scholarly journals Il sostegno esterno ufficiale agli stati de facto nel Caucaso del sud

Author(s):  
Giorgio Comai

De facto states in the South Caucasus are supported by a patron: Russia in the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Armenia in the case of Nagorno Karabakh. In spite of the contested international status of these territories, assistance to de facto states is often fully formalised, and relevant details are included in budget laws as well as documents issued by pension funds. This article presents relevant data and sources, and highlights the importance of taking them in consideration to inform analyses on the political economy of these territories, as well as to develop policies of engagement.

2012 ◽  
Vol 164 (2) ◽  
pp. 237-257
Author(s):  
Paweł OLSZEWSKI

The main subject of this article is the presentation of the historical backgrounds of the contemporary conflicts over the Mountainous Karabagh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The author describes the history of these regions from the beginning of the 19th century till 1992. The conquest of the South Caucasus by Imperial Russia in the 19th century resulted in the immigrations of Armenians to the Mountainous Karabagh, Ossetians to South Ossetia and Georgians to Abkhazia. These immigrations completely changed the ethnic compositions of these region. The Russian authorities supported the immigrations of pro-Russian Armenians and Ossetians.The political situation in these regions changed in 1918, when the independence of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan was declared. South Ossetia and Abkhazia were parts of independent Georgia, and the Mountainous Karabagh was dependent on Azerbaijan. Ossetians and Abkhazians resisted the Georgian authorities and Karabagh Armenians fought against Azerbaijan’s rule.After the conquest of the South Caucasus by Soviet Russia in 1920-1921, the Mountainous Karabagh remained part of Soviet Azerbaijan, and South Ossetia and Abkhazia remained part of Soviet Georgia. The Autonomous Oblast of Nagorno-Karabagh was created in the Mountainous Karabagh in 1923. The authorities of the Mountainous Karabagh were dominated by Karabagh Armenians and this region was practically independent of Soviet Azerbaijan. A similar situation was in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, especially after 1956.The development of Abkhazian and Ossetian national movements at the end of the 1980s led to the situation in which Abkhazians and South Ossetians claimed the political autonomy of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, and then the independence of these regions. The Georgian authorities were against these claims, as they considered these regions to constitute the historical parts of Georgia. The political hostility between Georgia and South Ossetia resulted in South Ossetian-Georgian armed fighting in January 1991, and South Ossetia proclaimed its independence in November 1991. Moreover, the political conflict between the Georgian government and the Abkhazian authorities in the first half of 1992 turned into open war in August 1992.Karabagh Armenians claimed the incorporation of the Mountainous Karabagh into Soviet Armenia because of historical, ethnic, cultural and regional connections between the Mountainous Karabagh and Armenia. These claims were very strong from the end of 1980s, but Azerbaijan’s communist authorities and the Azerbaijan anti-communist movement wanted to retain the Karabagh region in Azerbaijan. The hostility between the local Armenian and Azerbaijan population of the Mountainous Karabagh turned into armed fighting in 1989. The Mountainous Karabagh proclaimed its independence in December 1991.


Author(s):  
A. Krylov

The post-Soviet history of the South Caucasus is divided into three stages of different duration, format and character. The first stage (1991-2008) began after the collapse of the USSR and continued until the war in South Ossetia in August 2008. At this time, the formation of independent states took place, the vectors of foreign policy of the new states were determined. The second stage of the post-Soviet history of the South Caucasus (2008-2020) began after a five-day war and Russia's recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia has strengthened its position in the South Caucasus by building a long-term system of response to potential threats in the southern direction. The Georgian factor has ceased to play an important role, the Armenian direction has become the main one in the policy of the United States and the collective West. To reformat the South Caucasus in American interests, “football diplomacy” was used, and then the second Karabakh war followed. After the end of the second Karabakh war, the third stage of the post-Soviet development of the South Caucasus began. At the end of 2020, Moscow managed to stabilize the situation and bring a contingent of Russian peacekeepers into the conflict zone. Further prospects for the development of the South Caucasus depend on many contradictory factors. The more tense the international situation and Russia's relations with the United States and the collective West will be, the higher the likelihood of the outbreak of new wars and conflicts in the South Caucasus.


