scholarly journals Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation: How States Pursue the Bomb

2017 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 110-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vipin Narang

How do states pursue nuclear weapons? Why do they select particular strategies to develop them, and how do these choices affect the international community's ability to prevent nuclear proliferation? The bulk of the proliferation literature focuses on why states want nuclear weapons. The question of how they pursue them, however, has largely been ignored. This question is important because how states try to acquire nuclear weapons—their strategies of nuclear proliferation—affects their likelihood of success and thus the character of the nuclear landscape. Four strategies of proliferation are available to states: hedging, sprinting, hiding, and sheltered pursuit. Nuclear acquisition theory explains why a proliferator might select one strategy over the others at a given time. Empirical codings from the universe of nuclear pursuers, combined with a detailed plausibility probe of India's long march to acquiring nuclear weapons—including novel details—establish the analytical power of the theory. Different strategies of proliferation offer different opportunities and vulnerabilities for nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation, with significant implications for international security.

1995 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 101-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Lee

The debate over nuclear proliferation has generated a large literature, but this literature does not adequately address the moral issues. A moral analysis of proliferation must go beyond concerns of international security. In this essay, Lee addresses the following questions: (1) Does nuclear proliferation make the world a more dangerous place; that is, does it increase security? (2) Is it morally permissible for a nonnuclear state to acquire nuclear weapons? (3) What are morally permissible actions for states trying to keep other states from acquiring nuclear weapons?


2021 ◽  
pp. 002200272110369 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eleonora Mattiacci ◽  
Rupal N. Mehta ◽  
Rachel Elizabeth Whitlark

How does dual-use technology influence cooperation? This study explores how the development of nuclear latency (the technological precursors to nuclear weapons) affects U.S. cooperative overtures toward its possessors. We argue that the ambiguous nature of nuclear latency creates uncertainty about the intentions of its possessors and impacts cooperation. Using event data, we find that a state’s possession of overt lab-scale enrichment and reprocessing facilities is significantly correlated with greater cooperative overtures from the United States toward that country. These overtures may serve as effective tools to counter nuclear proliferation among these states. Yet, when latent states engage in a concerted effort to keep their facilities secret, both at the lab and a more advanced “pilot” stage, this relationship is reversed. These results carry important implications for the impact of emerging, dual-use technologies on international security broadly.


2020 ◽  
pp. 77-86
Author(s):  
Nataliya Romashkina ◽  
◽  
Dmitry Stefanovich ◽  

Purpose: To identify the current strategic stability problems associated with the destructive impact of information and communication technologies (ICT) on the basis of analysis and systematization according to various parameters of cyber risks and threats to international security and global stability that can reduce the level of strategic stability and to develop relevant proposals that can lay the foundation for creation of a deterrence policy in the ICT domain. Research method: analysis, synthesis and scientific forecasting, expert assessment, comparative analysis of the cyber domain within the framework of a systematic approach. Result: the article presents analysis and systematization risks and threats to international security and global stability emanating from the cyber sphere according to various parameters. The article proves the impact of the accelerated development of information and communication technologies (ICT) on strategic stability, and that ensuring the cybersecurity of nuclear weapons requires special attention. The global problems of strategic stability at the current stage are posed and the conclusions are that the protection of strategic weapons, early warning systems, air and missile defense, communications, command and control over nuclear weapons from harmful ICTs are the pressing global problems of our time. Specific scenarios of cyber threats leading to a decrease in the level of strategic stability below the necessary and sufficient level have been elaborated, and proposals have been formulated to minimize the corresponding escalation threats. Proposed measures can become a basis for a deterrence policy in the ICT domain, as it was done during the period of bipolarity with regard to nuclear weapons, and become the foundation for broader international agreements on arms control in the so-called nuclear information space of the future.


