Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Entitlement

1995 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 101-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Lee

The debate over nuclear proliferation has generated a large literature, but this literature does not adequately address the moral issues. A moral analysis of proliferation must go beyond concerns of international security. In this essay, Lee addresses the following questions: (1) Does nuclear proliferation make the world a more dangerous place; that is, does it increase security? (2) Is it morally permissible for a nonnuclear state to acquire nuclear weapons? (3) What are morally permissible actions for states trying to keep other states from acquiring nuclear weapons?

1981 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 213-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
George H. Quester

Nine predictions are advanced on the impact on the international system of a successful effort to contain nuclear proliferation.The world will see a modest dilution of the prerogatives of sovereignty, very much tailored to the halting of nuclear weapons spread. Some breakthroughs will be achieved in the multinational management of nuclear industry. Current “pariah states” may escape such status, simply through the latent possibility of nuclear proliferation. Nuclear weapons will continue to go unused in combat, just as they have since 1945. Soviet-American cooperation on the nuclear proliferation front will continue. The traffic in conventional arms may by contrast go relatively unchecked, as most countries conclude that this kind of weapons spread is less bad than nuclear proliferation. All of this will be carried through by statements distorted by the normal deceptions of diplomacy. The world will nonetheless generally become more sophisticated in discounting any glamor or political clout in nuclear weapons programs. Most of the barrier to proliferation will come through normal political and economic exchange, rather than through any violent or military interventions.


1981 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
George H. Quester

The spread of nuclear weapons would make the world a much less stable place, and such a spread may be difficult to stop. Yet proliferation is not as yet inevitable.Several viewpoints are implicitly rejected in this collection. One is that nuclear proliferation would actually be desirable for the world. Another is that such weapons spread is inevitable. Other rejected viewpoints are that such spread can be halted only by a crash program, by a brutal exercise of American national power, or by a substantial surrender of such power.The international system may indeed hamper a nonproliferation effort in various ways—for example, in a drastic worsening of Soviet-American relations or a major disruption of world oil production.Yet the most important counter to pessimism about containing proliferation comes from the world's awareness of how bad actual proliferation would be. States which pretend to be indifferent or resigned to such nuclear weapons spread will quietly be making contributions to halting it.


Author(s):  
Jan Ruzicka

This essay reconstructs Hedley Bull’s position on nuclear proliferation in The Anarchical Society. Avoiding the extremes of nuclear optimism and pessimism, Bull provided nuanced arguments about the relationship between nuclear proliferation and international order. Bull remained agnostic as to what the world of many nuclear powers would look like. He used this unpredictability to emphasize the notion of restraint involving both superpower cooperation to prevent states from going nuclear as well as the exercise of self-restraint on the part of superpowers. Showing restraint was crucial to the continued existence of the states system. Bull worried that proliferation represented a particular threat to it. Nuclear weapons exposed states to the prospect of sudden and complete destruction. This could lead to the abolition of the state system and its replacement with world government, to which Bull was strongly opposed. The conclusion illustrates Bull’s relevance in relation to the recent pursuit of non-proliferation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 107
Author(s):  
Yunia Utami Indah Haloho ◽  
Xavier Nugraha ◽  
Atiqoh Farhan Maulani

The preservation of the stability of world peace became one of the wishes of the entire international community. But these expectations seemed to be a sense of concern in the event of a war between countries using nuclear weapons. International law governs the nuclear weapons of international treaties, one of which is the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968. In addition to providing a guarantee of a sense of security was formed No First Use Policy to ensure the country owners of nuclear weapons are not the first party to use nuclear weapons in the event of a conflict with other countries. The purpose of this research is to learn about the implementation of No First Use Policy on the use of nuclear weapons by the countries that have them and the international security of the world. The method used in the study is normative juridical is supported by data obtained by library research. Regarding the implementation of the No First Use Policy each country with nuclear weapons has different attitudes about it. Whereas No First Use Policy has had a positive impact on the arrangement of the use of nuclear weapons of the world for security and order.


