scholarly journals The Low-Carbon Supply Chain Coordination Problem with Consumers’ Low-Carbon Preference

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 3591 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Wu ◽  
Yuxiang Yang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Coordination Problem ◽  
Emission Abatement ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

In this paper, we study the supply chain coordination problem between a manufacturer and a retailer regarding consumers’ low-carbon preferences. The retailer considers the market demand to determine the order quantity; the manufacturer chooses how to reduce emissions according to the retailer’s order quantity. We consider four cases, including the non-emission abatement, the emission abatement of decentralized decision-making, the centralized decision-making and the retailer providing a cost-sharing contract. By comparing the four cases, we find that the case of a retailer providing a cost-sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain, achieving a Pareto improvement for the manufacturer and retailer. In addition, we use the Rubinstein bargaining model to determine the cost-sharing ratio. Finally, numerical simulations are given to analyze the impact of the cost-sharing ratio on the equilibrium results, including the profit and the emission abatement level. Furthermore, we investigate the impact of the cost-sharing ratio and consumers’ low-carbon awareness on the profits of the members in the supply chain. We find that the equilibrium results, including the order quantity, the emission abatement level and the profits of the members in the supply chain under contract, are higher than the ones under centralized decision-making. The results show that in the higher low-carbon awareness market, retailers should formulate a reasonable cost-sharing ratio to achieve emission reduction coordination.

scholarly journals Joint Emission Reduction Dynamic Decisions and Coordination in a Supply Chain Considering Altruistic Behavior and Reference Low-Carbon Effect

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
ziyuan zhang ◽  
Liying Yu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Altruistic Behavior ◽  
Intensity Increase ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Reduce Emissions ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

Abstract In the context of low-carbon economy, supply chain members’ joint emission reduction issue has become a research hotspot, while there are few researches which synthetically studies the effect of consumers’ reference low-carbon effect and supply chain members’ altruistic behavior on their decisions. To study the impact of supply chain members’ altruistic behavior and consumers’ reference low-carbon effect on their joint emission reduction decisions and profits, we build optimization models under four decision scenarios, in which we solve the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s optimal emission reduction strategies and other equilibrium solutions by differential game theory. We obtain some findings. First, consumers' reference low-carbon effect will harm the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer, discourage the manufacturer's enthusiasm to reduce emissions and retailer's enthusiasm for low-carbon publicity. Second, the altruistic behavior of the manufacturer and the retailer can not only weaken the negative impact of the reference low-carbon effect, but also promote both parties to actively reduce emissions, help achieve Pareto improvement of their own profits and utilities, and obtain additional social welfare. Third, the cost-sharing contract can encourage the manufacturer to increase emission reduction investment without affecting the retailer’s low-carbon publicity investment, and can achieve a Pareto improvement of both parties’ profits and utilities. In addition, the cost-sharing ratio is only proportional to the marginal profits and altruistic intensity of both parties, and is not affected by the reference low-carbon effect. Meanwhile, the cost-sharing ratio will decrease as the manufacturer’s marginal profit and altruistic intensity increase, and will increase as the retailer’s marginal profit and altruistic intensity increase. In particular, when the retailer is completely altruistic, the cost-sharing contract can achieve perfect coordination of the supply chain.

scholarly journals Dynamic Optimization and Coordination of Cooperative Emission Reduction in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Reference Low-Carbon Effect and Low-Carbon Goodwill

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 539
Author(s):  
Ziyuan Zhang ◽  
Liying Yu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Dynamic Optimization ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Marginal Effect ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
The Impact

Although the issue of cooperative emission reduction in supply chains has been extensively studied, there is little literature that considers the impact of consumers’ reference low-carbon effect and product low-carbon goodwill on their purchasing behavior in the issue of dual-channel supply chain cooperative emission reduction. In order to explore the impact of consumers’ reference low-carbon effect and product low-carbon goodwill on the balanced emission reduction decisions and profit of dual-channel supply chain members, we establish a dual-channel supply chain emission reduction dynamic optimization model, use differential game theory to solve the manufacturer’s optimal emission reduction investment and the retailer’s optimal low-carbon publicity investment strategies under four different decision scenarios, and analyze them in detail. In addition, we also design an effective low-carbon publicity cost-sharing contract to achieve coordination of the supply chain. The research results show that the equilibrium strategies of the manufacturer and retailer and the overall profit of the supply chain under the centralized decision scenario are better than those of decentralized decision scenario. When the initial reference low-carbon level is low, the online and offline reference low-carbon effects are beneficial to the manufacturer and retailer. When the initial low-carbon goodwill is high, it is beneficial for both the manufacturer and retailer to increase consumer recognition of low-carbon goodwill. When the ratio of low-carbon publicity cost sharing provided by the manufacturer to the retailer is within a reasonable range, the cost-sharing contract can reduce the double marginal effect and achieve supply chain coordination.