1981 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 213-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
George H. Quester

Nine predictions are advanced on the impact on the international system of a successful effort to contain nuclear proliferation.The world will see a modest dilution of the prerogatives of sovereignty, very much tailored to the halting of nuclear weapons spread. Some breakthroughs will be achieved in the multinational management of nuclear industry. Current “pariah states” may escape such status, simply through the latent possibility of nuclear proliferation. Nuclear weapons will continue to go unused in combat, just as they have since 1945. Soviet-American cooperation on the nuclear proliferation front will continue. The traffic in conventional arms may by contrast go relatively unchecked, as most countries conclude that this kind of weapons spread is less bad than nuclear proliferation. All of this will be carried through by statements distorted by the normal deceptions of diplomacy. The world will nonetheless generally become more sophisticated in discounting any glamor or political clout in nuclear weapons programs. Most of the barrier to proliferation will come through normal political and economic exchange, rather than through any violent or military interventions.


2018 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Alexander Lanoszka

This chapter introduces the main themes and arguments of the book. It argues that alliances should make problematic instruments for thwarting nuclear proliferation despite the conventional wisdom that they have been partly responsible for keeping the number of states armed with nuclear weapons low. One reason is that they are ultimately unbelievable since states can still decide to forego spending blood and treasure to rescue an ally in dire need. Another reason is that strengthening alliance ties to discourage nuclear proliferation could lead to other undesirable behaviours that might increase the chance of war. In light of this puzzle, this introductory chapter sketches the book’s main argument that alliances can be most useful for preventing potential nuclear proliferation but much less useful for curbing actual nuclear proliferation.


1983 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 194-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. F. Goheen

The issue of nuclear proliferation is replete with problems to which there are no surefire solutions. In this essay, this troublesome terrain is examined in three different but complementary ways: first, through case studies of the nuclear dealings of the U.S. with India and Pakistan; second, in a broad review of incentives toward and dampers on the spread of nuclear weapons; and third, in terms of implications for national policy.


Author(s):  
Nicholas L. Miller

This book examines the historical development and effectiveness of US efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Drawing on hundreds of declassified documents, the first part of the book shows how the anticipation of nuclear domino effects in the 1960s and 1970s led the United States to strengthen its nonproliferation policy, moving from a selective approach—which was relatively permissive toward allies acquiring nuclear weapons—and toward a more universal policy that opposed proliferation across the board. Most notably, Washington spearheaded the establishment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968 and adopted sanctions legislation in the late 1970s that credibly threatened to cut off support to countries seeking nuclear weapons. The second part of the book analyzes how effective these policies have been in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. Statistical analysis suggests that a credible threat of sanctions has deterred countries dependent on the United States from even starting nuclear weapons programs over the last several decades. Meanwhile, in-depth case studies of French, Taiwanese, Pakistani, and Iranian nuclear activities illustrate the conditions under which sanctions succeed against ongoing nuclear weapons programs. The findings hold important implications for international security and nonproliferation policy.


1981 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 193-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Nacht

An examination of the past relationships between nuclear proliferation and American security policy substantiates several propositions. First, the political relationship between the United States and each new nuclear weapon state was not fundamentally transformed as a result of nuclear proliferation. Second, with the exception of the Soviet Union, no new nuclear state significantly affected U.S. defense programs or policies. Third, American interest in bilateral nuclear arms control negotiations has been confined to the Soviet Union. Fourth, a conventional conflict involving a nonnuclear ally prompted the United States to intervene in ways it otherwise might not have in order to forestall the use of nuclear weapons.In all respects, however, the relationship between nuclear proliferation and American security policy is changing. The intensification of the superpower rivalry and specific developments in their nuclear weapons and doctrines, the decline of American power more generally, and the characteristics of nuclear threshold states all serve to stimulate nuclear proliferation. It will be increasingly difficult in the future for American security policy to be as insulated from this process as it has been in the past.


1981 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
George H. Quester

The spread of nuclear weapons would make the world a much less stable place, and such a spread may be difficult to stop. Yet proliferation is not as yet inevitable.Several viewpoints are implicitly rejected in this collection. One is that nuclear proliferation would actually be desirable for the world. Another is that such weapons spread is inevitable. Other rejected viewpoints are that such spread can be halted only by a crash program, by a brutal exercise of American national power, or by a substantial surrender of such power.The international system may indeed hamper a nonproliferation effort in various ways—for example, in a drastic worsening of Soviet-American relations or a major disruption of world oil production.Yet the most important counter to pessimism about containing proliferation comes from the world's awareness of how bad actual proliferation would be. States which pretend to be indifferent or resigned to such nuclear weapons spread will quietly be making contributions to halting it.


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