2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Larisa Sotieva

Editors’ note: Immediately following the August 2008 war in and around South Ossetia, two London-based peacebuilding organisations active in the South Caucasus, Conciliation Resources and International Alert, commissioned Larisa Sotieva to conduct research into the situation on the ground in the aftermath of the war. Sotieva, who grew up in South Ossetia and has a long track record in humanitarian and peacebuilding work in the South Caucasus, was in an unusual position to be able to conduct research within the area. She did not, however, have access to territory controlled by the Georgian side during a fortnight of fieldwork and was therefore only able to cover those areas under the control of the Russian military at that time. This paper, which is based on that research, is not an academic article, but an eye-witness account documenting the general situation and fate of the people whom the researcher was able to contact, as well as particular examples offering insights into the situation in South Ossetian society at the time of writing (September-October 2008). Research findings were circulated to a limited policy-oriented audience in March 2009 and have now been edited into this paper for publication. The editors thank International Alert and Conciliation Resources for permission to publish this material.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 130-141
Author(s):  
Tabib Huseynov

This article discusses major policy and institutional interventions needed for conflict transformation in the South Caucasus. It examines how different forms of territorialpolitical organisation of government have been used to mitigate both violent and nonviolent conflicts and how international experience could be applied to promote peaceful resolution of the conflicts over Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorny Karabakh. The article shows how the conflicting parties’ mental fixation on final status stalls peace processes, and argues that rather than discussing end-state solutions or end-state models of governance, conflict parties need to focus on interim (transitional) policy and institutional arrangements that would allow them to normalise relations and set out roadmaps for cooperation and gradual reconciliation. The article also underlines the importance of adhering to standards of good governance and human rights, as necessary preconditions for ensuring the legitimacy, and thus, sustainability, of peace processes.


2021 ◽  
pp. 209-246
Author(s):  
Craig Berry

We are increasingly conscious that private pension schemes in the UK are primarily financial institutions. UK private pensions provision has always been highly financialized, but the individualization of provision means this dynamic matters more than ever to retirement incomes. Furthermore, individualization has occurred at a time when the UK economy’s capacity to support a long-term approach to capital investment, upon which pensions depend, has declined. The chapter argues that pensions provision essentially involves managing the failure of the future to resemble the present, or more specifically present forecasts of the future. As our ability to manipulate the value of the future has increased, our ability to tolerate forecast failure has declined. The chapter details how pension funds invest, and how this has changed, and provides an original understanding of several recent attempts to shape pensions investment, ultimately demonstrating the limitations of pensions policy in shaping how provision functions in practice.


2002 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-276 ◽  
Author(s):  
Svante E. Cornell

The granting of autonomous status to minority populations has gained support among academics and practitioners alike as a way to solve, manage, and even preempt ethnic conflict. In spite of the enthusiasm for ethnofederalism, however, the provision of autonomy to minorities may actually increase rather than decrease the likelihood of conflict. Under certain political conditions, autonomy promotes the separate identity of the minority and increases its motivation and capacity to seek separation from the central state. This article presents a rudimentary theoretical framework identifying which qualities of autonomy solutions increase the likelihood of conflict. It discusses how autonomy relates to other factors conducive to conflict by studying minorities in the South Caucasus and examines the case of Georgia. In Georgia, there were five ethnic minority populations, two of whom—the Abkhaz and the South Ossetians—enjoyed autonomous status and were the only minorities to engage in armed conflict with the Georgian government. This article shows how autonomy, by empowering ethnic elites with control of statelike institutions and by enhancing factors such as leadership, economic viability, and external support, played a crucial role in the escalation of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Conversely, the absence of autonomy mitigated separatist and secessionist sentiments among two of Georgia's other minority groups—Javakheti's Armenian and Kvemo Kartli's Azeri populations.


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