Agent-based Virtue Ethics and the Problem of Action Guidance

2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liezl van Zyl
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Fundamental Problem ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
Michael Slote ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right ◽  
Action Guidance

AbstractAgent-based accounts of virtue ethics, such as the one provided by Michael Slote, base the rightness of action in the motive from which it proceeds. A frequent objection to agent-basing is that it does not allow us to draw the commonsense distinction between doing the right thing and doing it for the right reasons, that is, between act-evaluation and agent-appraisal. I defend agent-basing against this objection, but argue that a more fundamental problem for this account is its apparent failure to provide adequate argue action guidance. I then show that this problem can be solved by supplementing an agent-based criterion of right action with a hypothetical-agent criterion of action guidance.

scholarly journals Eudaimonism about Virtue and Qualified Agent Right Action: Some Prospects for Environmental Virtue Ethics

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Duncan Christian Martin
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Environmental Ethics ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Environmental Virtue ◽  
Concrete Action ◽  
Environmental Virtue Ethics ◽  
The Right ◽  
Action Guidance

<p>In this thesis, I aim to show that virtue oriented approaches to environmental ethics are in a position to provide satisfying answers to two central ethical questions: “What kind of person should I be?”, and “What should I do?” I argue that two such approaches – Rosalind Hursthouse’s environmental virtue ethics and Philip Cafaro’s account of environmental vice – provide insights about how we ought to be with regard to the environment, in terms of character and attitudes. I then defend Hursthouse’s account of right action against several objections. First, I respond to the worry that a shortage of environmental exemplars might count against Hursthouse, by showing that non-virtuous agents can conceive of what to do by seeking to avoid acting from environmental vices. Second, I respond the worry that her account of right action fails to generate the right result for non-virtuous agents in some cases, by showing that such cases can be accounted for by appeal to the distinction between action guidance and action assessment. Third, I consider the worry that her theory will fail to provide concrete action guidance. Theories which seek to provide concrete action guidance in all contexts face serious problems of their own, I respond. Further, I maintain that Hursthouse is not ruled out from providing the sort of action guidance her critics are interested in.</p>

scholarly journals Eudaimonism about Virtue and Qualified Agent Right Action: Some Prospects for Environmental Virtue Ethics

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Duncan Christian Martin
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Environmental Ethics ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Environmental Virtue ◽  
Concrete Action ◽  
Environmental Virtue Ethics ◽  
The Right ◽  
Action Guidance

<p>In this thesis, I aim to show that virtue oriented approaches to environmental ethics are in a position to provide satisfying answers to two central ethical questions: “What kind of person should I be?”, and “What should I do?” I argue that two such approaches – Rosalind Hursthouse’s environmental virtue ethics and Philip Cafaro’s account of environmental vice – provide insights about how we ought to be with regard to the environment, in terms of character and attitudes. I then defend Hursthouse’s account of right action against several objections. First, I respond to the worry that a shortage of environmental exemplars might count against Hursthouse, by showing that non-virtuous agents can conceive of what to do by seeking to avoid acting from environmental vices. Second, I respond the worry that her account of right action fails to generate the right result for non-virtuous agents in some cases, by showing that such cases can be accounted for by appeal to the distinction between action guidance and action assessment. Third, I consider the worry that her theory will fail to provide concrete action guidance. Theories which seek to provide concrete action guidance in all contexts face serious problems of their own, I respond. Further, I maintain that Hursthouse is not ruled out from providing the sort of action guidance her critics are interested in.</p>

Would a Virtuous Person Grandstand?

Grandstanding ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 119-138
Author(s):  
Justin Tosi ◽  
Brandon Warmke
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Character Trait ◽  
General Character ◽  
Virtuous Person ◽  
Will To Power ◽  
Slave Revolt ◽  
Right Reason ◽  
Moral Talk ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right

This chapter discusses moral grandstanding from the standpoint of virtue ethics. Three common approaches to virtue ethics are considered. A virtuous person would not grandstand according to the classical conception of virtue, on which virtue is doing the right thing for the right reason. People would be disappointed if they found out that a widely admired, historic speech turned out to be grandstanding. Vanity, the general character trait most closely associated with grandstanding, is not plausibly a virtue according to virtue consequentialism. Finally, grandstanding is an abuse of morality, like the one Nietzsche labels the slave revolt in morals, as grandstanders use moral talk as an underhanded shortcut to satisfy their will to power.

