The Temper Tantrums of Nations: Why Would Weak Nations Challenge Hegemonic Nations?

2012 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 321-346 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elias L. Khalil
Keyword(s):  
South Korea ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Choice Model ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Moral Outrage ◽  
Net Benefit ◽  
Military Conflict ◽  
The Us ◽  
Cost Of War ◽  
The Cost

Abstract In March 2005, riots erupted in South Korea against Japan in reaction to Japan’s claims of sovereignty over some rocky uninhabited islets (0.23 km2). What explains the moral outrage against Japan, the severity of which could have erupted into a military conflict? Such outrage is a puzzle for two reasons. First, the probability that South Korea could defeat Japan is nil, especially since the US-Japan alliance dominates the US-South Korean alliance. Second, even if the probability of defeating Japan was 100%, the net benefit of conflict was apparently negative – given the meager potential reward vis-à-vis the cost of war. This article offers a rational choice model that demonstrates that the moral outrage cannot be explained as a strategic threat. The analysis demonstrates that sociological and evolutionary game explanations are also unconvincing. This calls for an evaluation of how emotions relate to rational choice in international conflicts.

scholarly journals When Does Mutualism Offer a Competitive Advantage? A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Host-Host Competition in Mutualism

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdel H Halloway ◽  
Katy D Heath ◽  
Gordon G McNickle
Keyword(s):  
Competitive Advantage ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Neighborhood Size ◽  
Net Benefit ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Local Neighborhood ◽  
Specific Direction ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Cost

Questions: Can resource-resource trade mutualism offer a competitive advantage to plants? If so, what are the conditions that give mutualism an advantage especially with regard to the size of the neighborhood? Hypothesis: We hypothesized that mutualism could offer a competitive advantage if the benefits outweighed the costs. We also hypothesized that this competitive advantage could lead to coexistence between mutualist and non-mutualist strategies within the same population. We also hypothesize that local neighborhood size (the number of competitors at a given moment) would change this response, though the specific direction of change was unclear to us. Method: We created an evolutionary game theoretic model in which a plant could either be a mutualist or non-mutualist that incorporated nutrients freely available to the plant, nutrients obtained only through mutualism with microbes, the cost of producing roots, the cost of trade with microbes, and neighborhood size. We sought ESS solutions as defined by the Nash equilibrium criterion. Key Assumptions: 1) Costs and benefits are fixed for all plants. 2) Freely available nutrients are equally shared between all competing plants in a local neighborhood. 3) Microbially obtained nutrients are shared equally between mutualistic plants in the local neighborhood. Conclusion: We found that mutualism could offer a competitive advantage if the net benefit was positive. Coexistence between mutualist strategies in our model happens because of competition between mutualists over the microbially available nutrient. Coexistence was more likely with greater neighborhood size but at the expense of mutualist fixation.

Game Theory and the Future of International Security

2018 ◽  
pp. 178-192
Author(s):  
Andrew H. Kydd
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
International Relations ◽  
International Security ◽  
Dynamic Models ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Formal Theory ◽  
The Future ◽  
Cost Of War ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Cost

Game theory can help guide our thinking about the future of international relations in three ways. Static models can help us understand the effects of varying exogenous parameters, like the cost of war, the level of transparency, or the returns from trade. Dynamic models help us understand how fears or hopes for the future can affect present behavior, and how present behavior constrains or enables future options. Finally, evolutionary game theoretic models can represent processes that unfold over longer time horizons, helping us understand the rise of international cooperation and the decline of war. Given that we have no data on the future, formal theory is especially useful in guiding our speculation.

The cost-utility of the rivastigmine transdermal patch in the management of patients with moderate Alzheimer's disease in the US

2009 ◽  
Vol 36 (S 02) ◽  
Author(s):  
A Brennan ◽  
B Nagy ◽  
A Brandtmüller ◽  
SK Thomas ◽  
M Gallagher ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Alzheimer’S Disease ◽  
Alzheimer's Disease ◽  
Cost Utility ◽  
Transdermal Patch ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Cost

Rational Choice Theory and the 1990 Party Merger in South Korea

OUGHTOPIA ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-282
Author(s):  
In-Kyun Kim ◽  
Myeong-Geon Koh
Keyword(s):  
South Korea ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory

The Cost of War

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Garton
Keyword(s):  
Cost Of War ◽  
The Cost

scholarly journals Economic Value of Terminal Aerodrome Forecasts at Incheon Airport, South Korea

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (12) ◽  
pp. 6965
Author(s):  
In-Gyum Kim ◽  
Hye-Min Kim ◽  
Dae-Geun Lee ◽  
Byunghwan Lim ◽  
Hee-Choon Lee
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
South Korea ◽  
Co2 Emissions ◽  
Fuel Efficiency ◽  
Economic Value ◽  
Analysis Data ◽  
Annual Average ◽  
Loss Model ◽  
Total Budget ◽  
The Cost

Meteorological information at an arrival airport is one of the primary variables used to determine refueling of discretionary fuel. This study evaluated the economic value of terminal aerodrome forecasts (TAF), which has not been previously quantitatively analyzed in Korea. The analysis data included 374,716 international flights that arrived at Incheon airport during 2017–2019. A cost–loss model was used for the analysis, which is a methodology to evaluate forecast value by considering the cost and loss that users can expect, considering the decision-making result based on forecast utilization. The value was divided in terms of improving fuel efficiency and reducing CO2 emissions. The results of the analysis indicate that the annual average TAF value for Incheon Airport was approximately 2.2 M–20.1 M USD under two hypothetical rules of refueling of discretionary fuel. This value is up to 26.2% higher than the total budget of 16.3 M USD set for the production of aviation meteorological forecasts by the Korea Meteorological Administration (KMA). Further, it is up to 10 times greater than the 2 M USD spent on aviation meteorological information fees collected by the KMA in 2018.

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