Time Discount Rate of Forest-Dependent Communities: Evidence from Andhra Pradesh, India

Executive Summary This study presents evidence on time discount rate of forest-dependent communities (FDCs) in the backdrop of the joint forest management program launched by the Government of India in 1990. The study uses data from two regions of the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh—Rayalaseema (a relatively dry forest region with low income) and the coastal region (relatively fertile forest and with higher income). We also identify socio-economic determinants of their patience levels and factors which distinguish the two regions. To elicit individual discount rates of FDCs members and their determinants, we use the choice task design methodology. Members from both regions were found to be highly impatient using the standard choice task design with the revealed time discount rate averaging 800% per annum. Members of FDCs from Rayalaseema were more impatient than their counterparts from the coastal region, although the statistical evidence is weak. We find no association between the income of members of FDCs and their time discount rate for both regions. Membership to caste categories showed a different response in both the regions, with members from the Scheduled Caste category and Other Backward Classes found to have a lower discount rate than those from the Scheduled Tribes category of Rayalaseema region and vice versa for the coastal region. For the coastal region, those with larger family size and heads of households were found to have a lower discount rate.

Solution to the Equity Premium Puzzle

This study provides a solution of the equity premium puzzle. Questioning the validity of the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion for detecting the risk behavior of investors, a new tool in the form of the sufficiency factor of the model was developed to analyze the risk behavior of investors. The calculations of this newly tested model show that the value of the coefficient of relative risk aversion is 1.033526 by assuming the value of the subjective time discount factor as 0.99. Since these values are compatible with the existing empirical studies, they confirm the validity of the newly derived model that provides a solution to the equity premium puzzle.

Behavioral Differences in the Preference for Hepatitis B Virus Vaccination: A Discrete Choice Experiment

Understanding behavioral factors differences in the preferences for vaccinations can improve predictions of vaccine uptake rates and identify effective policy interventions to increase the demand for vaccinations. In this study, 353 adults in Shandong province in China were interviewed about their preferences for hepatitis B virus (HBV) vaccination. A discrete choice experiment (DCE) was employed to analyze the preference for HBV vaccinations, and a mixed logit model was used to estimate respondent preferences for vaccination attributes included in the DCE. While the protection rate against hepatitis B (HB), duration of protection, risk of side-effects, and vaccination cost were shown to influence adults’ preferences for HBV vaccination, adults valued “99% hepatitis B protection” above other attributes, followed by “20 years’ protection duration” and “1 in 150,000 risk of side-effects”. Individuals with lower time discount rates, non-overconfidence, or higher risk aversion were more likely to choose a vaccine. Lower risk aversion individuals showed a higher preference for lower risk of side-effects. Lower time discount rate individuals showed a higher preference for longer protection duration. Non-overconfidence individuals showed a higher preference for higher hepatitis B protection and cost. Interventions should be targeted to the behavioral determinants impeding vaccination.

Towards a vertically separated broadband infrastructure: The potential role of voluntary separation

Public policymakers face the challenge of maintaining incentives for investments in fiber-to-the-premises (FTTP) infrastructure while simultaneously enabling effective competition. In that regard, the ability of vertically integrated operators to discriminate against downstream rivals is regarded as a major regulatory problem, especially as policing nondiscrimination obligations is notoriously difficult for vertically integrated operators. The European regulatory framework mandates functional separation to eliminate discrimination incentives. However, this measure comes with significant drawbacks and caveats and resembles a strong market and ownership intervention. The present article discusses how voluntary vertical separation can achieve the positive effect of a vertically separated industry structure without the need for strong market interventions. We use a discounted cash flow model to compare the financial attractiveness of wholesale-only and integrated business models for a greenfield FTTP rollout. We further discuss and test how public policymakers could positively affect the profitability of a wholesale-only business model. Based on our findings, we recommend public-policymakers and national regulation authorities to proactively define separation scenarios and respective ex ante regulation reductions precisely, to make adjustments to broadband state aid programs that favor wholesale-only providers, and to critically reflect the hampering effect volume and time discount wholesale tariff structures of incumbents have on the emergence of wholesale-only networks.

An Evaluation of the New Japanese Bonus–Malus System with No-claim and Claimed Subclasses

The purpose of this research is to evaluate the new Japanese Bonus–Malus System (BMS 2012) in automobile insurance, which is an unusual system wherein both no-claim and claimed subclasses exist. To evaluate BMS 2012, we conduct a simulation analysis and compare BMS 2012 with the former Japanese BMS (BMS 2009) in terms of the present value of the total insurance premium that is closely related to the frequency of insurance claims. Based on the comparison, our main conclusion is that BMS 2012 offers more effects to lower the frequency of insurance claims than BMS 2009 does when the policyholders’ classes in BMS are high classes that evaluate as safety drivers, time discount and/or renewal rates are relatively low, and the policyholders’ risk averseness is large.