Consequentialism, Virtue, and Character

2020 ◽  
pp. 462-473
Author(s):  
Julia Driver
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Evaluation ◽  
Virtuous Person ◽  
Right Action ◽  
The Right ◽  
Do So

This essay argues that consequentialist theories can both accommodate virtue evaluation, and, indeed, the most plausible versions must do so, and that consequentialist theories can also be structured as forms of virtue ethics. Different strategies available to the consequentialist are presented and criticized, including indirect strategies which argue that the right action is the action that the virtuous person would perform. The best way for the consequentialist to approach virtue is as another form of moral evaluation understood in consequentialist terms which is distinct from consequentialist act evaluation; that is, evaluating action is only one part of an overarching consequentialist account of moral evaluation, and the theory can also be applied to dispositions, motives, intentions, etc.

scholarly journals Overdemanding Consequentialism? An Experimental Approach

Utilitas ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 250-275 ◽  
Author(s):  
MARTIN BRUDER ◽  
ATTILA TANYI
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Experimental Approach ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Normative Significance ◽  
Act Consequentialism ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right

According to act-consequentialism the right action is the one that produces the best results as judged from an impersonal perspective. Some claim that this requirement is unreasonably demanding and therefore consequentialism is unacceptable as a moral theory. The article breaks with dominant trends in discussing this so-called Overdemandingness Objection. Instead of focusing on theoretical responses, it empirically investigates whether there exists a widely shared intuition that consequentialist demands are unreasonable. This discussion takes the form of examining what people think about the normative significance of consequentialist requirements. In two experiments, the article finds that although people are sensitive to consequentialist requirements and, on average, find more extreme demands less reasonable, the level of disagreement with consequentialism falls short of qualifying as a widely shared intuition, even when demands are the highest. The article then ends with a general discussion of possible objections to its methods and its findings.

Bhagavad-Gita and Bhakti-yoga

Hinduism ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shyam Ranganathan
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
South Asian ◽  
Social Practice ◽  
The South ◽  
Bhagavad Gita ◽  
Right Action ◽  
Good Outcome ◽  
The Right ◽  
Bhagavad Gītā ◽  
Children And War

Disagreements about ethics, morality, or dharma (as described in the South Asian tradition) are disagreements about the right or the good. There are four basic theories. The teleological options are Virtue Ethics (the Good character causes the Right action), and Consequentialism (the Good outcome justifies the Right action). These options are teleological because they prioritize the Good (the end) over the Right (the means). The commonly known procedural option that prioritizes the Right over the Good is Deontology (the Right considerations justify the Good action). However there is a fourth option unique to the South Asian tradition that is also procedural. This is Bhakti/Yoga (the right action which consists in devotion to the procedural ideal of the Right—the Lord/Sovereignty—causes a Good outcome, namely the perfection of this devotion). This is a theory defended systematically (likely for the first time) in Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtra (YS). There the procedural ideal of being a person, Sovereignty (Īśvara), is defined by the traits of being untouched by past choices (karma) and unimpeded (without afflictions or kleśa-s) (YS I.23–25): and this is approximated by the practice of Unconservativism (Tapas) and Self-Governance (Svādhyāya) (YS II.1). The theory is also explored dialectically in the great Sanskrit epic, the Mahābhārata, and especially in its chapter 18, the Bhagavad Gītā (Gītā). Here Arjuna (the protagonist) is faced with the prospects of a fratricidal war and articulates three reasons to avoid the conflict. Consequentialism: if he were to fight the war, it would result in sorrowful outcomes for all concerned (Gītā 1.34–36). Virtue Ethics: though the enemy is evil, fighting would render him (Arjuna) no better than the opponent rendering it the wrong, virtue destroying choice (Gītā 1.38–39). Deontology: war undermines good social practice that, among other things, protects women and children, and war, hence, constitutes a wrong consideration in justifying practice (Gītā 1.41). The three approaches to ethics share a commonality: they define Right action in some way by way of the Good, and they constitute Conventional Morality, which gives rise to Moral Parasites (those who wish others to be bound by Conventional Moral expectations, but do not intend to do so themselves). In response, Krishna, who is Arjuna’s charioteer, teaches Arjuna two procedural responses that prioritize the Right over the Good: karma yoga, a form of Deontology that emphasizes the rightness of duty, and bhakti yoga, known as “Īśvara Praṇidhāna” in the Yoga Sūtra. Yoga/Bhakti is unique among the four ethical theories in defining the right by way of the procedural ideal (Īśvara), and not the Good. This allows Yoga/Bhakti to play an instrumental role in resetting the moral order, by abandoning Conventional Morality. Krishna as the figure of Īśvara in the Mahābhārata subsequently leads Arjuna and his brothers (the Pāṇḍava) to victory over Moral Parasites (the Kauravas). Conventional approaches to bhakti that interpret it by way of familiar beliefs of the Western tradition (such as Theism, a version of Virtue Ethics) do not reveal the philosophical controversies that motivate Bhakti/Yoga or its contribution to philosophy.

