scholarly journals Third-Party Punishment Mechanism and Corporate Cooperation in Environmental Investment: Experiments on Public Goods Game

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Yuling Liao ◽  
Liang Zhang ◽  
Siying Lei ◽  
Meizhe Song ◽  
Wenkang Deng ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Success Rate ◽  
Positive Influence ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Environmental Investment ◽  
Environmental Resource ◽  
Resource Investment ◽  
Punishment Mechanism

In the context of corporate environmental investment (EI), this paper designs an experiment on public goods game without punishment and an experiment on that game with third-party punishment (TPP). Then, the influence of IEP and TPP mechanism on corporate EI behaviors was tested in details. The results show that different enterprises vary in IEP and took heterogenous behaviors in the two corporate EI experiments; the introduction of TPP pushed up the environmental resource investment of enterprises and increased the success rate of EI cooperation; IEP and TPP exerted a significantly positive influence on corporate EI behaviors; the introduction of TPP, coupled with the consideration of corporate IEP, can effectively elevate corporate EI and improve the eco-environment.

scholarly journals Synergistic third-party rewarding and punishment in the public goods game

2019 ◽  
Vol 475 (2227) ◽  
pp. 20190349 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yinhai Fang ◽  
Tina P. Benko ◽  
Matjaž Perc ◽  
Haiyan Xu ◽  
Qingmei Tan
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Synergistic Effects ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Public Intervention ◽  
The Third ◽  
Individual Incentive ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
The Impact

We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game in the presence of third-party rewarding and punishment. The third party executes public intervention, punishing groups where cooperation is weak and rewarding groups where cooperation is strong. We consider four different scenarios to determine what works best for cooperation, in particular, neither rewarding nor punishment, only rewarding, only punishment or both rewarding and punishment. We observe strong synergistic effects when rewarding and punishment are simultaneously applied, which are absent if neither of the two incentives or just each individual incentive is applied by the third party. We find that public cooperation can be sustained at comparatively low third-party costs under adverse conditions, which is impossible if just positive or negative incentives are applied. We also examine the impact of defection tolerance and application frequency, showing that the higher the tolerance and the frequency of rewarding and punishment, the more cooperation thrives. Phase diagrams and characteristic spatial distributions of strategies are presented to corroborate these results, which will hopefully prove useful for more efficient public policies in support of cooperation in social dilemmas.

scholarly journals The Evaluation of Second- and Third-Party Punishers

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-9
Author(s):  
Nobuhiro Mifune ◽  
Yang Li ◽  
Narumi Okuda
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Undergraduate Students ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Negative Evaluation ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
The Cost

Although punishment can promote cooperative behavior, the evolution of punishment requires benefits which override the cost. One possible source of the benefit of punishing uncooperative behavior is obtaining a positive evaluation. This study compares evaluations of punishers and non-punishers. Two hundred and thirty-four undergraduate students participated in two studies. Study 1 revealed that, in the public goods game, punishers were not positively evaluated, while punishers were positively evaluated in the third-party punishment game. In Study 2, where the non-cooperator was a participant of a public goods game, we manipulated the punishers participation in the game. The results showed that punishers received no positive evaluations, regardless of their participation in the game, indicating that negative evaluation may not be a reaction toward aggression with retaliatory intentions.

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