Author(s):  
C. Dale Walton

This chapter examines the role played by nuclear weapons in international politics during and after the cold war, making a distinction between the First Nuclear Age and the ongoing Second Nuclear Age. After providing a background on the First Nuclear Age, the chapter considers the various risks present in the Second Nuclear Age, focusing on issues related to nuclear deterrence, nuclear proliferation networks, strategic culture, and ballistic missile defences. It then discusses the assumption that arms control and disarmament treaties are the best means to further counterproliferation efforts. It also assesses the future of nuclear weapons and whether the world is facing a Third Nuclear Age before concluding with an analysis of the relevance of deterrence in the face of changing political and technological circumstances.


2011 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sico van der Meer

AbstractFrom the moment that their enormous destructive capacity was first shown to the world, nuclear weapons are universally considered as the most cruel weapons that exist. Nevertheless, several countries developed nuclear weapons since then. At the same time, much international efforts have been put into stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and, eventually, reaching complete nuclear disarmament. Looking in retrospective, how successful have these efforts been in the last 65 years? After a concise comparison between forecasts and outcomes of the nuclear proliferation process, this article analyses a variety of non-proliferation efforts, and also compares them to the accomplishments in the field of chemical and biological weapons.


Author(s):  
A. Kalyadin

The practical use of nuclear weapons displayed the necessity to toughen the responsibility for serious contempt of the international legal non-proliferation norm, to make the NPT regime more "sharp-toothed", to fill vivid gaps in this regime and place a reliable safety screen in the way of nuclear arsenals creation. The author investigates the means and tools of nuclear proliferation interception, and suggests options to produce an essential positive effect by weakening of pressure on the world politics from some countries' powerful forces which make the case for other legitimized coercion sources referring to the "ineffectiveness" of the UN.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dr. Rani Erum

Proliferation of Nuclear technology is accepted as a grave threat to the world. However, after the initial use of this lethal weapon at the end of World War II, the technology and techniques were transferred from secret government programs and by private organizations in various fields. Such transformation has been amplified by the privatization of civil nuclear energy projects, as well as other established industries in such way that at the time of need they can use the technology in making of nuclear weapons. Thus, this advancement of nuclear weapons program, material, technology and expertise are not only accessible for purchase from nongovernmental institutions but it has also increased the threat of its misuse by non-state actors. This study examines not only reasons of military nuclearization adopted by powers that be and their regional rivals but also provide comprehensive analysis of relating threats of acquiring this devastating technology by Rogue states and non-states actors and possible future perils faced by the world due to misuse.


2017 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 110-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vipin Narang

How do states pursue nuclear weapons? Why do they select particular strategies to develop them, and how do these choices affect the international community's ability to prevent nuclear proliferation? The bulk of the proliferation literature focuses on why states want nuclear weapons. The question of how they pursue them, however, has largely been ignored. This question is important because how states try to acquire nuclear weapons—their strategies of nuclear proliferation—affects their likelihood of success and thus the character of the nuclear landscape. Four strategies of proliferation are available to states: hedging, sprinting, hiding, and sheltered pursuit. Nuclear acquisition theory explains why a proliferator might select one strategy over the others at a given time. Empirical codings from the universe of nuclear pursuers, combined with a detailed plausibility probe of India's long march to acquiring nuclear weapons—including novel details—establish the analytical power of the theory. Different strategies of proliferation offer different opportunities and vulnerabilities for nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation, with significant implications for international security.


2021 ◽  
pp. 002200272110369 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eleonora Mattiacci ◽  
Rupal N. Mehta ◽  
Rachel Elizabeth Whitlark

How does dual-use technology influence cooperation? This study explores how the development of nuclear latency (the technological precursors to nuclear weapons) affects U.S. cooperative overtures toward its possessors. We argue that the ambiguous nature of nuclear latency creates uncertainty about the intentions of its possessors and impacts cooperation. Using event data, we find that a state’s possession of overt lab-scale enrichment and reprocessing facilities is significantly correlated with greater cooperative overtures from the United States toward that country. These overtures may serve as effective tools to counter nuclear proliferation among these states. Yet, when latent states engage in a concerted effort to keep their facilities secret, both at the lab and a more advanced “pilot” stage, this relationship is reversed. These results carry important implications for the impact of emerging, dual-use technologies on international security broadly.


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