The CIA and the Polish Crisis of 1980–1981

2004 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 120-123
Author(s):  
Richard T. Davies
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Central Intelligence Agency ◽  
Intelligence Community ◽  
Intelligence Agency ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Senior Officer ◽  
Polish Crisis ◽  
The One ◽  
The U.S

The crisis in Poland in 1980–1981 imposed great demands on the U.S. intelligence community. On the one hand, U.S. intelligence analysts sought to determine whether the Soviet Union might send troops into Poland to crush the Solidarity movement. On the other hand, a small group of senior intelligence and national security officials who were privy to reports from Colonel Ryszard Kukliński, a senior officer on the Polish General Staff who was secretly working for the United States, had to decide how best to use the enormously valuable information the colonel was providing. These issues and others pertaining to the activities of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during the Polish crisis are examined in a new book by Douglas J. MacEachin, a former CIA deputy director who oversaw the agency's efforts vis-à-vis Poland and the Soviet Union. MacEachin's book, as this essay shows, provides an astute and refreshingly candid evaluation of the CIA's performance.

scholarly journals Soviet Union in the 1970s – 1980s in the mirror of foreign documentary heritage

2020 ◽  
pp. 61-71
Author(s):  
Dar'ya Viktorovna Yakupova ◽  
Roman Aleksandrovich Yakupov
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Central Intelligence Agency ◽  
Contemporary History ◽  
Historical Sources ◽  
Intelligence Agency ◽  
Department Of State ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Archival Documents ◽  
The U.S

The subject of this article is the content of the foreign electronic archival documents of U.S. departments dedicated to the analysis of situation in the Soviet Union. The goal consists in carrying out a historiographical analysis of foreign documentary heritage of the United States within the framework of comprehension of historical experience of the development of the Soviet Union in the 1970s – 1989. The object this research is the published materials of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Historical Sector of the U.S. Department of State, which contain records on the analysis of development of the Soviet Union during this period. Relevance of this topic is substantiated by increased of the publically available foreign electronic archival materials, which requires their analysis, description, determination of information capacity, as well as assessment of information contained therein for further utilization in the historical (humanities) research on the contemporary history of Russia. The novelty is defined by the fact that this article is first based on interpretation of foreign historical sources to describe the capabilities and limitations of different types of published intelligence documents of the CIA and the U.S. Department of State that characterize the development of the Soviet Union in various spheres. Introduced into the scientific discourse documents allow concluding on the prospects of using the heritage of the U.S. electronic archives in the scientific research, as well as assessing their veracity and reliability. The authors note that these materials contain valuable information on the U.S. policy with regards to the USSR, and analytical awareness on socioeconomic development of the Soviet Union during the 1970s – 1980s. It is established that in many cases publication of the foreign archival documents is often of tendentious nature.

The Role of the Mongolian People’s Republic in the Korean War

2018 ◽  
pp. 97-130
Author(s):  
Denzenlkham Ulambayar
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Korean War ◽  
World Order ◽  
The United States ◽  
Central Intelligence Agency ◽  
Intelligence Agency ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Archival Documents ◽  
The Korean War ◽  
History Of

Since the 1990s, when previously classified and top secret Russian archival documents on the Korean War became open and accessible, it has become clear for post-communist countries that Kim Il Sung, Stalin and Mao Zedong were the primary organizers of the war. It is now equally certain that tensions arising from Soviet and American struggle generated the origins of the Korean War, namely the Soviet Union’s occupation of the northern half of the Korean peninsula and the United States’ occupation of the southern half to the 38th parallel after 1945 as well as the emerging bipolar world order of international relations and Cold War. Newly available Russian archival documents produced much in the way of new energies and opportunities for international study and research into the Korean War.2 However, within this research few documents connected to Mongolia have so far been found, and little specific research has yet been done regarding why and how Mongolia participated in the Korean War. At the same time, it is becoming today more evident that both Soviet guidance and U.S. information reports (evaluated and unevaluated) regarding Mongolia were far different from the situation and developments of that period. New examples of this tendency are documents declassified in the early 2000s and released publicly from the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in December 2016 which contain inaccurate information. The original, uncorrupted sources about why, how and to what degree the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) became a participant in the Korean War are in fact in documents held within the Mongolian Central Archives of Foreign Affairs. These archives contain multiple documents in relation to North Korea. Prior to the 1990s Mongolian scholars Dr. B. Lkhamsuren,3 Dr. B. Ligden,4 Dr. Sh. Sandag,5 junior scholar J. Sukhee,6 and A. A. Osipov7 mention briefly in their writings the history of relations between the MPR and the DPRK during the Korean War. Since the 1990s the Korean War has also briefly been touched upon in the writings of B. Lkhamsuren,8 D. Ulambayar (the author of this paper),9 Ts. Batbayar,10 J. Battur,11 K. Demberel,12 Balảzs Szalontai,13 Sergey Radchenko14 and Li Narangoa.15 There have also been significant collections of documents about the two countries and a collection of memoirs published in 200716 and 2008.17 The author intends within this paper to discuss particularly about why, how and to what degree Mongolia participated in the Korean War, the rumors and realities of the war and its consequences for the MPR’s membership in the United Nations. The MPR was the second socialist country following the Soviet Union (the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics) to recognize the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) and establish diplomatic ties. That was part of the initial stage of socialist system formation comprising the Soviet Union, nations in Eastern Europe, the MPR, the PRC (People’s Republic of China) and the DPRK. Accordingly between the MPR and the DPRK fraternal friendship and a framework of cooperation based on the principles of proletarian and socialist internationalism had been developed.18 In light of and as part of this framework, The Korean War has left its deep traces in the history of the MPR’s external diplomatic environment and state sovereignty

