Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation

1998 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 269-305 ◽  
Author(s):  
James D. Fearon

Neoliberals and their neorealist critics have debated the relative importance of two main obstacles to international cooperation—problems of cheating and enforcement and problems of relative gains. By contrast, I argue that problems of international cooperation have a common strategic structure in which a third, distinct obstacle plays a crucial role. Almost regardless of the issue area, states must first resolve the bargaining problem of agreeing on terms before they can implement and begin to enforce an agreement. Furthermore, the bargaining and enforcement problems interact. Using a game model, I show that if states must bargain to determine the deal to be enforced, the “shadow of the future” cuts two ways. A high expectation of continued interactions may make enforcing the agreement easier, but it can also give states an incentive to bargain harder, delaying agreement in hopes of getting a better deal. Empirical evidence from trade and arms control negotiations suggests that this mechanism may help to explain the costly standoffs that are often observed in international politics and are problematic for received neoliberal theories.

2020 ◽  
pp. 095148482097145
Author(s):  
Eleonora Gheduzzi ◽  
Niccolò Morelli ◽  
Guendalina Graffigna ◽  
Cristina Masella

The involvement of vulnerable actors in co-production activities is a debated topic in the current public service literature. While vulnerable actors should have the same opportunities to be involved as other actors, they may not have the needed competences, skills and attitudes to contribute to this process. This paper is part of a broader project on family caregivers’ engagement in remote and rural areas. In particular, it investigates how to facilitate co-production by looking at four co-design workshops with family caregivers, representatives of a local home care agency and researchers. The transcripts of the workshops were coded using NVivo, and the data were analysed based on the existing theory about co-production. Two main findings were identified from the analysis. First, the adoption of co-production by vulnerable actors may occur in conjunction with other forms of engagement. Second, the interactions among facilitators and providers play a crucial role in encouraging the adoption of co-production. We identified at least two strategies that may help facilitators and providers achieve that goal. However, there is a need for an in-depth understanding of how facilitators and providers should interact to enhance implementation of co-production.


Societies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Lavinia Țânculescu

In this study, I aim to explore the role of old women in the life of the Christian Orthodox Church in the Romanian space. The analysis is based on empirical evidence (qualitative fieldwork and case studies) gathered between 2017 and 2019, and it mainly employs the framework of theory of tradition, and theories of attachment and of parent–infant relationship. I will show that old women going to church have a double role: To educate the community in keeping the religious tradition, and to initiate other members, especially the very young ones (blood-related or not), in the Romanian Orthodox faith. The paper discusses the advantages and disadvantages offered by both aforementioned roles, putting forth possible explanations for the tensions arising between generations. I conclude by underlining the crucial role that old women have in today’s struggle for survival of the Romanian Orthodox Church and in its spiritual identity.


Politics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 396-412 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan A Schirm

Domestic politics theories of international political economy and the recent disruptions in international cooperation and trade apparently induced by domestic discontent have shown the crucial role domestic forces play in influencing governmental preferences. This article contributes to this theoretical school, first, by assessing seminal works on the ideational, material, and institutional dimensions of domestic politics, and second, by conceptualising the ‘societal approach’ to fill a major gap in domestic politics theorising. The societal approach asks under which conditions value-based societal ideas, domestic institutions, and material interests matter in shaping governmental preferences. When do ideas prevail over interests and vice versa? How do they interact with each other and with domestic institutions? The societal approach includes all three domestic variables as potential driving forces for governmental preferences and conceives them both as individual and as interacting forces. Most importantly, it complements domestic politics theories by proposing hypotheses on the conditions for the influence of each variable on governmental preferences. The article brings together previously conceived parts of the societal approach and considerably expands it.


1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (3) ◽  
pp. 701-726 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duncan Snidal

Many political situations involve competitions where winning is more important than doing well. In international politics, this relative gains problem is widely argued to be a major impediment to cooperation under anarchy. After discussing why states might seek relative gains, I demonstrate that the hypothesis holds very different implications from those usually presumed. Relative gains do impede cooperation in the two-actor case and provide an important justification for treating international anarchy as a prisoner's dilemma problem; but if the initial absolute gains situation is not a prisoner's dilemma, relative gains seeking is much less consequential. Its significance is even more attenuated with more than two competitors. Relative gains cannot prop up the realist critique of international cooperation theory, but may affect the pattern of cooperation when a small number of states are the most central international actors.


Author(s):  
John Baylis

This chapter explores a variety of questions on how to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). It begins with a discussion of the shift that took place during the cold war from disarmament to arms control, as well as the shift in relative importance that occurred in the early post-cold war era from arms control to more forcible means to tackle nuclear proliferation. It then considers the emergence of new ideas, first in the Clinton administration, and then in the Bush administration, that focused less on arms control and more on counterproliferation. It also examines a host of problems and dilemmas associated with counterproliferation, the Obama administration's policy of engagement and ‘tough but direct diplomacy’, and the challenges presented by new geopolitical tensions. Finally, it reflects on future prospects for strategic nuclear arms control.


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