scholarly journals Can cost sharing contracts coordinate green supply chains based on manufacturers’ overconfidence

2021 ◽  
Vol 236 ◽  
pp. 04014
Author(s):  
Hui Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Numerical Experimentation ◽  
Set Up ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Green Supply Chains ◽  
The Impact

Cost sharing contracts is one of the most common contracts to coordinate green supply chains. In this paper, we examine whether it can coordinate green supply chains in the set up of overconfidence. We assume that the manufacturer is overconfident and the retailer is rational. The manufacturer overestimates consumers’ sensitivity to product greenness and accurately estimates the uncertainty of demand. The overconfident manufacturer and the rational retailer cooperate through cost sharing contracts. Then, we construct a game theoretical model to analyze the impact of manufacturers’ overconfident on product greenness, pricing, profit and supply chain cooperation. At last, a numerical experimentation is presented. We find that, (1) the product greenness, wholesale price and retail price increase with the manufacturer’s overconfidence as well as the retailer’s cost sharing proportion. (2) no matter how much the cost sharing proportion is, the profit of manufacturers and retailers decreases with the manufacturer’s overconfidence level. (3) cost sharing contracts can achieve the green supply chain coordination in rational setting. But under manufacturers’ overconfidence, it cannot.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Decisions of Fresh Products for Competitive Suppliers with Traceability Technology

2021 ◽  
Vol 257 ◽  
pp. 02072
Author(s):  
Qi Zheng ◽  
Qian Xiao ◽  
Peiting Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Model ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Technology Adoption ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Fresh Products ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Mathematical Model

This paper focuses on the impact of traceability technology adoption on supply chain coordination. We consider a fresh product supply chain consisting of two suppliers and one retailer with centralized and decentralized decision-making. Considering the factors of the tag cost of traceability technology and the freshness of the product, two scenarios-with and without traceability technology are analyzed. The mathematical model is applied to investigate the impact of applying traceability technology on decision-making and profit of supply chain when two suppliers compete. The results show that: (1) the fresh product supply chain with the traceability technology is more profitable than the case that without the traceability technology; (2) when the tag cost of the traceability technology is within the threshold, the supplier’s profit decreases with the increase of the tag cost, and it is always greater than the corresponding profit when comparing with the case that without adopting the traceability technology; (3) if the tag cost of the traceability technology is too high, the retailer can use cost sharing or bargaining with the supplier to encourage him to implement the technology.

scholarly journals Knowledge Sharing Strategy and Emission Reduction Benefits of Low Carbon Technology Collaborative Innovation in the Green Supply Chain

2022 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fuqiang Wang ◽  
Huimin Li ◽  
Yongchao Cao ◽  
Chengyi Zhang ◽  
Yunlong Ran
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Knowledge Sharing ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Knowledge Stock ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
The Cost

Knowledge sharing (KS) in the green supply chain (GSC) is jointly determined by the KS efforts of suppliers and manufacturers. This study uses the differential game method to explore the dynamic strategy of KS and the benefits of emission reduction in the process of low carbon (LC) technology in the GSC. The optimal trajectory of the knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits of suppliers and manufacturers under different strategies are obtained. The validity of the model and the results are verified by numerical simulation analysis, and the sensitivity analysis of the main parameters in the case of collaborative sharing is carried out. The results show that in the case of centralized decision-making, the KS efforts of suppliers and manufacturers are the highest, and the knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits of GSC are also the best. The cost-sharing mechanism can realize the Pareto improvement of GSC’s knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits, but the cost-sharing mechanism can only increase the supplier’s KS effort level. In addition, this study found that the price of carbon trading and the rate of knowledge decay have a significant impact on KS. The study provides a theoretical basis for promoting KS in the GSC and LC technology innovation.

scholarly journals The More Supply Chain Control Power, the Better? A Comparison among Four Kinds of Cooperation Models

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weihua Liu ◽  
Shuqing Wang ◽  
Donglei Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
The Other ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Control Power ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Optimal Value ◽  
Total Profit

This paper introduces the parameter of supply chain control power into existing supply chain coordination models and explores the impacts of control power on the profits of manufacturer, retailer, and the overall supply chain under four modes of decision-making, including the decentralized decision-making dominated by manufacturer, the decentralized decision-making dominated by retailer, centralized decision-making, and Nash negotiation decision-making. Some significant conclusions are obtained. Firstly, supply chain control power does have great impact on the supply chain profits. The profit of the whole supply chain with centralized decision-making is higher than those of the other three modes, while the overall profit of supply chain with decentralized decision-making is superior to the profit when retailer and manufacturer dominate the supply chain together. Secondly, with decentralized decision-making, for manufacturer and retailer, it is beneficial to gain the control powers of the supply chain; however, control power has an optimal value, not the bigger, the better. Thirdly, under certain circumstances, order quantity will increase and the wholesale price will decrease when control power is transferred from manufacturer to retailer. In this case, the total profit of supply chain dominated by retailer will be greater than that dominated by manufacturer.