The CIA Confronts the Tito-Stalin Split, 1948–1951

2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-145
Author(s):  
Coleman Mehta
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Korean War ◽  
Good Deal ◽  
The United States ◽  
Central Intelligence Agency ◽  
Intelligence Agency ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Korean War ◽  
Soviet Invasion ◽  
Political Economic

After relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia broke down in 1948, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) devoted a good deal of attention to Yugoslavia. Initially, however, the Truman administration was reluctant to provide extensive security assistance to the regime of Josip Broz Tito, who until 1948 had been a brutal Stalinist. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 changed the situation. The United States developed much closer political, economic, and military ties with Yugoslavia, and the CIA established a formal agreement of cooperation with the Yugoslav Ministry of State Security, especially on intelligence-sharing and covert operations. U.S. officials were particularly concerned about ensuring that Yugoslavia would be able to defend itself, if necessary, against a Soviet invasion.

Congo/Zaire-US Relations

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lise Namikas
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Democratic Republic Of Congo ◽  
The United States ◽  
Central Intelligence Agency ◽  
Intelligence Agency ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Un Peacekeeping ◽  
Plantation Slavery ◽  
The Cold War

At the dawn of the 20th century, the region that would become the Democratic Republic of Congo fell to the brutal colonialism of Belgium’s King Leopold. Except for a brief moment when anti-imperialists decried the crimes of plantation slavery, the United States paid little attention to Congo before 1960. But after winning its independence from Belgium in June 1960, Congo suddenly became engulfed in a crisis of decolonization and the Cold War, a time when the United States and the Soviet Union competed for resources and influence. The confrontation in Congo was kept limited by a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force, which ended the secession of the province of Katanga in 1964. At the same time, the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) intervened to help create a pro-Western government and eliminate the Congo’s first prime minister, Patrice Lumumba. Ironically, the result would be a growing reliance on the dictatorship of Joseph Mobutu throughout the 1980s. In 1997 a rebellion succeeded in toppling Mobutu from power. Since 2001 President Joseph Kabila has ruled Congo. The United States has supported long-term social and economic growth but has kept its distance while watching Kabila fight internal opponents and insurgents in the east. A UN peacekeeping force returned to Congo and helped limit unrest. Despite serving out two full terms that ended in 2016, Kabila was slow to call elections amid rising turmoil.

The Window of Vulnerability That Wasn't: Soviet Military Buildup in the 1970s—A Research Note

2008 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 118-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pavel Podvig
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Large Degree ◽  
The United States ◽  
Intelligence Community ◽  
Military Buildup ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Nuclear Exchange ◽  
The U.S

The Soviet strategic modernization program of the 1970s was one of the most consequential developments of the Cold War. Deployment of new intercontinental ballistic missiles and the dramatic increase in the number of strategic warheads in the Soviet arsenal created a sense of vulnerability in the United States that was, to a large degree, responsible for the U.S. military buildup of the late 1970s and early 1980s and the escalation of Cold War tensions during that period. U.S. assessments concluded that the Soviet Union was seeking to achieve a capability to fight and win a nuclear war. Estimates of missile accuracy and silo hardness provided by the U.S. intelligence community led many in the United States to conclude that the Soviet Union was building a strategic missile force capable of destroying most U.S. missiles in a counterforce strike and of surviving a subsequent nuclear exchange. Soviet archival documents that have recently become available demonstrate that this conclusion was wrong. The U.S. estimates substantially overestimated the accuracy of the Soviet Union's missiles and the degree of silo reinforcement. As the data demonstrate, the Soviet missile force did not have the capability to launch a successful first strike. Moreover, the data strongly suggest that the Soviet Union never attempted to acquire a first-strike capability, concentrating instead on strategies based on retaliation.

scholarly journals Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan in the Documents of J. Carter Administration

2020 ◽  
pp. 88-100
Author(s):  
Olexandr Koval ́kov
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
National Security ◽  
The United States ◽  
Central Intelligence Agency ◽  
Carter Administration ◽  
Clear Understanding ◽  
Intelligence Agency ◽  
Department Of State ◽  
The U.S

