scholarly journals Game-Theoretic Comparison Approach for Intercontinental Container Transportation: A Case between China and Europe with the B&R Initiative

2017 ◽  
Vol 2017 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xi Chen ◽  
Xiaoning Zhu ◽  
Qingji Zhou ◽  
Yiik Diew Wong

This paper develops a game-theoretic model to analyze the competition between two container freight transportation modes (shipping and railway) using competitive game strategic interactions method, namely, deterrence, by taking account of the most cost-effective scale of the transportation capacity settings. The competition was set against the background of China’s Belt and Road (B&R) Initiative as a new situation for intercontinental Sino-Europe container freight transportation. The behavior of each mode (modeled as a carrier, resp.) is characterized by an optimization model with the objective of minimizing its cost by setting optimal basic freight rate and transportation deployment. A firm can use this method to compare the difference in the time value of the cargos and reduce the expense during the whole transportation process. Finally, the developed model is numerically evaluated by a case study of intercontinental transportation between Hefei (China) and Hamburg (Germany). The results show that deterrence effects largely depend on the deterrence objective, and the differential in the cost of two transportation modes tends to be stable with higher values in the deterrence objective. In the new intercontinental circumstance, the mode of railway transportation provides a new way to transport the cargos between China and Europe.

2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (6) ◽  
pp. 2432-2451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ron Adner ◽  
Jianqing Chen ◽  
Feng Zhu

We study compatibility decisions of two competing platform owners that generate profits through both hardware sales and royalties from content sales. We consider a game-theoretic model in which two platforms offer different standalone utilities to users. We find that incentives to establish one-way compatibility—the platform owner with smaller standalone value grants access to its proprietary content application to users of the competing platform—can arise from the difference in their profit foci. As the difference in the standalone utilities increases, royalties from content sales become less important to the platform owner with greater standalone value, but more important to the other platform owner. One-way compatibility can thus increase asymmetry between the platform owners’ profit foci and, given a sufficiently large difference in the standalone utilities, yields greater profits for both platform owners. We further show that social welfare is greater under one-way compatibility than under incompatibility. We also investigate how factors such as exclusive content and hardware-only adopters affect compatibility incentives. This paper was accepted by Chris Forman, information systems.


Author(s):  
David Stasavage

This chapter examines whether the difference in the activities of representative assemblies in city-states and territorial states had implications for the evolution of public credit. It first develops a basic game theoretic model that demonstrates how both political representation and public credit might emerge as an equilibrium outcome dependent on an underlying cost for representatives of monitoring public finances. It then uses the model to conduct empirical tests in order to identify what factors were correlated with the initial creation of a long-term public debt. Three hypotheses are tested: that access to credit depended on commercial and economic development; that access to credit depended on the presence of representative institutions; and that access to credit depended on the differing underlying conditions in city-states and territorial states. The results show that greater commercial and economic development favored access to public credit.


Games ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 48
Author(s):  
Kjell Hausken

A model is developed for two players exerting media manipulation efforts to support each of two actors who interact controversially. Early evidence may support one actor, while the full evidence emerging later may support the other actor. Exerting effort when the full evidence exceeds (falls short off) the early evidence is rewarded (punished) with lower (higher) unit effort cost. Properties and simulations are presented to illustrate the players’ strategic challenges when altering eight model parameters, i.e., a player’s unit effort cost, stake in the interaction, proportionality parameter scaling the strength of reward or punishment, time discount parameter, early evidence, full evidence, contest intensity, and evidence ratio intensity. Realizing the logic of the model may aid understanding on how to handle the difference between early and full evidence of controversies, in which players have an ideological stake.


2014 ◽  
Vol 587-589 ◽  
pp. 1944-1949
Author(s):  
Bing Wang ◽  
Chang Ning Deng ◽  
Fei Liu

This paper studied the influence of Bohai Strait Tunnel project on freight transportation system in Bohai Economic Rim by considering different transportation routes and modes. The model of modified Negative Exponent Network Flow Assignment was introduced in the paper. The market share of three transport routes in 2050, including Tonghua-Yantai, Chifeng-Yantai and Dalian-Yantai, was predicted. Results indicated that Bohai Strait Tunnel can shorten transportation distance and reduce transportation cost, and the two transportation modes of highway transportation and railway transportation through tunnel are economical and have larger market share better than that of the other transportation modes. It is very necessary to construct a transoceanic tunnel across the Bohai Strait.


2017 ◽  
pp. 120-130
Author(s):  
A. Lyasko

Informal financial operations exist in the shadow of official regulation and cannot be protected by the formal legal instruments, therefore raising concerns about the enforcement of obligations taken by their participants. This paper analyzes two alternative types of auxiliary institutions, which can coordinate expectations of the members of informal value transfer systems, namely attitudes of trust and norms of social control. It offers some preliminary approaches to creating a game-theoretic model of partner interaction in the informal value transfer system. It also sheds light on the perspectives of further studies in this area of institutional economics.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nargiz Mammadova ◽  
Aygun Malikova ◽  
Arzu Heydarova

Energies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (16) ◽  
pp. 4748
Author(s):  
Adrian Serrano-Hernandez ◽  
Aitor Ballano ◽  
Javier Faulin

Urban distribution in medium-sized cities faces a major challenge, mainly when deliveries are difficult in the city center due to: an increase of e-commerce, weak public transportation system, and the promotion of urban sustainability plans. As a result, private cars, public transportation, and freight transportation compete for the same space. This paper analyses the current state for freight logistics in the city center of Pamplona (Spain) and proposes alternative transportation routes and transportation modes in the last-mile city center distribution according to different criteria evaluated by residents. An analytic hierarchy process (AHP) was developed. A number of alternatives have been assessed considering routes and transportation modes: the shortest route criterion and avoiding some city center area policies are combined with traditional van-based, bike, and aerial (drone) distribution protocols for delivering parcels and bar/restaurant supplies. These alternatives have been evaluated within a multicriteria framework in which economic, environmental, and social objectives are considered at the same time. The point in this multicriteria framework is that the criteria/alternative AHP weights and priorities have been set according to a survey deployed in the city of Pamplona (Navarre, Spain). The survey and AHP results show the preference for the use of drone or bike distribution in city center in order to reduce social and environmental issues.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Tiberiu Dragu ◽  
Yonatan Lupu

Abstract How will advances in digital technology affect the future of human rights and authoritarian rule? Media figures, public intellectuals, and scholars have debated this relationship for decades, with some arguing that new technologies facilitate mobilization against the state and others countering that the same technologies allow authoritarians to strengthen their grip on power. We address this issue by analyzing the first game-theoretic model that accounts for the dual effects of technology within the strategic context of preventive repression. Our game-theoretical analysis suggests that technological developments may not be detrimental to authoritarian control and may, in fact, strengthen authoritarian control by facilitating a wide range of human rights abuses. We show that technological innovation leads to greater levels of abuses to prevent opposition groups from mobilizing and increases the likelihood that authoritarians will succeed in preventing such mobilization. These results have broad implications for the human rights regime, democratization efforts, and the interpretation of recent declines in violent human rights abuses.


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