The AKP’s Foreign Policy

2015 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 21-46
Author(s):  
Kubilay Arin

When Turkey’s Justice and Development Part (AKP) came to power in 2002, it brought a new strategy to foreign policy. Some scholars ascribed this reorientation to the rise of neo-Ottomanism, others to Islamization, and yet others to a Middle Easternization of foreign policy. All labels have one element in common: They give weight to Islam and Turkey’s imperial past as soft power assetsin the conduct of foreign policy by rejecting secular Kemalism in the country’s diplomacy. The AKP capitalized on Turgut Özal’s neo-Ottomanist foreign policy and Necmettin Erbakan’s multi-dimensional foreign policy by using Turkey’s pivotal geopolitical location to transform it into a global actor. The ongoing Islamic revival has caused the country’s attempted full westernization to slow down. But the West itself is hardly a monolithic bloc, given its own many internal cultural, linguistic,religious, political, and economic differences. I therefore describe Turkey as a “hybrid,” a modern and developing “semi-western” state, and argue that over time it will become ever more “socially conservative.”

2015 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 21-46
Author(s):  
Kubilay Arin

When Turkey’s Justice and Development Part (AKP) came to power in 2002, it brought a new strategy to foreign policy. Some scholars ascribed this reorientation to the rise of neo-Ottomanism, others to Islamization, and yet others to a Middle Easternization of foreign policy. All labels have one element in common: They give weight to Islam and Turkey’s imperial past as soft power assetsin the conduct of foreign policy by rejecting secular Kemalism in the country’s diplomacy. The AKP capitalized on Turgut Özal’s neo-Ottomanist foreign policy and Necmettin Erbakan’s multi-dimensional foreign policy by using Turkey’s pivotal geopolitical location to transform it into a global actor. The ongoing Islamic revival has caused the country’s attempted full westernization to slow down. But the West itself is hardly a monolithic bloc, given its own many internal cultural, linguistic,religious, political, and economic differences. I therefore describe Turkey as a “hybrid,” a modern and developing “semi-western” state, and argue that over time it will become ever more “socially conservative.”


Politeja ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (5(62)) ◽  
pp. 117-140
Author(s):  
David Darchiashvili ◽  
David Bakradze

The article views the geographical area between the EU and Russian borders as a battle space of two, drastically different foreign policy and ideological approaches. The authors argue that in the years since the end of the Cold War, a unique surrogate of former clash of liberal and communist worlds emerged, leading to and underpinning current Hybrid Warfare, underway from Ukraine to Georgia. Its roots lay in the Russian interpretation of the Western attitude towards the East as Neo-colonialist. Relying on the income from its vast energy resources, Russia also tries to develop its version of so called “Soft Power”, used by the West in this region. Though in Russian hands, it is coupled with Moscow’s imperial experiences and resentments, and is becoming a mere element in Hybrid or “non-linear” war. Speaking retrospectively, the Eastern Partnership Initiative of the European Union can be seen as a response to Hybrid threats, posed by Russia against its Western and Southern neighbors. But the question is, whether EU foreign policy initiatives towards this area can and will be efficient and sufficient, if continued to be mostly defensive and limited within Soft Power mechanisms and philosophy, while Russia successfully combines those with traditional Hard Power know-how? The authors argue that in the long run, European or Euro-Atlantic Soft Power tool-kits, spreading Human Rightsbased culture farther in the East, will remain unmatched. But in order to prevail over the Russian revisionist policy here and now, the West, and, particularly, the EU need to re-evaluate traditional foreign policy options and come up with a more drastic combination of Soft/Hard Powers by itself. As the Georgian case shows, the European community should more efficiently use Conditionality and Coercive Diplomacy, combined with clearer messages about partners’ membership perspectives.


2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 308-323
Author(s):  
Birgül Demirtaş

The perception of Turkey as a model of attractive country in the region has started to change in the recent years. In the first decade of the JDP rule Turkey was seen as an emerging power with its strong economy, improving democracy and inspiring foreign policy. However, the developments since the Arab Uprisings in the neighbourhood, Gezi movement at home, end of the Kurdish peace process, as well as coup attempt and subsequent de-democratisation harmed the soft power of Turkey. This study argues that the JDP’s understanding of democracy and democratisation has been full of flaws from the very beginning of its rule. The Turkish example shows that countries can experience subsequent processes of de-democratisation and de-democratisation if governing parties did not endogenise the basic norms of democracy. Therefore, it is argued that the reverse wave of de-democratisation characterises Turkey more than the “selective” processes of democratisation. It is also argued that JDP elite via its discourse has been constructing the West as the ‘Other’.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 93-114
Author(s):  
Sandra Baniak

Serbia inherited Yugoslavia’s tendency to pursue its foreign policy in terms of “multi-vector” policy and balancing between the West and the East to achieve its own political goals and maintain the attention of other countries. Despite the desire to join the European Union, as officially declared by the state authorities, Serbia also strives to maintain a “strategic partnership” with Russia. This paper presents Russia’s interests in the policy towards Serbia in the economic sphere over the years, starting from 1999. It points to the complexity of Serbian-Russian economic relations and their relationship with political issues. Russia, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, can significantly affect Serbia’s internal and foreign policy, making it dependent on guarding Serbia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and through the lack of recognition of Kosovo’s independence by pursuing its own interests, manifested by an increasing Russian presence in the energy sector.