The article examines the documents of Jimmy Carter Administration (1977-1981) published in «Foreign Relations of the United States» series that represent the U.S. position on the Soviet intervention in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in December 1979. The author argues that the growing Soviet presence and finally a military intervention in Afghanistan was taken seriously in the United States and made Washington watch the developments in this country closely. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan became one of the major themes in the U.S. foreign policy. It was presented in a large array of documents of various origins, such as the Department of State correspondence with the U.S. Embassies in Afghanistan and the Soviet Union; analytical reports of the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and Bureau of Intelligence and Research; exchanges of memorandums between National Security Council officers and other officials; memos from National Security Adviser Z. Brzezinski to J. Carter, and others. They represented the preconditions, preparations and implementation of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The authors of the documents discussed in details the possible motives of the Soviet leaders, and predicted the short-term consequences of the USSR’s intervention for the region and the whole world. Due to the clear understanding of the developments in Afghanistan in December 1979 by the J. Carter administration, it completely rejected the Soviet official version of them that adversely affected the bilateral Soviet-U.S. relations and international relations in general. Due to the lack of accessible Soviet sources on the USSR’s intervention in Afghanistan, the documents of Jimmy Carter’s administration fill this gap and constitute a valuable source for a researcher.

The Increasing Public Profile of the CIA

2019 ◽  
pp. 64-84
Author(s):  
David P. Hadley
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Central Intelligence Agency ◽  
Intelligence Agency ◽  
The Public ◽  
Fidel Castro ◽  
High Profile ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Bay Of Pigs

This chapter examines the public presence of the Central Intelligence Agency after its high-profile successes in Iran and Guatemala, related in the previous chapter. An effort to oust Sukarno in Indonesia failed, and the CIA was troubled by the general political environment of the 1950s, driven by fears that the Soviet Union was technologically ahead of the United States. Though able to weather the crisis that ensued when a U-2 surveillance plane was shot down over the Soviet Union in 1960, the CIA’s public and humiliating failure to oust Fidel Castro in the April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion undermined the CIA’s reputation for effectiveness. Though not a reason for the failure of the invasion, the press’s coverage of the anti-Castro operation demonstrated that press attitudes toward the agency had begun to shift as a younger generation of reporters and managers more willing to question the CIA emerged on the scene.

“The World Was Not Turning in Their Direction”: The United States and the Decolonization of Angola

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-65
Author(s):  
Tiago Moreira de Sá
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Central Intelligence Agency ◽  
National Union ◽  
Intelligence Agency ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Internal Context

In the mid-1970s, the United States and the Soviet Union decided to export the Cold War to Angola at levels that were unprecedented on the African continent. In the case of the United States, this led to immense support for local allies—the National Liberation Front of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola—in the form of many tons of heavy weaponry, millions of dollars, and the use of mercenaries and even paramilitary operatives of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. This article explains U.S. actions in Angola from 1974 to 1976 against the backdrop of the Cold War, highlighting the decision-making process in Washington, the international context, the internal context, and the actions of both superpowers.

Labor’s Cold Warriors: The American Federation of Labor and “Free Trade Unionism” in Cold War Japan

2003 ◽  
Vol 12 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 207-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Gerteis
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Western Europe ◽  
The United States ◽  
Central Intelligence Agency ◽  
United States Government ◽  
American Federation Of Labor ◽  
Intelligence Agency ◽  
American Federation

AbstractDuring the 1950s, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) led a global covert attempt to suppress left-led labor movements in Western Europe, the Mediterranean, West Africa, Central and South America, and East Asia. American union leaders argued that to survive the Cold War, they had to demonstrate to the United States government that organized labor was not part-and-parcel with Soviet communism. The AFL’s global mission was placed in care of Jay Lovestone, a founding member of the American Communist Party in 1921 and survivor of decades of splits and internecine battles over allegiance to one faction or another in Soviet politics before turning anti-Communist and developing a secret relation with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) after World War II. Lovestone’s idea was that the AFL could prove its loyalty by helping to root out Communists from what he perceived to be a global labor movement dominated by the Soviet Union. He was the CIA’s favorite Communist turned anti-Communist.

The Clinton Administration and Africa: White House Involvement and the Foreign Affairs Bureaucracies

1998 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 8-13
Author(s):  
John F. Clark
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Clinton Administration ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Formulation ◽  
Central Intelligence Agency ◽  
Intelligence Agency ◽  
White House ◽  
Continuity And Change ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
The U.S

Both continuity and change capture the evolving role of the Clinton White House in the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. Elements of continuity are reflected in a familiar pattern of relationships between the White House and the principal foreign policy bureaucracies, most notably the U.S. State Department, the U.S. Department of Defense (Pentagon), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and more recently the U.S. Department of Commerce. As cogently argued in Peter J. Schraeder’s analysis of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa during the Cold War era, the White House has tended to take charge of U.S. African policies only in those relatively rare situations perceived as crises by the president and his closest advisors. In other, more routine situations—the hallmark of the myriad of U.S. African relations—the main foreign policy bureaucracies have been at the forefront of policy formulation, and “bureaucratic dominance” of the policymaking process has prevailed. Much the same pattern is visible in the Clinton administration, with the exception of President Clinton’s trip to Africa in 1998. Until that time, events in Somalia in 1993 served as the only true African crisis of the administration that was capable of focusing the ongoing attention of President Clinton and his closest advisors. Given that the United States is now disengaged from most African crises, Africa has remained a “backwater” for the White House and the wider foreign policymaking establishment.

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