scholarly journals Interpreting the History of Evolutionary Biology through a Kuhnian Prism: Sense or Nonsense?

2021 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-35
Author(s):  
Koen B. Tanghe ◽  
Lieven Pauwels ◽  
Alexis De Tiège ◽  
Johan Braeckman
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Biology ◽  
Developmental Model ◽  
Evolutionary Synthesis ◽  
Extended Evolutionary Synthesis ◽  
Origin Of Species ◽  
Scientific Revolutions ◽  
Structure Of Scientific Revolutions ◽  
History Of ◽  
Modern Evolutionary Synthesis

Traditionally, Thomas S. Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) is largely identified with his analysis of the structure of scientific revolutions. Here, we contribute to a minority tradition in the Kuhn literature by interpreting the history of evolutionary biology through the prism of the entire historical developmental model of sciences that he elaborates in The Structure. This research not only reveals a certain match between this model and the history of evolutionary biology but, more importantly, also sheds new light on several episodes in that history, and particularly on the publication of Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1859), the construction of the modern evolutionary synthesis, the chronic discontent with it, and the latest expression of that discontent, called the extended evolutionary synthesis. Lastly, we also explain why this kind of analysis hasn’t been done before.

scholarly journals Extending the Explanatory Scope of Evolutionary Theory: The Origin of Historical Kinds in Biology and Culture

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gunter Wagner ◽  
Gary Tomlinson
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Theory ◽  
Population Biology ◽  
Evolutionary Biology ◽  
Cell Types ◽  
Biological Species ◽  
Evolutionary Synthesis ◽  
Extended Evolutionary Synthesis ◽  
Modern Evolutionary Synthesis ◽  
Intellectual Challenge ◽  
Recent Extension

Since its inception, evolutionary theory has experienced a number of extensions. The most important of these took the forms of the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis (MES), embracing genetics and population biology in the early 20th century, and the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES) of the last thirty years, embracing, among other factors, non-genetic forms of inheritance. While we appreciate the motivation for this recent extension, we argue that it does not go far enough, since it restricts itself to widening explanations of adaptation by adding mechanisms of inheritance and variation. Here we argue that a more thoroughgoing extension is needed, one that broadens the explanatory scope of evolutionary theory. In addition to adaptation and its various mechanisms, evolutionary theory must recognize as a distinct intellectual challenge the origin of what we call “historical kinds.” Under historical kinds we include any process that acquires a quasi-independent and traceable lineage-history in biological and cultural evolution. A limited number of historical kinds have been recognized in evolutionary biology, and corresponding research programs have been formed around them. The best characterized examples are biological species and genes. We propose that the conceptual category of historical kinds can and needs to be extended, and we develop the notion of a historical kind in a series of paradigmatic exemplars, from genes and cell types to rituals and music. The explanation of the origin of historical kinds should be a main objective of biological and cultural sciences.

scholarly journals Evolutionary biology today and the call for an extended synthesis

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (5) ◽  
pp. 20160145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas J. Futuyma
Keyword(s):  
Natural Selection ◽  
Evolutionary Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Biology ◽  
Epigenetic Inheritance ◽  
Reaction Norm ◽  
Evolutionary Synthesis ◽  
Historical Background ◽  
Extended Evolutionary Synthesis ◽  
Extended Synthesis ◽  
Proximate Causation

Evolutionary theory has been extended almost continually since the evolutionary synthesis (ES), but except for the much greater importance afforded genetic drift, the principal tenets of the ES have been strongly supported. Adaptations are attributable to the sorting of genetic variation by natural selection, which remains the only known cause of increase in fitness. Mutations are not adaptively directed, but as principal authors of the ES recognized, the material (structural) bases of biochemistry and development affect the variety of phenotypic variations that arise by mutation and recombination. Against this historical background, I analyse major propositions in the movement for an ‘extended evolutionary synthesis’. ‘Niche construction' is a new label for a wide variety of well-known phenomena, many of which have been extensively studied, but (as with every topic in evolutionary biology) some aspects may have been understudied. There is no reason to consider it a neglected ‘process’ of evolution. The proposition that phenotypic plasticity may engender new adaptive phenotypes that are later genetically assimilated or accommodated is theoretically plausible; it may be most likely when the new phenotype is not truly novel, but is instead a slight extension of a reaction norm already shaped by natural selection in similar environments. However, evolution in new environments often compensates for maladaptive plastic phenotypic responses. The union of population genetic theory with mechanistic understanding of developmental processes enables more complete understanding by joining ultimate and proximate causation; but the latter does not replace or invalidate the former. Newly discovered molecular phenomena have been easily accommodated in the past by elaborating orthodox evolutionary theory, and it appears that the same holds today for phenomena such as epigenetic inheritance. In several of these areas, empirical evidence is needed to evaluate enthusiastic speculation. Evolutionary theory will continue to be extended, but there is no sign that it requires emendation.

