The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements

2011 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 84-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce W. Bennett ◽  
Jennifer Lind

In North Korea, the upcoming leadership transition in the Kim Jong-il regime will be a precarious time for the Kim family's hold on power. A collapse of the North Korean government could have several dangerous implications for East Asia, including “loose nukes,” a humanitarian disaster, a regional refugee crisis, and potential escalation to war between China and the United States. To respond to a collapse and these problems, neighboring countries may perform several military missions to stabilize North Korea. These include the location and securing of North Korean weapons of mass destruction, stability operations, border control, conventional disarmament, and combat/deterrence operations. Assuming that collapse occurs in a relatively benign manner, military missions to stabilize North Korea could require 260,000 to 400,000 troops. If collapse occurs after a war on the peninsula, or if it sparks civil war in North Korea, the number of missions—and their requirements—would grow. Because of the size and complexity of these missions, and because of the perils associated with mismanaging them, advance and combined planning is essential. Combined planning should include those actors (e.g., China, South Korea, and the United States) that could otherwise take destabilizing action to protect their own interests.

Author(s):  
Noah Blaine Hearn

Abstract North Korea poses significant risks to national security as it continues to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). On February 28, 2019, United States President Donald Trump announced that he would be departing his second summit with Kim Jong Un without having reached a deal regarding the denuclearization of North Korea. This anticlimactic outcome followed weeks of media buildup surrounding the two leaders’ meeting in Hanoi, Vietnam; however, negotiators from both countries have pledged to continue their efforts at crafting a deal. As they continue this endeavor, those with a seat at the negotiating table must recognize that the most prudent path forward for the United States is to ensure that any such disarmament deal also address North Korea’s capacity to develop of biological weapons (BWs) in addition to nuclear and chemical capabilities as part of a comprehensive strategy.


Asian Survey ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter M. Beck

Abstract North Korea underwent a seemingly seamless leadership transition from father to son in the midst of a struggling economy and widespread hunger. The North drew even closer to China but also reached out to the United States and Russia for the first time in several years. Meanwhile, inter-Korean relations remained in a deep freeze.


2010 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 273
Author(s):  
Michael J Kelly ◽  
Sean Watts

In the aftermath of the Cold War, many began to question the continuing efficacy, or at least call for reform, of collective security structures such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations Security Council. Yet, North East Asia never enjoyed a formal, institutionalised collective security structure. As Russia and the United States recede and China emerges in North East Asia, this article questions whether now is the time to consider such an arrangement. Financially, Japan and South Korea are locked into a symbiotic relationship with China (as is the United States), while the government in Beijing continues to militarise and lay territorial and maritime claims to large areas of the region. Moreover, the regime in North Korea, with its new nuclear capabilities, remains unpredictable. Consequently, central components to the question of collective security in North East Asia are the equally vexing questions of what to do about North Korea and whether a new formalised security arrangement would include or exclude the People's Republic of China.


1955 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 158-159

The Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission (France, Soviet Union, Canada, United Kingdom, United States) met in London, May 13–June 22. Following discussion of possible approaches for the Sub-Committee, the Soviet representative presented a draft resolution11 prohibiting unconditionally weapons of mass destruction and asking the Security Council to effect an international agreement to guarantee enforcement of that prohibition. Permanent members of the Security Council would reduce by one-third conventional military equipment and personnel within a year. The draft recommended the convening by the Security Council of a conference to effect reduction of armaments by all states and to abolish military installations on foreign territories. The Soviet representative attacked parts of the United Nations Majority Plan for Control of Atomic Energy, stating that the United States desired to monopolize nuclear secrets and to secure information on Soviet armaments without prohibiting nuclear weapons.


Asian Survey ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 45 (5) ◽  
pp. 722-735 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Clay Moltz

Because of its energy reserves and long history of economic links with North Korea, the Russian Far East could provide useful incentives needed to help convince Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear program. For this reason, the United States should begin crafting a regionally based strategy that includes Russia.


Author(s):  
Patrick McEachern

After a year of trading colorful barbs with the American president and significant achievements in North Korea’s decades-long nuclear and missile development programs, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un declared mission accomplished in November 2017. Though Kim's pronouncement appears premature, North Korea is on the verge of being able to strike the United States with nuclear weapons. South Korea has long been in the North Korean crosshairs but worries whether the United States would defend it if North Korea holds the American homeland at risk. The largely ceremonial summit between US president Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, and the unpredictability of both parties, has not quelled these concerns and leaves more questions than answers for the two sides' negotiators to work out. The Korean Peninsula’s security situation is an intractable conflict, raising the question, “How did we get here?” In this book, former North Korea lead foreign service officer at the US embassy in Seoul Patrick McEachern unpacks the contentious and tangled relationship between the Koreas in an approachable question-and-answer format. While North Korea is famous for its militarism and nuclear program, South Korea is best known for its economic miracle, familiar to consumers as the producer of Samsung smartphones, Hyundai cars, and even K-pop music and K-beauty. Why have the two Koreas developed politically and economically in such radically different ways? What are the origins of a divided Korean Peninsula? Who rules the two Koreas? How have three generations of the authoritarian Kim dictatorship shaped North Korea? What is the history of North-South relations? Why does the North Korean government develop nuclear weapons? How do powers such as Japan, China, and Russia fit into the mix? What is it like to live in North and South Korea? This book tackles these broad topics and many more to explain what everyone needs to know about South and North Korea.


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