Development and Transformation of the Indian Nuclear Doctrine

Indian rationale for developing nuclear weapons is embedded in Article 51 of United Nations (UN) Charter. After analyzing the changes in Indian defence procurements, a huge defence spending and public statements issued by the former and incumbent Indian government official authors presume India is changing its nuclear posture. New Delhi is discarding earlier publicly stated No-First Use (NFU) posture with ready or super ready status. It is replacing Credible Minimum Deterrent (CMD) posture with overkill capacity. India revived earlier announced Cold Start Doctrine (CSD). The objective of this paper is to review changes in Indian nuclear doctrine and capabilities and implications for Pakistan security. However a qualitative method is used for the completion of this research. Paramount aim of nuclear signaling is to avoid outbreak of violence. The findings of this paper include dividing Indian strategic community into leftists/rightists. Further, abovementioned changes can result in Indian preemptive strike against Pakistan or inadvertent or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. The region is ripe for nuclear exchange. South Asia is nuclear flashpoint. In conclusion, Pakistan needs to expedite its diplomatic efforts to highlight changes introduced by India. Islamabad should follow North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strategy to solidify its conventional and nuclear armed force structure to deter militarily powerful enemy

Mito-Mendelian Interactions Alter in vivo Glucose Metabolism and Insulin Sensitivity in Healthy Mice

The regulation of euglycemia is essential for human health with both chronic hypoglycemia and hyperglycemia having detrimental effects. Diabetes risk increases with age and exhibits racial disparity. Interestingly, mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) damage accumulates with age and its sequence varies with geographic maternal origins (maternal race). From these two observations, we hypothesized that mtDNA background may contribute to glucose metabolism and insulin sensitivity. Pronuclear transfer was used to generate Mitochondrial-Nuclear eXchange (MNX) mice to directly test this hypothesis, by assessing physiologic parameters of glucose metabolism in nuclear isogenic C57BL/6J mice harboring either a C57BL/6J (C57n:C57mt wild-type - control) or C3H/HeN mtDNA (C57n:C3Hmt - MNX). All mice were fed normal chow diets. MNX mice were significantly leaner, had lower leptin levels and were more insulin sensitive, with lower modified Homeostatic Model Assessment of Insulin Resistance (mHOMA-IR) values and enhanced insulin action when compared to their control counterparts. Further interrogation of muscle insulin signaling revealed higher phosphorylated Akt/total Akt ratios in MNX animals relative to control, consistent with greater insulin sensitivity. Overall, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that different mtDNA combinations on the same nuclear DNA (nDNA) background can significantly impact glucose metabolism and insulin sensitivity in healthy mice.

Gaming and Modeling Combat

This chapter discusses wargaming, combat modeling, and simulation, as well as force sizing and other issues related to military operations and warfighting scenarios. It argues that the ultimate purpose of wargaming and modeling is to help a country like the United States decide what kind of military, and military budget, it needs — as well as when and how to decide to use force. The chapter examines simple models of combat, starting with Lanchester equations, derived by a British engineer early in the twentieth century. However, they do not account well for most types of modern warfare, so the chapter shifts to other models and emphasizes an approach modified from that of the late Trevor Dupuy, focused on air-ground combat. The chapter also studies naval combat, including amphibious assault, blockade operations, and nuclear exchange calculations. Ultimately, it concludes with a framework for analyzing progress, or the lack thereof, in counterinsurgency operations like those in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Deterrence (In)stability Between India and Pakistan

Since the introduction of India’s cold start and Pakistan’s full spectrum deterrence doctrines, the subcontinental deterrence landscape has been characterised by strong cross-domain dynamics. In extremis, if both states adhere to the threats issued in their doctrines a Pakistan-supported militant attack on Indian soil could escalate into an all-out nuclear exchange. It is a development that has been met with great concern by many analysts for its detrimental impact on deterrence stability. Since the doctrines are believed to have become operational, at least four incidents occurred which could have sparked this cross-domain escalation spiral. And yet, crisis behaviour proved vastly different from what doctrine predicted. What does this say about deterrence stability on the subcontinent? This chapter assesses deterrence stability on the basis of perfect deterrence theory, which is argued to provide a more nuanced view of deterrence relationships than classical deterrence theory. It finds support for the stability-instability paradox and argues that deterrence is less unstable than appears at first sight. Furthermore, to fully appreciate the degree of deterrence stability, it is suggested that the factors ‘context’ and ‘narrative’ should be included into the equation.