RISE, GRUBENHUND: ON PROVINCIALIZING KUHN

2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
DEBORAH R. COEN
Keyword(s):  
History Of Science ◽  
Knowledge Production ◽  
Foreign Languages ◽  
Ludwik Fleck ◽  
Scientific Revolutions ◽  
Visual Metaphors ◽  
Structure Of Scientific Revolutions ◽  
History Of ◽  
Kuhnian Revolution ◽  
Neutral Ground

Bilingualism was Kuhn's solution to the problem of relativism, the problem raised by his own theory of incommensurability. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, he argued that scientific theories are separated by gulfs of mutual incomprehension. There is no neutral ground from which to judge one theory fitter than another. Each is formulated in its own language and cannot be translated into the idiom of another. Yet, like many Americans, Kuhn never had the experience of moving comfortably between languages. “I've never been any good really at foreign languages,” he admitted in an interview soon before his death. “I can read French, I can read German, if I'm dropped into one of those countries I can stammer along for a while, but my command of foreign languages is not good, and never has been, which makes it somewhat ironic that much of my thought these days goes to language.” Kuhn may have been confessing to more than a personal weakness. His linguistic ineptitude seems to be a clue to his overweening emphasis on the difficulty of “transworld travel.” Multilingualism remained for him an abstraction. In this respect, I will argue, Kuhn engendered a peculiarly American turn in the history of science. Kuhn's argument for the dependence of science on the norms of particular communities has been central to the development of studies of science in and as culture since the 1980s. Recent work on the mutual construction of science and nationalism, for instance, is undeniably in Kuhn's debt. Nonetheless, the Kuhnian revolution cut off other avenues of research. In this essay, I draw on the counterexample of the physician–historian Ludwik Fleck, as well as on critiques by Steve Fuller and Ted Porter, to suggest one way to situate Kuhn within the broader history of the history of science. To echo Kuhn's own visual metaphors, one of the profound effects of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions on the field of history of science was to render certain modes of knowledge production virtually invisible.

Developmental biology and human evolution

2011 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. e2
Author(s):  
Jeffrey H. Schwartz
Keyword(s):  
Biological Sciences ◽  
Population Genetics ◽  
Evolutionary Biology ◽  
Molecular Change ◽  
Human Fossil ◽  
Evolutionary Studies ◽  
History Of ◽  
Modern Evolutionary Synthesis ◽  
Organismal Development ◽  
Taxic Diversity

The Evolutionary or Modern Evolutionary Synthesis (here identified as the Synthesis) has been portrayed as providing the foundation for uniting a supposed disarray of biological disciplines through the lens of Darwinism fused with population genetics. Rarely acknowledged is that the Synthesis’s success was also largely due to its architects’ effectiveness in submerging British and German attempts at a synthesis by uniting the biological sciences through shared evolutionary concerns. Dobzhansky and Mayr imposed their bias toward population genetics, population (as supposedly opposed to typological) thinking, and Morgan’s conception of specific genes for specific features (here abbreviated as genes for) on human evolutionary studies. Dobzhansky declared that culture buffered humans from the whims of selection. Mayr argued that as variable as humans are now, their extinct relatives were even more variable; thus the human fossil did not present taxic diversity and all known fossils could be assembled into a gradually changing lineage of time-successive species. When Washburn centralized these biases in the new physical anthropology the fate of paleoanthropology as a non-contributor to evolutionary theory was sealed. Molecular anthropology followed suit in embracing Zuckerkandl and Pauling’s assumption that molecular change was gradual and perhaps more importantly continual. Lost in translation was and still is an appreciation of organismal development. Here I will summarize the history of these ideas and their alternatives in order to demonstrate assumptions that still need to be addressed before human evolutionary studies can more fully participate in what is a paradigm shift-in-the-making in evolutionary biology.

