De Facto State Foreign Policy “Social Moves” in Abkhazia and South Ossetia

2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-205
Author(s):  
Mary Elizabeth Smith

This paper presents “social moves” as a new strategy de facto states can use in their interactions with the international community, with or without the possibility of a formal recognition of sovereignty. Special attention is paid to Abkhazia’s continuing desire for an independent state compared to South Ossetia’s desire for Russian absorption in light of both regions’ ethnic histories and turbulent relationships with Georgia. Key analysis includes discussion of the diplomatic soft power “social moves” the Abkhazian Foreign Ministry has begun in the last two years and the absence of similar “social moves” within the South Ossetian Foreign Ministry.

2015 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 21-46
Author(s):  
Kubilay Arin

When Turkey’s Justice and Development Part (AKP) came to power in 2002, it brought a new strategy to foreign policy. Some scholars ascribed this reorientation to the rise of neo-Ottomanism, others to Islamization, and yet others to a Middle Easternization of foreign policy. All labels have one element in common: They give weight to Islam and Turkey’s imperial past as soft power assetsin the conduct of foreign policy by rejecting secular Kemalism in the country’s diplomacy. The AKP capitalized on Turgut Özal’s neo-Ottomanist foreign policy and Necmettin Erbakan’s multi-dimensional foreign policy by using Turkey’s pivotal geopolitical location to transform it into a global actor. The ongoing Islamic revival has caused the country’s attempted full westernization to slow down. But the West itself is hardly a monolithic bloc, given its own many internal cultural, linguistic,religious, political, and economic differences. I therefore describe Turkey as a “hybrid,” a modern and developing “semi-western” state, and argue that over time it will become ever more “socially conservative.”


Author(s):  
Giorgio Comai

De facto states in the South Caucasus are supported by a patron: Russia in the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Armenia in the case of Nagorno Karabakh. In spite of the contested international status of these territories, assistance to de facto states is often fully formalised, and relevant details are included in budget laws as well as documents issued by pension funds. This article presents relevant data and sources, and highlights the importance of taking them in consideration to inform analyses on the political economy of these territories, as well as to develop policies of engagement.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 155-178
Author(s):  
Nguyen Huong Thach Thao

Abstract In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) issued its final award on the South China Sea dispute between the Philippines and China that caught the attention of the international community. Since this was the first time that a claimant in the South China Sea had ever referred the case to an international juridical body in an effort to settle the dispute, the responses of both claimant and non-claimant stakeholders were awaited. Realising the relevance of the issue, I conduct a comparative study of the responses to the PCA’s final award to two major claimants with similar positions on the South China Sea—the Philippines and Vietnam. The main aim of this study is to indicate the similarities and/or differences in the way these two states responded to the final decisions of the PCA. The study finds that even though both the Philippines and Vietnam reacted to the award in a similar manner, the motives behind their responses were different. In general, the South China Sea policy of the Philippines has always been less consistent than that of Vietnam, which can be explained through each state’s foreign policy tendencies.


2009 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vladimir Shlapentokh

The responsibility of Georgian President Michael Saakashvili for the war with Russia continued to be hotly debated in Georgia, Russia and the world several months after its end.1 Indeed, there are various views about Saakashvili’s decision to attack South Ossetia. By the end of the war, the international community was inclined to recognize the adventurous actions of the Georgian president, but put most of the blame on Moscow for its disproportionate reaction, its bombardment of Georgian cities, its permission to South Ossetian forces to plunder Georgians villages and kill Georgians, as well as its long occupation of Georgian territory.


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 181-198
Author(s):  
Srabani Roy Choudhury

As an introduction to this special issue, this article examines the shaping of Japan’s foreign policy; looking at how Japan has risen to the demand of the international community to assume more responsibility in conflict situations, circumventing a pacifist constitution that it had been dealt with. It then explains relations between Middle East and Japan and shows how the latter has been balancing its national interest in order to conform to its alliance with the United States. With more Asian powers having stake in the Middle East, Japan has become proactive about its role in the region. However, with limited hard power options, Japan would have to concentrate on its soft power capabilities and on using its economic strength to mark its presence in the Middle East.


2015 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 21-46
Author(s):  
Kubilay Arin

When Turkey’s Justice and Development Part (AKP) came to power in 2002, it brought a new strategy to foreign policy. Some scholars ascribed this reorientation to the rise of neo-Ottomanism, others to Islamization, and yet others to a Middle Easternization of foreign policy. All labels have one element in common: They give weight to Islam and Turkey’s imperial past as soft power assetsin the conduct of foreign policy by rejecting secular Kemalism in the country’s diplomacy. The AKP capitalized on Turgut Özal’s neo-Ottomanist foreign policy and Necmettin Erbakan’s multi-dimensional foreign policy by using Turkey’s pivotal geopolitical location to transform it into a global actor. The ongoing Islamic revival has caused the country’s attempted full westernization to slow down. But the West itself is hardly a monolithic bloc, given its own many internal cultural, linguistic,religious, political, and economic differences. I therefore describe Turkey as a “hybrid,” a modern and developing “semi-western” state, and argue that over time it will become ever more “socially conservative.”


Author(s):  
James Ker-Lindsay

There are few questions more interesting and more important for the international community than the issue of how new states are created and accepted into the wider global system through the process of recognition. While there are thousands of ethnic groups around the world, there are just 193 member states of the United Nations. And yet, for many years, the foreign policy aspects of secession and the recognition of seceding territories have received relatively little attention by scholars in the field of politics and international relations. This was largely because the subject was seen to be a marginal interest. Few territories managed to stage a credible attempt at secession. Almost none managed to gain widespread acceptance. However, over the past decade, there has been a significant growth in the attention given to secession and recognition in international relations. This has been particularly apparent since Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia, in 2008, and because of heightened secessionist tensions in the former Soviet Union. To date, the question of de facto states—territories that are unrecognized or partially recognized—has been at the heart of studies into secession and recognition in the field of politics and international relations. Attention in this area has tended to focus on the nature, structure, and international interaction of unrecognized territories. However, the scope of research is now widening. As well as interest in the historical development of attitudes towards secession and recognition practices, scholars are now looking at the way in which parent states—as the territories they have broken away from are generally known—attempt to prevent de facto states from being recognized or otherwise legitimized by the international community. Meanwhile, increasing attention is also being given to the role of external parties, such as great powers, as well as to the efforts of secessionist territories themselves to find ways to encourage recognition, or at least to participate more widely in the international system. Therefore, while the community of scholars working in the field of secession and recognition is still relatively small, the subject itself is undergoing rapid growth.


Author(s):  
Meliha Benli Altunışık

This chapter focuses on the soft power of Turkey, comparing its engagements with the states of the South Caucasus (and Central Asia) to the countries of the Middle East. The chapter argues that for Turkey, the use of soft power was a tool to re-establish relations with, and acquire acceptance in, its neighborhood. In the case of the South Caucasus, Turkey attempted to reconnect with a region that it was cut off from for a long time due to the Soviet era and the Cold War. In the Middle East, there was an effort to redefine its engagement after a decade of securitization of its foreign policy in the 1990s. Although soft power increased Turkey’s visibility and presence, it is unclear if it changed the nature of Turkey’s influence, which remained highly limited when faced with the realities of hard power politics, unable to influence the regional actors it targeted.


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