Nuclear selection is effectively policed by mating restrictions of the dikaryotic life cycle of mushroom-forming fungi

Altruistic social interactions generally evolve between genetically related individuals or other replicators, whereas sexual interactions usually occur among unrelated individuals. This tension between social and sexual interactions is resolved by policing mechanisms enforcing cooperation among genetically unrelated entities. For example, most organisms with two haploid genomes are diploid, both genomes encapsulated inside a single nuclear envelope. A fascinating exception to this are Basidiomycete fungi, where the two haploid genomes remain separate. Uniquely, the haploid nuclei of the dikaryon can fertilize subsequent gametes encountered, the presumed benefit of this lifecycle. The implications for the balance of selection within and among individuals are largely unexplored. We modelled the implications of a fitness tradeoff at the level of the haploid nucleus versus the level of the fungal individual. We show that the most important policing mechanism is prohibition of fusion between dikaryons, which can otherwise select for detrimental levels of nuclear mating fitness. An additional policing mechanism revealed by our model is linkage between loci with fitness consequences. Our results show that benefits of di-mon matings must be paired with policing mechanisms to avoid uncontrolled selection at the level of the nuclei. Furthermore, we discuss evolutionary implications of recent claims of nuclear exchange in related fungal groups.

Living with Uncertainty: Modeling China's Nuclear Survivability

Many strategists argue that to deter a nuclear attack, states must be certain of their ability to retaliate after a nuclear first strike. China's nuclear posture of uncertain retaliation suggests an alternative logic. Given the catastrophic consequences of a nuclear attack, uncertain retaliation can have a strong deterrent effect, and assured retaliation is not necessary. A simplified nuclear exchange model developed to evaluate China's nuclear retaliatory capabilities against the Soviet Union in 1984 and the United States in 2000 and 2010 shows that China's nuclear retaliatory capability has been and remains far from assured. In its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, the United States promised to maintain strategic stability with China; therefore, the 2010 scenario can be considered as a baseline for China-U.S. strategic stability. Both China and the United States are developing or modernizing their strategic offensive and defensive weapons. The technical competition between China and the United States favors each in different ways. A hypothetical scenario of China versus the United States in 2025 reveals that China-U.S. strategic stability will likely be maintained at no lower than its 2010 level.

British Thinking about Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Chapter 1 examines how British policy-makers viewed the arrival of tactical nuclear weapons, employing as a vehicle in the 1950s debate on the relative merits of the opposing strategic theories of ‘graduated deterrence’ and ‘massive retaliation’. It shows how the British government rejected any suggestion to draw distinctions in peacetime between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons because of a strong belief that such an announcement would undermine the overall deterrent effect of nuclear weapons. Gripped by a ‘deterrence habit of mind’, civilian leaders viewed tactical nuclear weapons not as meaningful military tools, but as weapons of escalation whose use would trigger a strategic nuclear exchange between the superpowers. The rejection of any kind of graduated deterrence through the use of tactical nuclear weapons set a precedent in how British policy-makers conceived the utility of tactical nuclear weapons, which would have important consequences in the following debates about NATO strategy.

Conventional Forces and Tactical Nuclear Weapons in NATO Strategy

Chapter 2 analyses how the British deterrence habit of mind manifested in a preference for a ‘pure-deterrence’ strategy for NATO. NATO’s forums were a market for strategic ideas, and competing visions of nuclear warfare reflected the often incompatible preferences of its member states. Bargaining and compromise resulted in significant changes to defensive concepts throughout the Cold War and saw the emergence of two distinct strategies, massive retaliation and flexible response, which provided the conceptual framework for the Army’s thinking about nuclear war. The chapter explores the most important assumptions made about the character of nuclear warfare, the political and military utility of tactical nuclear weapons, and the perceived role of ground forces within NATO’s deterrent posture. It argues that the British reluctance to accept that military organizations could perform a useful function during or after a nuclear exchange set an ominous tone for the Army’s own theorizing about future war.