Can Virtue Ethics Account for Supererogation?

2015 ◽  
Vol 77 ◽  
pp. 25-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Heyd
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
Classical Utilitarianism ◽  
Vast Literature ◽  
The Face ◽  
The One ◽  
Better Than ◽  
Supererogatory Action

In his classical article, ‘Saints and Heroes’, James Urmson single-handedly revived the idea of supererogation from it astonishingly long post-Reformation slumber. During the first two decades after its publication, Urmson's challenge was taken up almost exclusively by either utilitarians or deontologists of some sort. On the face of it, neither classical utilitarianism nor Kant's categorical imperative makes room for action which is better than the maximizing requirement, on the one hand, or beyond the requirement of duty, on the other. Nevertheless, both utilitarians and Kantians, as well as deontic logicians, offered more flexible and sophisticated versions of their respective theories which could accommodate supererogatory action. In my 1982 book on supererogation I tried to address the question whether virtue ethics could capture that new category of actions which are praiseworthy though not strictly required. But the focus of my discussion was mostly Aristotle (and Seneca) and accordingly more interpretive in nature. However, that was just before the tremendous surge of interest in virtue ethics and the vast literature debating the merits of agent-based vs. action-based approaches in moral theory. It turned out that fitting supererogation into virtue-based moral theory proved to be a more difficult task than doing so in consequentialist and deontological theories. Some argued that supererogation could nevertheless be accounted for in aretaic terms; others held that it could not and that this fact attested to either a theoretical weakness – even if not a refutation – of virtue-based ethics, or to the incoherence of the concept of supererogation.

Mechanisms of Resource Curse and Economic Policy

2007 ◽  
pp. 4-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Polterovich ◽  
V. Popov ◽  
A. Tonis
Keyword(s):  
Real Exchange Rates ◽  
Resource Curse ◽  
Budget Deficits ◽  
Resource Abundance ◽  
Fuel Prices ◽  
Use Of Resources ◽  
Resource Wealth ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right ◽  
Rich Countries

This paper compares various mechanisms of resource curse leading to a potentially inefficient use of resources; it is demonstrated that each of these mechanisms is associated with market imperfections and can be "corrected" with appropriate government policies. Empirical evidence seems to suggest that resource abundant countries have on average lower budget deficits and inflation, and higher foreign exchange reserves. Besides, lower domestic fuel prices that are typical for resource rich countries have a positive effect on long-term growth even though they are associated with losses resulting from higher energy consumption. On top of that resource abundance allows to reduce income inequalities. So, on the one hand, resource wealth turns out to be conducive to growth, especially in countries with strong institutions. However, on the other hand, resource abundance leads to corruption of institutions and to overvalued real exchange rates. On balance, there is no solid evidence that resource abundant countries grow more slowly than the others, but there is evidence that they grow more slowly than could have grown with the right policies and institutions.

Challenges of Media Education Standards in Georgia

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marine Vekua
Keyword(s):  
Working Conditions ◽  
Teaching Methods ◽  
International Standards ◽  
The Other ◽  
Historical Background ◽  
Journalism Education ◽  
Education Standards ◽  
Modern Media ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right

The main goal of this research is to determine whether the journalism education of the leading media schools inGeorgia is adequate to modern media market’s demands and challenges. The right answer to this main questionwas found after analyzing Georgian media market’s demands, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, differentaspects of journalism education in Georgia: the historical background, development trends, evaluation ofeducational programs and curricula designs, reflection of international standards in teaching methods, studyingand working conditions.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document