scholarly journals A Two-Echelon Agricultural Product Supply Chain with Freshness and Greenness Concerns: A Cost-Sharing Contract Perspective

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Manyi Tan ◽  
Manli Tu ◽  
Bin Wang ◽  
Tianyue Zou ◽  
Hong Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Sensitivity Analyses ◽  
Agricultural Product ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

Agricultural products are basic needs of human beings, and whether they are cultivated in a green (or organic) manner has direct impact on environment and public health. This research incorporates product freshness and greenness into a two-echelon agricultural product supply chain (APSC). Game theoretic analyses are carried out to examine pricing, freshness, and greenness decisions of the supply chain members with and without cost-sharing for greenness investment. Subsequently, we conduct comparative and sensitivity analyses for these optimal decisions and profits of the APSC members under different cases. Numerical experiment is employed to investigate the impact of key parameters on equilibrium decisions and profitability. Analytical and experimental results show that the cost-sharing contract of greenness investment for agricultural products helps to strengthen the supply chain members’ effort in improving the greenness and freshness levels of the agricultural product, thereby enhancing both individual and channel profitability of the APSC under certain conditions. This research also reveals a widened profit gap between the producer and the retailer under the cost-sharing contract.

scholarly journals Study on Benefit Coordination of Supply Chain Network Based on Green Development

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (8) ◽  
pp. 1458
Author(s):  
Gao ◽  
Wang
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Main Body ◽  
Supply Chain Network ◽  
Logistics Network ◽  
Coordination Model ◽  
Green Development ◽  
Green Index ◽  
The Cost

Based on Stackelberg's master–slave game theory and green index decision-making conditions, this paper studies the benefit coordination of a supply chain network composed of a business flow network and logistics network, discusses the decision-making behavior of the main body of the supply chain network under the performance of green contracts or speculative behavior, respectively, and further constructs the supply chain network collaborative benefit coordination model under the guidance of a manufacturer considering a green development index. The supply chain network interest coordination model analyzes the relationship between the dominant manufacturer behavior and the supply chain network green index and network profit. The results show that fulfilling green contracts helps improve the profitability and sustainability of supply chain networks. A counter-intuitive but interesting result is that the dominant manufacturers increase the cost-sharing ratio or penalties of the logistics network, which will reduce the profit level and green index of the logistics network, and increase the cost-sharing ratio or punishment of the suppliers. Strength will increase the profitability and green index of the logistics network. Finally, we validate the relevant conclusions of the model through numerical simulation analysis.

scholarly journals Coordinating Contracts for Two-Echelon Supply Chain with Price and Promotional Sensitive Demand

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 132
Author(s):  
Hooman Abdollahi ◽  
Mohammad Talooni
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Promotional Effort ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
The Cost

<p class="zhengwen"><span lang="EN-GB">In this paper three coordinating contracts in supply chain namely (i) revenue-sharing contract (ii) cost-sharing contract (iii) profit-sharing contract are proposed for two echelon supply chain coordination perspective under promotion and price sensitive demand. In our model buyer makes the promotional decision and undertakes the promotional sales effort cost. It is shown that in decentralized channel the results are sub-optimal. It is found analytically that the revenue-sharing contract coordinates pricing decision but not promotional decision for all values of the promotional effort cost. It is also found that the cost-sharing contract fails to coordinate channel. The profit-sharing contract is demonstrated to coordinate both the pricing and the promotional decisions in the channel.</span></p>

Cost-Sharing Contract in Low Carbonization Supply Chain Based on Improving Demand for Low-Carbon Products

2014 ◽  
Vol 1073-1076 ◽  
pp. 2539-2544
Author(s):  
Yan Ju Zhou ◽  
Yu Qing Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Carbon Emission Reduction ◽  
Reduction Cost

For the existence of carbon emission reduction cost, the retail price of the products is so high that the market demand is low, which restricts the promotion of low-carbon products. On the background of a bilateral-monopoly supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer, we establish Stackelberg models based on the carbon emission reduction cost-sharing. And we analyze the changes of the order quantity, the profits of each member and the whole supply chain before and after the implementation of the carbon emission reduction cost-sharing contract. According to the research, when the carbon emission reduction cost-sharing contract is introduced into the model, it leads to a good consequence that the optimal order quantity of the low-carbon product increases, the retail price decreases, and the manufacturer and the retailer will get Pareto improvement on certain condition. Then we derivate the necessary conditions that the profit of the retailer and the manufacturer could both increase.

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