price Policy ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Coordination Problem ◽  
Consumer Returns ◽  
The Impact

This paper examines the optimal order decision in a supply chain when it faces uncertain demand and uncertain consumer returns. We build consumer returns model with decision-makers’ risk preference under mean-variance objective framework and discuss supply chain coordination problem under wholesale-price-only policy and the manufacturer’s buyback policy, respectively. We find that, with wholesale price policy, the supply chain cannot be coordinated whether the supply chain agents are risk-neutral or risk-averse. However, with buyback policy, the supply chain can be coordinated and the profit of the supply chain can be arbitrarily allocated between the manufacturer and the retailer. Through numerical examples, we illustrate the impact of stochastic consumer returns and the supply chain agents’ risk attitude on the optimal order decision.

Tactic of Supply Chain Coordination when the Freight Cost of Unit Product is Sensitive to Lot Size

2012 ◽  
Vol 601 ◽  
pp. 593-598 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hua Ming Gui
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Lead Time ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Optimal Size ◽  
Lot Size ◽  
Optimal Production ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Product Delivery ◽  
Analytical Result

Considering a supply chain with a manufacturer and a wholesaler, we assume the freight cost of unit product is sensitive to lot size and the manufacturer is responsible for product delivery, the optimal lot size models under decentralized decision and centralized supply chain are presented. The analytical result shows that the more flexible the delivery capacity is, the smaller the optimal production size is, which is consistent with short order lead time and small lot size that claimed by the wholesaler. Therefore, the manufacturer can quickly respond to demand of the wholesaler under the condition that the total cost is invariable. Moreover, when the delivery capacity isn’t absolute flexibility, the manufacturer may motivate the wholesaler to undertake product delivery through reducing the transfer price so that the wholesaler’s optimal order size under decentralized supply chain is closer to both the manufacturer’s optimal production size and the entire supply chain’s optimal size under centralized supply chain, which may benefit the entire supply chain since both can obtain a win-win solution.

Supply Chain Coordination for E-Commerce: Risk Penalty vs. Flat Rate

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ju Myung Song ◽  
Yao Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Common Belief ◽  
Shipping Industry ◽  
Flat Rate

Problem definition: We study the coordination of an E-commerce supply chain between online sellers and third party shippers to meet random demand surges, induced by, for instance, online shopping holidays. Academic/practical relevance: Motivated by the challenge of meeting the unpredictable demand surges in E-commerce, we study shipping contracts and supply chain coordination between online sellers and third party shippers in a novel model taking into account the unique features of the shipping industry. Methodology: We compare two shipping contracts: the risk penalty (proposed by UPS) and the flat rate (used by FedEx), and analyze their impact on the seller, the shipper, and the supply chain. Results: Under information symmetry, the sophisticated risk penalty contract is no better than the simple flat rate contract for the shipper, against common belief. Although both the risk penalty and the flat rate can coordinate the supply chain, the risk penalty does so only if the shipper makes zero profit, but the flat rate can provide a positive profit for both. These results represent a new form of double marginalization and risk-sharing, in sharp contrast to the well-known literature on the classic supplier-retailer supply chain, where risk-sharing contracts (similar to the risk penalty) can bring benefits to all parties, but the single wholesale price contract (similar to the flat rate) can achieve supply chain coordination only when the supplier makes zero profit. We also find that only the online seller, but not the shipper, has the motivation to vertically integrate the seller-shipper supply chain. Under information asymmetry, however, the risk penalty brings more benefit to the shipper than the flat rate, but hurts the seller and the supply chain. Managerial implications: Our results imply that information plays an important role in the shipper’s choices of shipping contracts. Under information symmetry, the risk penalty is unnecessarily complex because the simple flat rate is as good as the risk penalty for the shipper; moreover, it is better for the seller-shipper coordination. However, under information asymmetry, the shipper faces additional shipping risk that can be offset by the extra flexibility of the risk penalty. Our study also explains and supports the recent practice of online sellers (e.g., Amazon.com and JD.com), but not shippers, to vertically integrate the supply chain by consistently expanding their shipping capabilities.

scholarly journals Trade Credit with Barter in a Capital-Constrained Supply Chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (20) ◽  
pp. 11361
Author(s):  
Yangyang Huang ◽  
Zhenyang Pi ◽  
Weiguo Fang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Uncertain Demand ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Supply Rate ◽  
Optimal Order Quantity ◽  
And Performance

Barter has emerged to alleviate capital pressure, maximize the circulation of goods, and facilitate the disposal of excess inventory. This study considers a two-level supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a capital-constrained retailer with trade credit, in which the retailer exchanges unsold products for needed subsidiary products on a barter platform. The retailer’s optimal order quantity and the manufacturer’s wholesale price are derived, and the influences of barter and other factors on the equilibrium strategy and performance of the supply chain are examined; these results are verified and supplemented by numerical simulation. We find that the retailer can increase profit by bartering when facing highly uncertain demand, that the retailer’s optimal order quantity increases with the supply rate and demand for subsidiary products, and that both manufacturer and retailer benefit from the high supply rate of subsidiary products. However, barter induces the manufacturer to raise the wholesale price to prevent its profit from being harmed. In addition, the manufacturer suffers from the retailer’s initial capital.

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