2021 ◽  
Vol 54 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 128-155
Author(s):  
Salome Minesashvili

Georgia’s European identity, often regarded as the basis of its pro-Western foreign policy, has been contested in the domestic arena by alternative agendas. While government changes are usually deemed instigators of change in this contestation, no systematic analysis has been conducted on the effect of external developments. Considering that Georgia’s relations with the West and Russia have been evolving and that the debates on European identity inherently relate to foreign policy, this article asks to what extent and how contestation within the European identity discourse changes in response to different external events. To elucidate these questions, the study unpacks European identity discourse in Georgia between 2012 and 2017 in the context of various ongoing foreign policy developments. These include developments in Georgia–European Union (EU) and Georgia–Russia relations, the war in Ukraine, and internal issues of the EU. Moreover, instead of common pro- and anti-European binary positions, identity discourse is analyzed as a combination of three identity categories via media in which each category constructs different degrees of difference with Europe. This article finds that advocates of each category interpret different foreign policy developments to reinforce, rather than challenge, their positions; thus, contestation and division in the discourse persist over time.


Author(s):  
A. A. Vershinin ◽  
A. V. Korolkov

he spate of violence all over the world including the West makes us to pay attention to the factor of force in world politics. During the past decades Western countries tried to reduce the problem of force to the discussion about so-termed soft power. As a result they were not politically and morally ready to the outbreaks of the use of force in its traditional meaning. This fact to large extent explains their pained reaction to the foreign policy of the Russian Federation and the ups and downs of their politics in regard to China.


2017 ◽  
Vol 03 (01) ◽  
pp. 79-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhidin J. Shangwe

In recent years, China has embraced the idea of soft power with ever more keen interest. Today, soft power is Beijing’s key strategy in international politics, albeit not in the way the concept is understood and applied in the West. However, this strategy can hardly be said to have yielded fruit in Africa despite China’s growing visibility and presence over the last two decades. This article aims at probing this issue by examining how China’s soft power is manifested in Tanzania. In an attempt to show that soft power is not entirely a new practice in international politics, the article first applies a historical perspective to illustrate that it has been part and parcel of Chinese diplomacy, long before the term was coined by Joseph Nye in 1990. The article then analyzes Chinese activities in Tanzania and how they have shaped perceptions of Tanzanians of China in the era of globalization. These activities are structured in line with three traditional sources of soft power as postulated by Nye, namely culture, political values and foreign policy. As a supplement to Nye’s definition, however, elements of hard power are also included in the article, such as the use of economic inducements to produce, bolster and wield soft power. In general, China has made headway in its soft power ambitions by gaining positive reviews in Tanzania. While the current achievement is crucial as an initial step, there is still a long way to go for China in consolidating its soft power. Although China has earned admiration in some quarters of Tanzanian society, it is still premature to assume that in the long run Beijing will continue to enjoy increasing soft power in the country. Indeed, in some cases, such admiration only exists in verbal recognition. In the meantime, activities that damage China’s image have further complicated matters and undermined China’s soft power in Tanzania.


2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-205
Author(s):  
Mary Elizabeth Smith

This paper presents “social moves” as a new strategy de facto states can use in their interactions with the international community, with or without the possibility of a formal recognition of sovereignty. Special attention is paid to Abkhazia’s continuing desire for an independent state compared to South Ossetia’s desire for Russian absorption in light of both regions’ ethnic histories and turbulent relationships with Georgia. Key analysis includes discussion of the diplomatic soft power “social moves” the Abkhazian Foreign Ministry has begun in the last two years and the absence of similar “social moves” within the South Ossetian Foreign Ministry.


2019 ◽  
pp. 299-316
Author(s):  
C. Raja Mohan

Foreign policy has been one of the unexpected areas of focus for the Modi government. This chapter begins with a brief overview of Modi’s inheritance and principal contributions like departure from the long standing non-aligned international position of India. Modi has embraced realpolitik over moralpolitik through his emphasis on ‘India First’, and as a result, India, which was hesitant in the past to draw closer to any major power, has done so with the United States of America. In the next section, India’s engagement with major powers like the United States of America, China, Russia, Europe and Japan is analyzed, and the idea that a structural shift could be observed as India moved closer to the West is discussed. However, India’s neighborhood challenges have been accumulating, and the Modi government has not been able to transcend them. In conclusion, the Modi regime has also focused on soft power with gusto, but this has been neutralized by internal fault lines fueled by vigilante groups.


Author(s):  
Elena Belokurova

This chapter examines how dominant political and academic discourses in Russia consider global governance, the respective roles played in this picture by policies of hard and soft power, and the role played by the values, culture, and internal policies of the current Russian regime. Special attention is paid to the transformation of Russia’s relations with the West, its own Eurasian regional integration project, and other attempts to build an alternative global governance vision. Given the particularly dynamic development of Russian foreign policies, recent history of the Russian foreign policy is examined, as well as the cultural and traditional justifications provided by Russian politicians for its foreign policy.


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