Combining Kuhn and Jung: outlining a ‘step ladder model’ (SLM) for scientific discovery and paradigm shift research

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 206-226
Author(s):  
Sam Keenan
Keyword(s):  
History Of Science ◽  
Paradigm Shift ◽  
Scientific Discovery ◽  
Jungian Psychology ◽  
Discovery Process ◽  
Scientific Revolutions ◽  
Ladder Model ◽  
Structure Of Scientific Revolutions ◽  
12 Steps ◽  
History Of

This paper provides the outline of a ‘step ladder model’ (SLM) comprising 12 steps of scientific discovery making. It incorporates both a ‘leap-off point’ from Kuhn'sStructure of Scientific Revolutions, and ideas from Jungian psychology to reveal patterns in the way in which scientific discoveries are made, across 40 examples from the history of science. The current consensus is that these discoveries are accidental. This paper aims to provide a model for deliberately making dream-based scientific discoveries. The key to this model is intrapsychic patterns in how discoveries of this kind can be made. As these patterns become gradually clearer, greater understanding of the dream-based scientific discovery-making process can develop. Gradually as a collective endeavour, as the SLM develops, the dream-based scientific discovery process can by degrees become less accidental, and progressively more deliberate.

scholarly journals Biology and panpsychism: German evolutionists and a philosopher Theodor Ziehen (1862–1950)

2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 240-253
Author(s):  
Georgy S. Levit ◽  
◽  
Uwe Hossfeld ◽  
Keyword(s):  
20Th Century ◽  
Evolutionary Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Biology ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Strong Impact ◽  
Ernst Haeckel ◽  
Quasi Experimental ◽  
History Of ◽  
Biological Systematics ◽  
Modern Evolutionary Synthesis

Theodor Ziehen was a prominent German psychiatrist and psychologist and a marginal philosopher of the first half of the 20th century who developed an exotic subjective-idealistic theory based on quasi-empirical psychological arguments. Although Ziehen was seen by contemporaries (most prominently by Vladimir Lenin) as a representative of the same philosophical current (empirio-criticism) as Mach and Avenarius, he never achieved their prominence in the history of philosophy. At the same time, Ziehen’s philosophy became influential in German biology, first of all, due to his direct and very strong impact on Bernhard Rensch. Rensch, in his turn, was the most significant figure on the international scene of what is known as the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis in biology. Rensch was not the only biologist influenced by Ziehen’s ideas. Ziehen had some communication with the “German Darwin” Ernst Haeckel and played a prominent role in the concept of the founder of biological systematics Willi Hennig. How to explain Ziehen’s prominent place in the history of evolutionary biology, despite his obscurity in the history of philosophy? Our hypothesis is that Ziehen became a visible figure in evolutionary theory because of the monistic bias in German biology. Ziehen’s epistemology appeared to be compatible with evolutionary monism and was developed by a practicing psychiatrist therefore obtaining a character of a quasi-experimental doctrine.

scholarly journals Kuhn and Wittgenstein: The Paradigm Priority Problem, Relativism and Incommensurability

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Wagner Oliveira
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
Theory Of Science ◽  
Traditional Conception ◽  
Linguistic Turn ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
Scientific Revolutions ◽  
Structure Of Scientific Revolutions ◽  
Social Nature ◽  
Conceptual Changes ◽  
History Of

For dropping the incommensurability idea elaborated at the time of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn dismisses the concept of “revolution”. The incommensurability involved the incomparability of theories. In this new environment, the revolution is replaced by conceptual reformulation and the incommensurability becomes occasional. The linguistic turn in Kuhn’s thought involves conceptual changes whose aim is to get around the accusation of relativism that the former notion of incommensurability arouses. The most fundamental effect of these conceptual reformulations is the commitment to a traditional conception of semantics. It changes the comprehension of the historical and social nature of the foundations of the changes that scientific knowledge goes through. The comparison between the answer to the problem of paradigm priority attributed by Kuhn to Wittgenstein and Wittgenstein by himself shows that the basis of the normative nature of paradigm commitment is an essentialist concern. In the second half of this paper, I will evaluate Kuhn’s manner of getting around the problems of incommensurability in contrast to Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy dealing with similar issues in On Certainty. This enables one to essay answers to the problems of incommensurability without relativism or any commitment to a traditional conception of semantics. These contrasts show how far Kuhn’s new theory of science departs from the Wittgensteinian inspiration and abandons the point of view of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. The development of these two halves makes it possible to indicate reasons to believe that questions concerning the theory and history of science can benefit largely from a grammatical exploration, which gives rise to a theory of science inspired by Wittgenstein’s thought, as Mauro Condé suggests.

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