A Game Theoretic Model of Adversaries and Media Manipulation

A model is developed for two players exerting media manipulation efforts to support each of two actors who interact controversially. Early evidence may support one actor, while the full evidence emerging later may support the other actor. Exerting effort when the full evidence exceeds (falls short off) the early evidence is rewarded (punished) with lower (higher) unit effort cost. Properties and simulations are presented to illustrate the players’ strategic challenges when altering eight model parameters, i.e., a player’s unit effort cost, stake in the interaction, proportionality parameter scaling the strength of reward or punishment, time discount parameter, early evidence, full evidence, contest intensity, and evidence ratio intensity. Realizing the logic of the model may aid understanding on how to handle the difference between early and full evidence of controversies, in which players have an ideological stake.

Incentivized Time Preferences, Level of Education in a Household and Financial Literacy: Laboratory Evidence

This study investigates the impact of financial literacy, level of education in a household and gender differences on time preferences of students at a university in South Africa. The study relies on a convenient sample of (N=85, female=48%) pursuing a financial literacy course. The study uses a questionnaire, a financial literacy test and a simple binary choice experimental game that elicited individual time discount rate to gather data. Ten percent of the participants were paid (in South African rands) for their time preference choices by way of quota random sampling. Female university students’ individual time discount rate was found to be on average higher than that of their male counterparts, indicating that female university students are generally impatient, especially those with low levels of financial literacy. Our results (using a Negative Binomial Regression analysis and Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis) show that time preferences of university students aresignificantly influenced by highest level of education in the household. The OLS regression model shows that financial literacy, measured using financial literacy test, significantly influence time preferences for all subjects. The study concluded that patience levels among male university students increase as financial literacy increases. Gender, income, age and family size significantly influence time preferences of university students. Highest level of education in a household, financial literacy and gender differences have a bearing on individual time preferences.

Incentivized Time Preferences, Level of Education in a Household and Financial Literacy: Laboratory Evidence

This study investigates the impact of financial literacy, level of education in a household and gender differences on time preferences of students at a university in South Africa. The study relies on a convenient sample of (N=85, female=48%) pursuing a financial literacy course. The study uses a questionnaire, a financial literacy test and a simple binary choice experimental game that elicited individual time discount rate to gather data. Ten percent of the participants were paid (in South African rands) for their time preference choices by way of quota random sampling. Female university students’ individual time discount rate was found to be on average higher than that of their male counterparts, indicating that female university students are generally impatient, especially those with low levels of financial literacy. Our results (using a Negative Binomial Regression analysis and Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis) show that time preferences of university students aresignificantly influenced by highest level of education in the household. The OLS regression model shows that financial literacy, measured using financial literacy test, significantly influence time preferences for all subjects. The study concluded that patience levels among male university students increase as financial literacy increases. Gender, income, age and family size significantly influence time preferences of university students. Highest level of education in a household, financial literacy and gender differences have a bearing on individual time preferences.

Introduction to dynamic programming

Dynamic optimization is widely used in many fields of economics, finance, and business management. Typically one searches for the optimal time path of one or several variables that maximizes the value of a specific objective function given certain constraints. While there exist some analytical solutions to deterministic dynamic optimization problems, things become much more complicated as soon as the environment in which we are searching for optimal decisions becomes uncertain. In such cases researchers typically rely on the technique of dynamic programming. This chapter introduces the principles of dynamic programming and provides a couple of solution algorithms that differ in accuracy, speed, and applicability. Chapters 8 to 11 show how to apply these dynamic programming techniques to various problems in macroeconomics and finance. To get things started we want to lay out the basic idea of dynamic programming and introduce the language that is typically used to describe it. The easiest way to do this is with a very simple example that we can solve both ‘by hand’ and with the dynamic programming technique. Let’s assume an agent owns a certain resource (say a cake or a mine) which has the size a0. In every period t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞ the agent can decide how much to extract from this resource and consume, i.e. how much of the cake to eat or how many resources to extract from the mine.We denote his consumption in period t as ct. At each point in time the agent derives some utility from consumption which we express by the so-called instantaneous utility function u(ct). We furthermore assume that the agent’s utility is additively separable over time and that the agent is impatient, meaning that he derives more utility from consuming in period t than in any later period.We describe the extent of his impatience with the time discount factor 0 < β < 1.